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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
I. Introduction 
  
1. After stabilizing the economy, Pakistan has realized strong economic growth and reduced 
poverty. Economic growth accelerated from 4.8 percent in 2002/03, 6.4 percent in 2003/04, and 8.4 
percent in 2004/05, to 6.6 percent in 2005/06. Poverty rates have declined in response, from about 33 
percent of households in 2002/02 to 24-29 percent in 2004/05, depending on choice of deflator.  
 
2. The resurgence of the economy provides the opportunity and the fiscal space to focus on 
protecting the poor and vulnerable. Although economic growth is the main vehicle for poverty 
reduction, international evidence suggests that not all groups benefit equally or immediately from growth. 
Poor and non-poor alike also remain vulnerable to individual level risks such as health, disability and 
unemployment, and to community-wide shocks such as natural disasters. Recent economic growth in 
Pakistan (and the South Asian region as a whole), has been accompanied by growing inequality and has 
not provided immunity from shocks. The earthquake, which struck the northern parts of the country on 
October 8, 2005, as well as a series of droughts in previous years, have demonstrated the vulnerability of 
the country to natural disasters and placed vulnerability center-stage as a major policy concern.  
 
3. Well-designed social protection policies and programs can complement growth by 
promoting equity and facilitating risk management. There are two main social protection instruments 
(i) safety net (or social assistance) programs such as income support (cash transfers, conditional cash 
transfers, workfare), and social welfare services (e.g., community-based rehabilitation); and (ii) social 
security programs, financed mainly by individual contributions, that help protect individuals (poor and 
non poor alike) against loss of income due to old age, disability, sickness, or unemployment, and thereby 
avoid falling into poverty.1 The mix of programs chosen by any particular country depends on country 
specific circumstances, including level of income and administrative capacity. 
 
4. The government’s poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) has recognized the vital role of social 
protection programs as its fourth pillar. The strategy document recognizes the importance of social 
protection to complement growth. It acknowledged that the efficiency of social protection programs being 
implemented in Pakistan was not well known and called for an in-depth study that would evaluate the 
ability of these programs to protect the poor and provide options for improving their effectiveness. 
 
5. At the request of the Government of Pakistan, this report evaluates the country’s social 
protection system and suggests improvements in their ability to protect the poor. Specifically, the 
study (i) presents a poverty and vulnerability profile to identify the main challenges to be addressed by 
social protection (Chapter 2); (ii) reviews programs, paying attention to their capacity to address these 
challenges (Chapter 3); and (iii) proposes a policy agenda for a more efficient and effective social 
protection system in Pakistan (Chapter 4). A brief introductory chapter (Chapter 1) precedes the main 
chapters of the report.  
 
                                                 
1
 World Bank (2005j) and World Bank (2002b). 
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6. The report is the result of an inter-institutional collaborative effort between the 
Government of Pakistan, civil society, and international donors. A social protection steering 
committee, comprised of the above stakeholders, oversaw the report’s preparation, including surveys, and 
vetted initial findings. The Planning Commission and the Steering Committee hosted several workshops 
in which initial findings of the report were discussed with a broad range of stakeholders. The initial 
findings and diagnostics have also helped inform the new (draft final) national social protection strategy. 
The report draws on existing knowledge and original work, and is based on administrative and survey 
data2, including a new special-purpose safety net survey, commissioned specifically for the report and 
conducted under the guidance of the Steering Committee for Social Protection. This survey, referred to in 
the text as the Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS) has two parts. The first part, referred to as PSNS (I) in 
the report, is a nationally representative data set that includes information on the coverage of safety net 
programs, while the second part of the survey, PSNS II, is based on a purposive sample, representative of 
safety net recipients and applicants (actual and potential), and provides information, inter alia, on 
program delivery as well as shocks and coping strategies for this specific household group (see Appendix 
1 for details).  
 
7. This report finds that while Pakistan implements a wide array of social protection 
programs, the effectiveness of these programs could be significantly improved. The report finds that 
social protection programs in Pakistan face important constraints in terms of coverage, targeting, and 
implementation, and inability to respond to vulnerability, which will need to be overcome in order that 
they can more effectively protect the poor. The report suggests a two-pronged approach for social 
protection reform: (i) improving the ability of safety net programs to reach the poor, promote exit from 
poverty, and respond to natural disasters; coupled with (ii) a longer term approach for strengthening social 
security. Considering social protection as a system rather than a collection of different programs would 
allow the government to curtail fragmentation, improve the quality of social protection spending, and 
have higher impact. Given fiscal constraints, the report suggests that coverage expansion first exploits the 
opportunity for efficiency improvements in current programs, through better targeting and reduction in 
duplication and overlap. However, the decline in real spending on the two main safety net programs is 
worrisome.3 It is therefore welcome that the government is considering how best to ensure adequate yet 
fiscally affordable spending on safety nets as part of its draft social protection strategy. A well-designed 
and -implemented system would allow the Government, consistent with its Poverty Reduction Strategy, to 
promote growth that would be underpinned with greater equity and security against risks. 
 
8. The remaining sections summarize the main findings and conclusions of the report. 
 
II. Identifying the neediest and most at risk: a profile of poverty and vulnerability 
 
9. As noted above, poverty has declined sharply in Pakistan, but a considerable agenda in 
addressing poverty and vulnerability still remains. Poverty still affects over a quarter of the county’s 
population, and vulnerability estimates suggest that many more households, approximately 56 percent of 
the population were vulnerable to remain or fall into poverty within a two-year horizon (2002/02 PIHS 
data). Half of this burden stems from vulnerability to chronic poverty (i.e., low consumption), while the 
other half is associated with vulnerability to transient poverty (i.e., exposure to risk and variation in 
consumption levels). Poverty and vulnerability levels are highest among rural households, particularly 
                                                 
2
 The main surveys used include: (a) Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS - 2001/02 and other years) and 
Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM – 2004/05), both of which are nationally representative; 
and (b) the Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS) in which part I is nationally representative while part II is 
representative of safety net beneficiaries and applicants.  
3
 Spending on the two main safety net programs, Bait-ul-Mal and Zakat, declined from 0.4 percent of GDP in 1991-
92 to 0.15 percent of GDP in 2004/05 and 0.14 percent of GDP in 2005/06. 
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those employed in the agricultural sector or those with no access to land or other productive assets, and 
among large households and children. They are also positively correlated with low human capital, making 
the low level and high inequality of health, nutrition, and education outcomes in Pakistan particularly 
worrisome as they contribute to perpetuate intergenerational poverty. Thus, in addressing welfare, it is 
useful to factor in both poverty and vulnerability to poverty. 
Figure 1: Shocks faced by safety net recipients and applicants 
 
Source: Safety net survey (PSNS II) 
 
10. What kinds of shocks affect Pakistani households? A special survey of safety net 
recipient/applicant households4 found that nearly two-thirds of respondents (about 80 percent of whom 
were poor) suffered from one or more major shocks in three years before the survey. While this survey 
was not nationally representative it gives an indication of the shocks that potentially affect Pakistani 
households. Specifically, over half of all shocks to this group (58 percent) were caused by individual 
specific factors, mainly health (e.g., death, sickness, disability) or family matters (Figure 1). The 
remaining (42 percent) shocks were community specific: natural calamities including drought (30 
percent), economic shocks (10 percent) and law and order (2 percent).  
 
11. Shocks impose major costs on both poor and non-poor among surveyed households. Survey 
respondents, especially the poorest, face considerable shock-related losses and expenses. Conditional on a 
shock, losses and expenses due to shocks represent 54 percent of annual consumption for ultra-poor 
respondent households compared to 27 percent for near poor households and 18 percent for non-poor 
households. These figures suggest that the potential impact of shocks can be devastating both in the short 
and the long term. 
 
12. Surveyed households employed several strategies to cope with risks. Households rely largely 
on asset-based strategies (using savings/assets—28 percent, or credit—25 percent) and less on behavioral 
                                                 
4
 These results presented in paragraphs 10-14 are derived from PSNS II, a representative sample of safety net 
recipients/applicants, and not nationally representative. The sample is predominantly poor. Over half of the sampled 
households (54 percent) are ultra poor (those with consumption below the food poverty line), about a quarter (23 
percent) are poor (between the food and national poverty lines), while the remaining were non-poor. (See Appendix 
1 for a detailed discussion of the sample). 
Most serious crises and shocks over past three years
Natural calamities
7%
Agricultural shocks
4%
Economic shocks
28%
Family matters
4%
Health shocks
54%
Law and order
3%
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strategies (decreasing consumption—1 percent, increasing labor supply, or relying on public and private 
assistance—10 percent) to cope with shocks. A surprisingly large share of households (25 percent) are 
inactive or ‘do nothing’ in the face of shocks. Use of asset-based strategies is more common under law 
and order shocks. In contrast, increased labor supply is used more often for family-related shocks, with 
both strategies important for health shocks. More informal strategies—using savings, shopkeeper credit, 
help from friends and relatives—are more common for less costly shocks. More formal strategies—
selling major assets, borrowing from a moneylender, requesting government assistance—are used for 
more costly shocks, where more resources are needed.  
 
13. Inefficient risk coping strategies sometimes lead these households into deeper poverty. 
Looking among the poor and non-poor among this specific sample of households, the non-poor, with 
likely greater access to markets, are more likely to use asset-based strategies while the poor are more 
likely to use behavior-based strategies. Because there are limits to the effectiveness of behavior-based 
strategies (e.g., consumption levels can only be reduced so much without falling into starvation and labor 
supply increases are similarly capped), these differences have important short- and medium-term 
implications, particularly among households with low pre-shock consumption and market access. As a 
result, these households were forced into situations that lead them deeper into poverty. For example, 33 
percent lowered their food intake, 10 percent put a child to work, and 8 percent pulled a child out of 
school in response to the shock. These percentages were higher for more costly shocks and among ultra-
poor households. The short-term effectiveness of coping strategies depends on the type of shock, but 
appears limited. Approximately 43 percent of those reporting a shock declared that they had not recovered 
from it at the time of the survey, compared to 20 percent who declared to have fully recovered. The share 
of those who had not yet recovered increases with the estimated cost of the shock, and is significantly 
higher for health shocks. 
 
14. The ineffectiveness of informal risk coping mechanisms for these households suggests that 
social protection programs should focus on both poverty and risk management. An effective social 
protection system would have to: (i) provide (minimum) income and other support for those with a small 
probability of exiting poverty, the chronic poor; (ii) implement mechanisms to exit poverty through 
access to economic opportunities and human capital; (iii) be risk responsive—high exposure to risk and 
high vulnerability require the safety net system to react quickly to shocks; and (iv) support risk mitigation 
to help households smooth income. Thus, programs must be capable of deploying assistance at short 
notice and expand and contract their beneficiary base as needs change.  
 
III. Fighting risk and vulnerability: Pakistan’s social protection system 
 
15. Pakistan has many social protection programs ranging from cash transfers to pensions 
(Table 1). The country’s social assistance includes two main federal cash transfer programs (Zakat and 
Bait-ul-Mal) and small scattered programs that provide social welfare and care services to persons with 
disabilities, child laborers, and others. Micro finance programs aim to give the poor access to credit. 
Although Pakistan has earlier implemented public works/workfare programs, no large workfare program 
is currently in place. To address aggregate economic (price) shocks, Pakistan implements a wheat subsidy 
program (there are also high expenditures on subsidies for power, water, gas, and fertilizer, which fall 
outside the scope of this report). Although no permanent program is in place to help individuals cope with 
aggregate disasters, Pakistan has used a combination of cash transfers, housing and social care services 
programs to help those affected by the 2005 earthquake. Pakistan’s social security system offers pension 
(old age, survivor and disability) benefits to formal sector workers. Public sector workers are provided 
civil service pensions, while private sector workers have access to pensions from the Employees Old Age 
Benefits (EOBI), but also provincially based pension and non-pension programs such as the Workers 
Welfare Fund (WWF) and the Employees’ Social Security Institutions (ESSI). 
 v
 
Table 1: Spending and beneficiaries of main social protection programs (2003/04) 
Expendi-
tures 
Share of 
GDP D 
Share of total 
SP budget 
  
(Rs. billion) (%)  (%) 
Source of 
funding 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
SAFETY NETS      
Income support and basic 
services 
     
Private  Zakat (guzara and other) 5.9 0.10 11.3 
(Zakat levy) 
1.6 mn A 
(guzara: 0.8 mn) 
 Bait-ul-Mal C 2.5 0.05 4.9 Federal budget 1.25 mn A 
 Social welfare services 0.5 0.009 1.0 Federal budget N.A. 
Exit Policies       
 Human capital 
accumulation--Tawana 
0.7 0.012 1.3 Federal budget 530,000 A 
Coping with Aggregate 
Risks 
     
 Wheat subsidy 8 0.14 15.4 Federal and 
provincial budgets 
N.A. 
TOTAL safety nets 17.6 0.31 33.9   
SOCIAL SECURITY     
Public sector      
 Civil service pension 
schemes (excl. military 
pensions)E 
28.0 0.50 53.8 Federal and 
provincial budgets 
0.8 mn retirees / 1.96 
mn active workers 
Private sector      
Workers Welfare Fund 
(WWF) 
2.6 0.046 5.0 Private sector 
employers 
N.A. 
 Employees’ Social Security 
Institutions (ESSI) 
2.1 0.037 4.0 Private sector 
employers 
850,000 B 
TOTAL social security 34.4 0.61 66.1     
TOTAL 52.0 0.92 100.0     
Sources: Issues and Policies Consultants (2004); World Bank (2006a); and information from program managers. 
N.A. Not available 
A
 Number of beneficiaries of recurrent cash and non-cash benefits. B Number of workers covered by insurance scheme. C 
Budget of Bait-ul-Mal has since been increased to Rs. 4.5 billion (0.08% of GDP) and the number of beneficiaries of 
FSP, its largest program, to 1.45 mn. D Based on revised estimate of GDP (at current market prices) for 2003/04 of Rs. 
5,641 mn. E Including military pensions would raise spending to Rs. 60 billion (1.07% of GDP), and beneficiaries to 1.9 
mn retirees and 2.9 mn active workers. Total SP spending including military would then be around 1.4% of GDP. 
(Spending on Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal constitutes 0.14 percent of GDP in 2004/05) 
 
16. These programs are fragmented and duplicative. For example, the country has two cash 
transfer systems with different modes of financing and delivery, but with similar objectives. Both 
programs offer (sometimes overlapping) non-cash benefits. Similarly, overlapping social security 
programs exist at federal and provincial level, to provide insurance coverage. These programs also 
provide stipends and training and in some cases even run their own health and education facilities, 
duplicating other public systems.  
 vi
 
17. Aggregate social protection expenditures are low and declining, and biased toward social 
security. The country spends around 1.4 percent of GDP on social protection (comprising safety net, 
pension, and other social security spending, lower than in neighboring countries (compared to 4.7 percent 
in India and 3.1 percent in Sri Lanka).5 Some 80 percent of Pakistan’s social protection expenditures are 
devoted to pensions and social security, which often benefit the non-poor and those in formal jobs, while 
only 20 percent of social protection spending and 0.3 percent of GDP is spent on safety nets, much lower 
than other countries in the region.6 Safety net spending on the two main safety net programs (Zakat and 
Bait-ul-Mal) has declined sharply, from 0.4 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to less than half of this level, or 
0.14 percent of GDP in 2004/05. Further, safety net expenditures have also decreased as a share of total 
PRSP expenditures in recent years. For example, among the budget lines listed as PRSP, or pro-poor, 
expenditures, those that pertain to social protection (food subsidies, Bait-ul-Mal, Tawana school meals, 
social security, and low cost housing) fell from 7.2 to 3.3 percent of total PRSP spending between 
2002/02 and 2005/06, as spending on other social sector programs increased.  
 
A. Safety net programs  
 
18. The safety net system has the objective of helping the poor cope with poverty and risks. The 
main programs in Pakistan are cash transfers, programs to help the poor exit poverty in the short or long 
term (conditional cash transfer pilots, microfinance and public works), social welfare and care services, 
and programs to help individuals cope with aggregate shocks (wheat subsidy and the recent earthquake 
relief effort). These programs face particular issues in reaching the poor and vulnerable: 
 
Cash transfers 
 
19. Pakistan offers income support through two cash transfer programs, Zakat and Bait-ul-
Mal. Although both programs have similar aims and target populations, these programs have different 
histories, operations, and funding. Zakat is based entirely on contributions (currently voluntary but earlier 
mandatory) from wealthy individuals and uses community structures to deliver benefits. In contrast Bait-
ul-Mal (PBM), introduced in the early 1990s, is funded and administered by the government. The primary 
objective of both programs is to provide cash transfers, but, as noted above, these programs also offer 
other (often duplicate) benefits such as stipends and training. 
 
20. As resources are limited and spread thin across overlapping programs, coverage is low. 
Contributions to Zakat have declined significantly, from 0.3 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 0.08 percent 
in 2002/03, as more people opted out by either withdrawing funds before the day that Zakat is levied or 
by filing a declaration of exemption, leading to concomitant declines in expenditures on Zakat programs. 
Assuming these trends prevail in the future, Zakat is set to become a very small program in a few years 
once reserves are exhausted. Fiscal allocations for Bait-ul-Mal have increased, but not enough to 
compensate for the decline in Zakat. The two programs together cover two million households or 8 
percent of the population with cash transfers; in contrast, some 8 million households are vulnerable to 
chronic poverty. Coverage levels are low when compared to other countries—Oportunidades in Mexico 
pays out transfers to 20 percent of the population (generally the poor), India’s PDS system covers 37 
percent of the population, while Sri Lanka’s Samurdhi reaches 40 percent of the population (often not the 
poorest).7 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted that the level of spending is not necessarily an indicator of the success of safety net programs. In 
both countries, program expenditures suffer from exclusion errors (many poor not covered) and inclusion errors 
(many non-poor covered).  
6
 This excluded hidden implicit fiscal liabilities of the pension fund (estimated at 25 percent of GDP). 
7
 These results are derived from PSNS (I), a nationally representative survey. 
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21. Benefit levels are small and with infrequent and irregular payments. For instance, the 
amount received by the average Zakat guzara cash transfer beneficiary during the 12 months before the 
survey was equivalent to 5-6 monthly installments, rather than the stipulated 12, and payments occurred 
with 6-8 months interval. Similarly, Bait-ul-Mal’s Food Support Program benefits are paid on a bi-annual 
basis and there is a standing proposal to cut this further to one annual installment. Even though small 
benefit amounts may justify some clustering of payments to minimize transaction costs, clustering 
undermines the extent to which the program contributes to consumption smoothing.8 
 
22. Benefit delivery systems are weak with negative impact on program efficiency. Major issues 
with Zakat and PBM’s service concern the long response time for payment activation after program 
registration, the costs associated with cashing program benefits and the irregularity and lumpiness of 
benefit payments. While 20 percent of all applicants received their first payment within a month of 
application, 50 percent had to wait 1-6 months and 8 percent had waited more than a year. One in ten 
households had difficulty getting their funds. Beneficiaries on average made 1.6 visits to the payment 
center to obtain funds; one in twenty had to go three times or more. Moreover, one in ten beneficiaries 
declared to have paid a bribe to get their benefit at some point, with bribes averaging 10 percent of the 
transfer. Finally, beneficiaries complain about small, lumpy, and infrequent installments. Even so, all said 
and done, program beneficiaries found the transfers useful in providing some poverty relief.  
 
23. Although both Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal display elements of pro-poor targeting, they could 
still perform better. The current fiscal allocation to cash transfer programs could be more efficient in 
covering the poor if program expenditures were better targeted. A sizeable share of benefits reaches the 
non-poor (inclusion errors), while many of the rejected applicants are poor (inclusion errors). Nearly 46 
percent of total benefit expenditures of Bait-ul-Mal reach the poorest 40 percent of the population, while 
43 percent of total Zakat expenditures reach the same population group.9 This performance could be 
improved. For example, 80 percent of expenditures on conditional cash transfers reach the bottom 40 
percent of the population in Honduras; 62 percent of total expenditures reach this group in Mexico; and 
almost 50 percent of Food for Education resources go to the bottom 40 percent in Bangladesh.  
 
24. Weak governance and lack of transparent eligibility conditions reduce targeting 
effectiveness. The main reasons behind poor targeting include (i) the lack of an objective targeting 
instrument: Both Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal target the ‘deserving needy’ and poor, but no objective targeting 
tool is used; (ii) the lack of an operational definition of poverty or targeting mechanism, that (iii) leave 
eligibility decisions in the hands of the chairmen and members of the local Zakat committees or of local 
authorities in the case of Bait-ul-Mal; and (iv) systematic differences in program access and eligibility 
which favor the non-poor—programs tend to be located in better off localities and benefits to increase 
with household income. 
 
25. Not surprisingly, these programs have little impact on poverty of recipient households. 
Zakat guzara transfers and rehabilitation grants represent 14 and 23 percent of average recipient 
household income, respectively. Similarly, PBM’s Food Support benefits are equivalent to 11 percent of 
household income among the ultra-poor, and to 8 and 5 percent among the poor and the non-poor 
respectively. In comparison, conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico and Nicaragua provide 21 
percent of average household consumption. Given the small size of program benefits and non-poor 
targeting in Pakistan, poverty and inequality decline only slightly in response to transfers. 
                                                 
8
 Results in paragraphs 21-22, 24-25 are derived from PSNS II, a survey of safety net recipients/applicants. 
9
 This result in is derived from PSNS I, a nationally representative survey.  
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Programs for exiting poverty 
 
26. Pakistan is implementing several pilot safety net programs that aim to improve human 
development outcomes for poor children, thereby eliminating the inter-generational link to poverty. 
Globally, there is a trend for cash transfer programs to include incentives to help poor children acquire 
human capital and avoid inter-generational poverty. These conditional cash transfers have successfully 
increased enrollment, improved health outcomes and reduced child labor10. Pakistan is also experimenting 
with these programs: (i) provincial stipend programs, including the Punjab Secondary School Stipend 
Program targeted to girls; (ii) Bait-ul-Mal’s Child Support Program, a pilot conditional cash transfer 
program targeted to the poorest households; (iii) a school meals program (Tawana) that aims to improve 
nutrition and education of poor girls in rural areas; and (iv) a cash transfer program that targets 
improvement of health status (TB) alone. These programs all have program evaluations in place that will 
allow the government to gauge how programs impact educational and health outcomes of target groups. 
 
27. For the working poor, microfinance programs provide opportunities to the poor to exit 
poverty, but program coverage in Pakistan is amongst the lowest in the region. Microfinance is 
offered through the banking sector (Khushali Bank) and NGOs (such as Rural Support Programs —
RSPs). Pakistan has the lowest penetration of microfinance in South Asia with less than 2 percent of poor 
households covered. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, over 60 percent of the poor are microfinance clients 
and this share is 9 and 14 percent in India and Nepal, respectively. However, the impact of microfinance 
on those who receive them is positive. The slow growth of microfinance in Pakistan is caused in part by 
the lack of a solid and profitable core business, relying on subsidized donor funds rather than profitability 
(Rasmussen, 2005).  
 
28.  In the past, Pakistan has implemented workfare programs to build infrastructure and offer 
temporary employment to the poor, but no major program currently exists. Past programs include 
workfare for Afghan refugees and the Khushal Pakistan Program, though their overall impact on poverty 
reduction is not known. Currently, no public works program exists to target the poor through low wages 
or conditions on public works contracts to employ local labor.  
 
Social welfare and care services  
 
29. Social welfare and care services are fragmented with low budgets, and their effectiveness is 
not well known. The poor need only cash transfers, but also need services to improve their welfare, e.g., 
rehabilitation services for the disabled. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education has been 
active in designing and providing several types of social welfare and care services programs for 
vulnerable groups such as working children, vulnerable women, and the disabled. The programs are 
publicly financed and administered by the federal government in some instances (e.g., special education 
schools for children with disabilities; PBM child labor or vocational training centers); provincial 
governments (beggar and drug addict homes; Punjab Child Protection Bureau); and districts (district 
social welfare offices). The delivery of services faces several issues: (i) Programs are fragmented and no 
over-arching framework for service provision to vulnerable groups exists. (ii) Public financing of social 
welfare and care services is low compared to needs (3 percent of social assistance spending), resulting in 
deficient coverage. Low budgets coupled with program fragmentation lead to poor coverage and weak 
administrative capacity to deliver and monitor services. (iii) The public sector remains focused on service 
delivery instead of policy development, setting service standards, regulation, and supervision. Finally, (iv) 
private provision of services by NGOs to vulnerable groups exists, but also with small coverage. The 
                                                 
10
 See Chapter 3. Evidence on health outcomes is mainly from the evaluation of Mexico’s 
Progressa/Opportunidades program. 
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Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education is aware of these issues and has announced its intention 
to strengthen service provision to special vulnerable groups.  
 
Programs for coping with aggregate shocks  
 
30. The government regularly intervenes in the wheat market through a subsidy with the 
understanding that wheat is a major staple for Pakistani households, and therefore changes in wheat 
prices directly impact welfare, particularly of poor consumers and producers, but at significant economic 
and fiscal costs. Since resell prices are not high enough to cover payments to producers and storage and 
handling costs, the government incurs significant fiscal expenses. Over the last 10 years, annual wheat 
subsidy costs have averaged around Rs. 6 billion, with the subsidy fluctuating from 0.1 to 0.5 percent of 
GDP. About a third of the subsidy accrues to millers to cover the difference between the guaranteed 
purchase and resale prices, and the other two-thirds finance inefficient government grain procurement and 
handling procedures. Aside from creating distortions in wheat prices, and although more in-depth analysis 
is needed, preliminary evidence seems to suggest that the current system favors millers and the non-poor 
(Dorosh, 2004). The ability of the program to help the poor cope with wheat price shocks is therefore 
small. 
 
31. The recent earthquake exposed the gap in the ability of the government to cope with natural 
disasters. Since no safety net structure existed that could be rolled out quickly, interventions had to be 
designed from scratch. The final relief package combined short-term income support (cash support) with 
long-term aid for reconstruction (housing). Community-based rehabilitation services anchored in four 
resource and information centers for persons with disabilities in the earthquake-affected areas are planned 
to complement this program. Following the earthquake, the government has developed the National 
Strategy and Plan of Action for Vulnerable Populations in Earthquake Affected Areas and the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and the Earthquake Rehabilitation Agency has approved its draft social protection 
strategy.  
 
B. Social security programs  
 
32. Safety nets address chronic poverty ex post, once it occurs. Social security programs—
insurance and long-term savings—in contrast, offer ex-ante protection and prevent households 
from falling into poverty.  
 
33. Pakistan implements several pension schemes providing pensions—benefits against old age, 
disability, and survivorship—but also social benefits and services. Civil service pensions for the 
public sector are the most important social security scheme, but benefits a small group of non-poor 
workers, and does not help the general population manage risk. Outside the public sector, salaried 
workers in the formal sector have access to health and maternity social security benefits, Workers’ 
Welfare Fund (WWF) and Provincial Social Security (ESSI). Some of these programs provide other non- 
insurance benefits and services such as housing, dowry payments, and health and education facilities.  
 
34. Social security programs have low coverage and are focused on the non-poor because of the 
strong link between coverage and access to formal employment. Coverage is limited to workers in the 
formal sector (30 percent of the non-agricultural labor force in 2003/04). Coverage is highest for the civil 
service schemes, while private sector programs reach a very small share of the labor force. Altogether, 
approximately 8.4 percent of the labor force has pension coverage. Low coverage rates are typical in low 
income countries given their small formal sectors. 
 
35. Schemes provide some, but largely inadequate, income support in case of disability, 
survivorship or old age. Although all benefits are low, civil servants pensions provide higher benefits 
 x
than the main private sector pension scheme (the Employees Old Age Benefits—EOBI). EOBI benefits 
are 45 percent lower because of the lack of indexation. For other funds, it is not well known whether they 
meet their mandates and provide significant benefits to workers. The role of the government provident 
fund in providing retirement benefits is also limited by withdrawals for various purposes before 
retirement.  
 
36. The main public and private schemes are fiscally unsustainable. Civil service pensions are 
financed from general revenues, with no contributions or fund accumulated to offset the liability. The size 
of this unfunded liability (or ‘pension debt’) is large when compared to published public debt figures and 
has been estimated (based on partial data) to be around 25 percent of GDP. Provincial government 
pensions will become a heavier burden in the next two decades as the civil service demographics play out. 
For EOBI, actuarial reports find that long-term benefits are not sustainable under current contribution 
rates, with cash flows becoming negative in less than two decades. To our knowledge, no actuarial 
calculations are available for the provincial programs such as ESSI.  
 
37. Professional asset management, modern accounting standards, and an investment policy 
necessary for sound management of social security reserves and financial sustainability of 
programs are not in place. For example, during the last two decades, the EOBI has relied on investment 
through the National Savings Scheme, but from 2001 onward this investment was disallowed. With over 
100 billion rupees in assets in 2005 and most of the portfolio maturing in 2006, the situation has become 
critical. Little information is available on the management of other funds; independent oversight is 
lacking. Investment policy statements are lacking.  
 
38. Administration and recordkeeping affect system coverage and performance. Poor service—
delays, lost records, and outright corruption—lead potential members and employers to avoid contributing 
to these schemes when possible. Conversely, weak monitoring and supervision allows greater evasion to 
take place. There are considerable gaps in information on workers covered by the scheme. This is because 
the institution is struggling to maintain and consolidate several legacy databases. Moreover, many 
employers, while making required payments, fail to submit individual payroll reports. With only a small 
part of the labor force covered by the scheme, operational cost of the EOBI run at least 20 percent of the 
collected contributions and almost one third of benefit payments. Though it is difficult to determine when 
administrative costs are excessive in public pension schemes, the current ratios clearly limit the long term 
sustainability of the scheme.  
 
IV. An agenda for better social protection 
39. Consistent with its Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Government of Pakistan is aware of the 
poverty and vulnerability challenges confronting the country and is developing a more 
comprehensive approach to social protection. This social protection strategy is an opportunity to 
establish priorities and goals for the social protection system as a whole and for specific programs to 
better articulate them around common guiding principles. Considering social protection as a system rather 
than a collection of different programs would allow the government to curtail fragmentation, improve the 
quality of social protection spending, and have higher impact. A strategy would be an opportunity to 
clarify the role and responsibilities of various social protection institutions.  
40. In moving forward, a social protection system can be organized around two pillars:  
 Productive safety nets to help individuals cope and escape poverty, with the flexibility to respond to 
natural disasters. This involves (a) reforming and strengthening basic income cash support, and 
linking it, based on pilot results, to improving human capital outcomes of the poor; and (b) gearing 
the system to respond more effectively to natural disasters and other aggregate shocks (e.g., droughts, 
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earthquakes). Piloting and evaluating innovative and affordable models to complement this basic 
safety net (e.g., workfare, and social welfare and care services) could be considered to strengthen 
basic income support, with scaling up pending fiscal resources and administrative capacity. 
 Effective social security to reduce the individual’s risk of falling into poverty. This much longer term 
effort could focus on (a) strengthening the formal social security system (public and private) through 
contributory schemes that offer consumption smoothing against individual risks (health, sickness, 
disability); and (b) given potentially high exposure to individual risks, piloting and evaluating 
innovative approaches to extend insurance coverage to the informal sector (e.g., social pensions or 
community based insurance), with scaling up based on administrative resources and fiscal capacity. 
41. Gradual, as opposed to simultaneous implementation of various reforms is desirable, given 
fiscal and administrative constraints. As expansion of social security to address individual risks will 
take time to unfold, a well-targeted and administered safety net is likely to be the main social protection 
instrument for Pakistan in the near term.  
 
42. Given fiscal constraints, the expansion of coverage could be financed through better 
targeting of existing programs, phasing out untargeted programs and program consolidation. Initial 
estimates show that a package of reforms, such as the one noted below, could significantly increase total 
annual expenditures on safety nets, 11 which may not be fiscally or administrative feasible in the near 
future. Thus, as a first measure increasing coverage will mean better targeting current programs, and 
reducing fragmentation and duplication of efforts across agencies (e.g., various stipends programs) and 
reducing untargeted programs (e.g., wheat subsidies). Increase in coverage over and beyond these 
resources will need to be phased in as resources and administrative capacity allow. However, the 
declining share of GDP spent on safety net programs is worrisome and it is therefore welcome that the 
government is considering how best to ensure adequate yet fiscally affordable spending on safety nets in 
its draft social protection strategy. Over time, the share of resources to social security programs, largely 
availed by the non-poor, will also need to be redressed and better linked to individual contributions and 
any expansion of coverage (including social pensions) in social security will need to be carefully 
considered against available resources. To pool resources across rich and poor provinces, safety net 
programs need to be federally financed. Social security pool risk through individual contributions that are 
calculated on actuarial fairness, safety nets are general revenue financed in order to pool risks across rich 
and poor regions. 
 
43. Improvements in administrative arrangements are needed for better delivery of social 
protection benefits and services. Without adequate administration, public information, and incentives to 
promote better governance, even the best designed programs can fail. Better governance of safety nets 
includes streamlining of benefits, clarifying roles of public actors, facilitating private sector partnerships, 
strengthening data collection and reporting systems, refining targeting systems, increasing system 
outreach, strengthening staff and management capacity, and setting up monitoring and evaluation. Better 
governance of social security would involve strengthening the capacity to forecast and simulate the 
impact of reforms, modernizing record keeping, and improving management and oversight of funds. 
Public information will be important for higher program outreach and public relations campaigns could be 
used to communicate and seek support for reforms.  
 
44. Social protection reforms will need leadership and inter-institutional coordination. While 
several separate agencies run different programs, policy needs to be coordinated to ensure national policy 
goals are met, synergies reached, and fragmentation avoided. Other countries with a similar challenge 
have retained their Ministry of Social Welfare or its equivalent in a coordinating role for social assistance 
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 Appendix 4 provides potential costs under particular assumptions of coverage and benefit levels. 
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and the Ministry of Labor or its equivalent in a similar role for social security. In Pakistan’s case, the 
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education would seem a natural choice for overseeing and 
coordinating safety net reforms, since the minister chairs the Cabinet’s social sector committee, but it 
would need strengthened capacity to design and evaluate policy. Coordination is important. For example, 
developing and implementing conditional cash transfers calls for coordination between Ministry of Social 
Welfare, Bait-ul-Mal, Health, and Education. Similarly, social security and employment-based programs 
could be overseen by the Ministry of Labor after consolidating some of the current implementation 
arrangements that split responsibilities between federal and provincial agencies.  
 
Table 2: Overview of main programs, target groups, and expected outcomes 
Program Target group Expected program 
objective after reform 
Priority being addressed 
1. Safety Net 
 a. Basic Income Support and Services 
 Unconditional Chronic poor  • Income support • Protecting against poverty 
including from aggregate 
shocks  
 Social care services 
(pilot) 
Vulnerable groups 
(disabled, children, 
others) 
• Enhanced welfare of 
target groups 
• Protecting against poverty 
including from aggregate 
shocks 
 
b. Promoting Exit  
 Transforming 
unconditional to 
conditional Transfers 
Chronic poor (with 
children) 
• Increase Human capital 
of poor 
children/mothers 
• Promoting exit from 
poverty 
 Links to micro finance, 
skill development 
 
Chronic poor (adults) • Increased access to 
economic opportunities 
• Promoting exit from 
poverty 
c. Addressing Aggregate Shocks 
 Workfare 
(pilot) 
 
Poor or vulnerable 
households with 
members of working 
age 
• Income support 
• Lower income volatility 
• Promoting risk 
management  
2. Social Security 
a. Formal Social 
security 
Formal sector workers 
(platform for informal 
workers) 
  
• Protection against old-
age poverty, disability 
and survivorship 
• Promoting risk 
management  
b. Informal Security 
(pilot of community 
based insurance; 
social pensions) 
Informal Sector  • Protection against health 
shocks 
• Promoting risk 
management 
 
 
45. We now turn to key areas of action for each of the two parts of the system. 
 
A. Developing productive safety nets 
 
46. A more effective safety net will require a strengthening of the basic cash transfer and social 
welfare system that incorporates incentives for exit from poverty and is able to respond to natural 
disasters.  
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Cash transfers 
 
47. Expansion of coverage. The coverage provided by Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal cash transfer programs 
needs to be expanded if programs are to act as significant poverty alleviation mechanisms. Coverage can 
be expanded through efficiency gains, for example, through improvements in administrative efficiency 
(e.g., better targeting and consolidation of benefits) under current levels of expenditures. Further 
expansion of coverage will need to be considered in line with administrative capacity and the availability 
of fiscal resources.  
 
48. Level of benefit: balancing adequacy, coverage, and incentives. Cash transfer programs 
currently pay low benefits. However, any increase in benefit needs to balance adequacy—or assistance 
needed to meet basic needs—with work incentives. Although some increase in the very low level of 
benefit would not compromise incentives, raising benefits for all recipients would need to be weighed 
against expanding program coverage, which seems a more immediate need. Moreover, large one-off and 
poorly targeted benefits could be phased out in favor of small well-targeted regular transfers. Benefit 
payment should be regular (every few months) and timely to allow households to smooth consumption. 
The duration of benefit also needs to be reconsidered by defining a program graduation policy—limiting 
benefit duration or periodical re-checking of eligibility.  
 
49. Improving targeting efficiency: adoption of an objective targeting instrument. A number of 
targeting instruments can be considered for Pakistan, including proxy means testing. This method uses a 
weighted average of observable characteristics to determine eligibility. Given its reliance on easily 
verifiable characteristics rather than formal income, it is usually suited to countries with informal 
economies. Another important advantage of proxy means test would be to base beneficiary selection on 
quantitative and objective criteria. However, this instrument will need to be piloted and evaluated and 
may well need to be combined by other methods, such as geographic and community based targeting, for 
improving the accuracy of targeting the poor. 
 
50. Reducing program fragmentation could enhance effectiveness. Although Zakat and Bait-ul-
Mal share a similar objective of providing basic support to the poorest households, they have different 
histories, target groups and financing methodologies and their coordination will need to be improved. But 
there are many smaller programs within these two cash transfer systems that are duplicative (e.g., 
stipends/training, and one-off grants) and will need to be consolidated or phased out. Moreover, as 
positive as it is to see numerous conditional cash and in-kind transfer initiatives flourishing in various 
areas of the country, it is important that experimentation leads to overall consolidation rather than 
fragmentation of cash support programs. Assessments of ongoing initiatives must pay attention to the 
extent to which these can be successfully scaled up and integrated within a unified cash transfer system to 
improve living standards among the target groups. Further, it will also be important to ensure that natural 
disaster assistance and relief is part of the main social protection system, so that there is in-built capacity 
for system to expand in a coordinated fashion to address future shocks.  
 
51. Incorporating incentives to poverty: conditional cash transfers. Cash transfer programs could 
be combined with graduation mechanisms to enhance their effectiveness. For long term exit from poverty, 
conditional cash transfers are a potential instrument to help improve the health and education outcomes of 
poor children. The Child Support pilot could be scaled up, if evaluation results show it to be effective, to 
promote education among poor beneficiaries of the cash transfer program. The potential inclusion of 
incentives for improving health and nutrition outcomes, in addition to education outcomes of the poor, 
could also be piloted and evaluated. It is important to note that these interventions require attention to 
supply of services and need to be coordinated closely with health and education programs. Conditional 
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cash transfers can also reduce child labor—as is the case in Bangladesh, for example12—though their 
impact could potentially be augmented through community awareness and ‘bridge schools’ that help 
transit working children into the regular school system. For promoting graduation of the working poor, 
cash transfer programs could gradually adopt mechanisms that would help facilitate access to 
microfinance, skills development, or public works to improve income earning capacity. 
 
Social Welfare and Care Services 
 
52. Innovative models of social welfare and care services that complement cash transfer 
programs could be piloted and evaluated to ascertain their feasibility for expansion, pending 
availability of fiscal resources. The poor and vulnerable require not only cash transfers but also services, 
e.g. rehabilitation for disabled. These services are in their nascent phase in Pakistan and need to develop 
innovative and fiscally viable options, potentially focusing on a community based approach, to deliver 
services to the poor. The public sector will need to shift its focus to policy development, regulation and 
monitoring and evaluation, and options for outsourcing the provision of care to private sector or 
community organizations will need to be considered.  
Coping with aggregate shocks 
53. To address natural disasters, a combination of cash transfer and, as these develop, social 
welfare and care services could be used, but their flexibility for addressing frequent shocks is 
limited. Cash transfer and services programs are by their nature targeted, so that their elasticity of 
response, particularly for more frequent shocks, is often low. The wheat subsidy, given its limited impact 
on the poor, could be phased out, and the poor protected with a stronger targeted safety net. 
 
54. Workfare could be piloted and evaluated to explore its role in addressing unemployment 
from aggregate shocks, such as droughts. A workfare (or cash for work) program that can expand in 
time of natural disasters, e.g., droughts and contract in other time periods could help protect households 
from loss of income in times in times of this and other natural calamities. Pakistan has experience with 
three labor intensive workfare projects targeted to the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan during 1984-
1996. While their overall impact on poverty is not known, the projects created 22.6 million person days of 
employment over a 12-year period and transferred vocational skills to participants. It should be noted that 
workfare programs can be administrative complex to develop, and should be piloted and evaluated, with 
expansion contingent on the availability of fiscal resources. International evidence suggests the design of 
the program should, inter alia, establish wage rates set low enough to encourage self-targeting by the very 
poor.  
 
B. Social security: helping individuals mitigate risks and avoid falling into poverty  
 
55. Despite its longer term implementation, Pakistan could still develop a vision for its future 
social security system. This longer term view would better enable the country to guide reform efforts in a 
coordinated and comprehensive fashion. A longer term vision—with clear benefit targets for old age, 
disability, survivors insurance, and health coverage—is the first steps toward a coherent social security 
system. Financing sources consistent with estimated costs based on actuarial calculations would be 
needed. Fundamental reform calls for identification of risks to be covered, target replacement rates to be 
defined, and determination of financing parameters and administrative and implementation arrangements. 
An explicit decision would then be needed on the share of costs to be pre-funded or passed onto future 
taxpayers. Institutional and administrative arrangements for cost and risk pooling would also be decided. 
However, transition from the current situation to the new long term vision may take a generation to 
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 See Ravallion and Wodon (1999). 
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unfold. In the meantime, strengthening the formal social security system and considering innovative 
approaches to extend coverage to the informal system might be considered. 
 
Strengthening formal social security systems 
56. Improving fiscal sustainability and financial management. The fiscal sustainability of civil 
service schemes can be improved through parametric changes in the system--changes in the assessment 
base, accrual rates and retirement age. This will lower short term and the present value of future pension 
spending. Systemic changes in the system—shifting to defined contribution system—would take up front 
fiscal outlays, but would eventually lead to a much more sustainable civil service pension system, 
lowering the present value of fiscal expenditures on pensions, from 71 to 47 percent of GDP. Options for 
improving the fiscal sustainability of EOBI will also need to be considered, including improvements in 
the financial management of reserves. Information on the management of other funds also needs to be 
improved, including strengthening independent oversight. Investment policy statements and processes 
will need to be defined and disclosure improved.  
 
57. Improving administrative capacity (recordkeeping and oversight). Monitoring systems will 
need to be strengthened to avoid evasion, thus improving the financial position of funded schemes. 
Improvements in tracking of individual earnings for the pension department to make accurate payments 
will be needed for parametric reforms in the civil service scheme. For a defined contribution (DC) 
scheme, record keeping would have to be much more stringent. Improving enforcement mechanisms for 
late payments and reporting is needed. In all schemes, monitoring is weak and will need to be 
considerably strengthened. 
 
58. Reducing program fragmentation. Administrative costs may be reduced through the 
consolidation of certain activities in one institution (e.g., cash transfers), as has often been proposed. 
Steps toward this include harmonization of practices (reporting, accounting, audits, actuarial evaluations) 
and establishing a common, updated database. Simplifying the process for registration and collection for 
employers would also help compliance. In this regard, the current effort to consolidate legislation is a 
welcome first step, though processes for external oversight are needed.  
 
Extending coverage to the informal sector 
 
59. Microfinance and community based groups are emerging as one way of expanding coverage 
to the informal sector. Their penetration is still low, and using these institutions to expand coverage 
would have a long gestation period. However, there might be scope for using community-based groups 
for providing insurance products in Pakistan as already happening with the rural support programs. These 
groups could ‘plug into’ a formal sector arrangement, for example a defined contribution pension cum 
insurance. Combined with civil service pension reforms, this could create a seamless system of pension 
coverage and other group insurance. It would allow easier movement between informal and formal, public 
and private sector work and lower administrative costs that would tend to be duplicated under parallel 
schemes. However, these schemes would have to be piloted and evaluated, and their fiscal costs assessed 
prior to any expansion. 
 
60. Social pensions are another way to extend coverage to elderly without access to a formal 
pension, but their costs and consistency with other safety net programs needs to be carefully 
considered. In many countries around the world and in the South Asia region, cash transfers to the 
elderly (or social pensions) are used to provide informal sector workers with income support in old age. 
These pensions can be means tested (India) or provided to all individuals over a particular age (Nepal). 
Social pensions can be costly, with costs increasing with the aging of the population. Further, the 
advantages of providing separate benefits to the elderly need to be assessed against the poverty needs of 
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other groups. The feasibility of using the existing cash transfer system to target the elderly also needs to 
be assessed prior to introducing social pensions. In Pakistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
is experimenting with social pensions in select districts, with expansion contingent on evaluation of pilot 
results and fiscal resources. 
 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 What is the rationale for this report and what is its expected value added in Pakistan’s current 
context? More generally, what is the role of social protection and why is it important? This first chapter 
provides the reader with some background information about the genesis of and motivation for this report, 
as well as with a rough overview of the report’s structure and contents. The chapter also proposes a 
general framework for the discussion of the role of social protection in fighting poverty and vulnerability, 
which is then applied to Pakistan’s context in the report. 
 
I. WHY THIS REPORT AND WHY NOW? 
1.2 After stabilizing the economy, Pakistan has seen strong economic growth in recent years. 
Economic growth has accelerated to 4.8 percent in 2002/03, 6.4 percent in 2003/04, 8.4 percent in 
2004/05, and 6.6 percent in 2005/06. Broad development outcomes, including social indicators, are also 
improving throughout the country. The resurgence of the economy provides the opportunity and the fiscal 
space to invest more in poverty alleviation and in the social sectors, and the government has repeatedly 
emphasized its desire and intent to address poverty in a more comprehensive manner. 
 
1.3 Yet important vulnerabilities remain, as evidenced by the recent earthquake and its 
aftermath. While economic growth is the key force behind poverty reduction, international evidence 
suggests that not all groups benefit from growth, and despite growth, poor and non-poor alike (in all, 
including higher income countries) remain vulnerable to individual level risks, such as health, disability 
and unemployment, but also to community wide shocks, such as natural disasters. The tragic earthquake 
which struck the northern parts of Pakistan on October 8, 2005, and a series of droughts in previous years 
has demonstrated extreme vulnerability of the population to natural disasters and placed vulnerability 
center-stage as a major policy concern. 
 
1.4 Pakistan’s poverty reduction strategy calls for particular attention to growth with equity. 
Pakistan’s social protection system comprises safety nets (a number of cash programs, subsidies, and 
employment promotion programs) and social security (pensions and health coverage) for the formal 
sector. The government’s poverty reduction strategy (PRSP), finalized in late 2003, recognizes the vital 
role of social protection programs (safety nets and other targeted programs and social security) in 
reducing the vulnerability of households to poverty and to cushion them from the impacts of individual 
and community-wide shocks (Government of Pakistan, 2003). As the impact of these programs was not 
known, the PRSP called for an in-depth study of the social protection programs, with a focus on safety 
nets. 
 
1.5 At the request of the Government of Pakistan, this report evaluates the country’s social 
protection system in light of existing challenges and makes recommendations for improvements. 
Specifically, the study (i) presents a complete poverty and vulnerability profile to identify the main 
challenges to be addressed by social protection (Chapter 2); (ii) critically reviews existing policies and 
programs, paying special attention to their capacity to address these challenges (Chapter 3); and (iii) 
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proposes a comprehensive policy agenda with both sectoral and program-specific recommendations 
aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of Pakistan’s social protection system (Chapter 4). 
 
1.6 The report is the result of an inter-institutional collaborative effort between several 
stakeholders: the Government of Pakistan, civil society, local and international researchers, and 
international donors. In June 2004, the government appointed an inter-agency Steering Committee on 
Social Protection led by the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission and co–chaired by the 
Executive Director of the Pakistan Center for Philanthropy. Representatives from international agencies, 
including the ADB, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) were also part of this working group. The workshops and seminars 
organized by the Committee have been important for advancing the dialogue among all stakeholders on 
the road ahead in terms of formulating a social protection reform strategy and action plan; a draft final 
strategy is now with the government for approval, and the initial findings and diagnostics of this report 
have been a key input to this. The committee has also supported the launch of a pilot conditional cash-
transfer program and the inclusion of a social protection chapter in the country’s Medium-Term 
Development Framework. 
 
1.7 The discussion draws on both existing knowledge and original work 13  and uses 
administrative and survey data, including a new special-purpose safety net survey commissioned 
specifically for the report (see Box 1.1 for details on this survey). The Safety Net Survey was 
commissioned by the Steering Committee to assess households’ risk coping behavior, the role of informal 
transfers, and the effectiveness of formal safety net programs, under supervision of the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics. The survey was implemented by Gallup Pakistan, with financial assistance from DFID and 
technical support from the Federal Bureau of Statistics. Other data sources include information from 
program officials at federal, provincial and local level, Pakistan Integrated Household Surveys, and 
fieldwork observations. The report draws on three different phases of the safety net survey, which have 
very different sampling properties (Appendix 1 provides more detail on the survey). 
 
II. WHAT IS SOCIAL PROTECTION? 
1.8 The broad objective of social protection (SP) policies and programs is to guarantee a 
minimum and stable level of income for those most in need, while providing them with the 
necessary means to smooth income over time and eventually exit poverty. Basic income support and 
essential services ensures that the living conditions of the chronic poor and those who fall into poverty (as 
a result of a shock) do not deteriorate beyond a minimum acceptable level, while increasing access of the 
poor to employment opportunities and through investments in human capital among the poor to open new 
avenues for them to exit poverty. Similarly, putting mechanisms in place for risk mitigation helps 
(vulnerable) households maintain more stable consumption levels and potentially prevents them from 
falling into poverty.  
                                                 
13
 Background papers were written by Issues and Policies Consultants (administrative review of programs); Carlo 
del Ninno, Giovanni Vecchi, and Noshin Hussain (on vulnerability); Paul Dorosh (wheat policy); Kalanidhi 
Subbarao (workfare); Deborah Schlichting (qualitative study of risk coping); and Nadia Maleeha Assad (literature 
survey). In addition, we also draw on a DFID-sponsored paper by Kabeer, Mumtaz, and Sayeed (transformative 
social protection) and on an ADB-sponsored background paper by Faisal Bari, Emma Hooper, Shahid Kardar, 
Shanza Khan, Irfan Mohammed, and Asad Sayeed (conceptualizing a social protection framework for Pakistan).  
 3
 
 
Box 1.1: An Overview of the new Pakistan Safety Net Survey 
 
The Safety Net Survey (PSNS) was designed to assess households’ risk coping, the role of informal transfers, and 
the effectiveness of formal safety net programs. The survey was implemented by Gallup Pakistan, with financial 
assistance from DFID. The report draws on three different phases of the safety net survey, which have very 
different sampling properties (Appendix 1 provides more detail on the survey). 
Phase I was a survey of 30,005 households, randomly selected from 300 sample locations all over Pakistan, 
collected during June-July 2005. The instrument included questions related to schooling, disabilities, health 
services, public and private assistance, pensions, income and expenditure, household assets and basic demographic 
characteristics of households. Phase I did not include an expenditure module, and we constructed quintiles defined 
on the basis of brief, self-reported expenditures. A village survey of key informants was also undertaken. Phase I 
was designed to be representative at the national and provincial level.  
Phase II was an in-depth survey of 2551 households selected among safety net beneficiaries and comparison 
groups such as applicants and those who felt the need for assistance but didn’t apply, from the same 300 locations. 
Information was collected on sources of vulnerability, coping strategies, private transfers, participation in formal 
safety net programs, and consumption expenditures using a consumption module identical to the one used in the 
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey. The Phase II survey was designed to result in a sufficiently large sample of 
safety net beneficiaries and applicants—these groups were therefore over-sampled, and as a consequence 
nationally representative poverty estimates cannot be derived from Phase II. Based on expenditures per capita and 
using the official poverty line updated to reflect current prices, we constructed three income groups: (i) the ultra-
poor, defined as households with expenditures below the food poverty line (Rs. 457 per capita per month), (ii) the 
poor, meaning households with expenditures below the official poverty line (Rs. 816 per capita per month) but 
above the food poverty line, and (iii) the non-poor, households with expenditures above the poverty line. Thirty-
eight percent of households in the Phase II sample are ultra-poor, 35 percent are poor (but not ultra-poor), and 27 
percent are non-poor, reflecting a sample that is tilted toward the poor. This means that the averages of the whole 
sample would be largely representative of low-income poor and vulnerable households (see Appendix 1). 
Phase III was a tracing (or tracking) study in which the names and addresses of 527 random beneficiaries were 
obtained from administrative records. The enumerators then attempted to locate these households to verify that 
they exist and are in receipt of benefits. Results are described in Appendix 1. 
 
 
1.9 Social protection is not a substitute for economic growth, which along with human capital 
development of individuals will remain pivotal for poverty reduction in Pakistan. Social protection can 
complement policies for creating growth and building human capital, and also help individuals cope with 
(and where possible exit) poverty and manage risk. Public social protection instruments should strive to 
add to the choices and options available to households, and where feasible explore potential synergies 
with informal and market-based risk management instruments used by households. Thus, public risk 
coping instruments need to be designed, keeping in mind the larger landscape of risk management 
strategies employed by households, markets, and society at large.14  
 
1.10 Although households often use informal or private mechanisms to (partially) insure 
themselves against income fluctuations, there is a strong rationale for government provision of 
social protection. First, governments may want to achieve an income distribution that differs from that 
generated by the market. They may, for instance, have a preference for a more equal distribution or a 
distribution that guarantees a minimum level of income for those at the very bottom with the 
understanding that lower poverty and inequality lead to higher economic growth (Perry et al, 2006). 
Second, governments may wish to correct market failures that leave households with insufficient 
insurance and risk pooling mechanisms (World Bank, 2005f). There are many benefits of addressing risk 
directly. Risk affects household welfare negatively through higher consumption variance, which can 
result in transient poverty. Uninsured risk also affects household welfare indirectly: in the absence of 
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 Holzmann and Jorgenson (2000). 
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well-functioning insurance markets, households reduce risk by choosing activities and asset portfolios 
with low risks and low returns. Innovation and investment can be stifled (World Bank, 2005j). Thus, 
uninsured risk and shocks not only push households into poverty, but also perpetuate their 
impoverishment by reducing opportunities for escaping poverty (Dercon, 2002). 
 
1.11 Social protection is generally provided through a mix of safety net (social assistance) and 
social security/insurance programs.15 Safety net/social assistance programs deliver transfers and or 
services to the chronic poor and those who fall into poverty as a result of a shock. In this sense, they allow 
individuals to cope with poverty ex-post (after a shock has occurred). Cash transfer programs, feeding 
programs, employment programs, e.g., workfare, or social welfare and care services (care of disabled and 
elderly) are examples of safety nets programs. Social security programs provide insurance against 
particular shocks or events by pooling risks across program participants. These programs allow 
individuals to mitigate risk (ex ante) and avoid falling into poverty. Safety net programs are financed by 
general revenues, while social security programs are financed by contributions paid by participants 
themselves or by the government/others on their behalf. Pensions, health insurance or unemployment 
insurance are examples of social security/insurance programs. Yet in practice the boundary between these 
two types of programs can break down. Some safety net programs, if not subject to a binding budget 
constraint, can be viewed as a risk-pooling mechanism across the entire general population, with 
contributions being paid via taxes and benefits being drawn according to need. Seen in this way, some 
safety net programs such as workfare perform an unemployment insurance function for informal sector 
workers. On the other hand, social security/insurance programs may be partially funded from general tax 
revenues, as mentioned above, hence resembling a subsidy (World Bank, 2004).  
 
1.12 To ensure maximum effectiveness, however, this mix needs to be a function of the country’s 
context and needs in terms of poverty and vulnerability. Poverty levels and exposure to risk varies 
across countries and across regions and areas within countries. Similarly the poor and the vulnerable are 
heterogeneous groups, with different capacities and needs. While some households are likely to be poor 
and to remain poor in the future, others could escape or remain out of poverty if provided with the right 
endowments and support. Countries with high or stubborn poverty levels or with deep pockets of poverty 
may want to focus on income support or basic service programs that are well targeted, while those where 
exposure to risk is high may be better off putting more emphasis on insurance or on programs that have 
the capacity to deploy assistance and to expand and contract fast in response to either individual or 
aggregate shocks.  
 
1.13 Attention should also be paid to the role played by existing formal and informal 
mechanisms for poverty alleviation and risk mitigation and coping, so as to promote 
complementarities between public and private interventions. Some analysts are concerned that public 
assistance may crowd out private transfers or create disincentives to work.16 Although the empirical 
evidence on this is mixed, when policymakers design public systems they do need to take into account the 
potential displacement of private risk management mechanisms. For example, for social insurance, a key 
concern is to regulate the private insurance market where it exists, and to augment the market by 
providing risk pooling mechanisms where markets fail. Another concern is to avoid the disincentives to 
work entailed by some forms of social security, e.g., unemployment insurance and social assistance (e.g., 
generous cash benefits). For redistributive programs, a key concern is to avoid displacement of private 
cash or in-kind support, as when the extended family provides help and shelter to orphans, widows, and 
other poor. This being said, informal risk coping is sometimes inefficient, inequitable, or detrimental and 
in need of replacement. Thus, if private risk coping consists of usurious loans, child labor, patron-client 
                                                 
15
 Social security programs also include employment protection legislation, but the discussion of this topic is outside 
the scope of this report. 
16
 Jimenez and Cox (1992). 
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relationships, or emergency asset sales, substituting it with well designed formal mechanisms is a policy 
objective, not a cause for concern. Appropriate design of social protection policies therefore has to take 
into account both the potential negative effect of displacing private transfers, and the potential positive 
effect of replacing inefficient, inequitable, or detrimental private risk coping with formal mechanisms 
(World Bank, 2005f). This can only be achieved if public interventions are considered against a general 
understanding of household risk management strategies. 
 
1.14 Social protection systems have to be adequately financed but also fiscally sustainable. Low 
and unstable levels of resources or resources that are spread too thin across too many initiatives will 
significantly compromise the effectiveness of the social protection system, especially if social protection 
programs are pursuing long-term goals such as human capital accumulation or promotion of viable 
economic opportunities. However, generous programs that are fiscally unsustainable can also compromise 
growth (e.g., pay as you go pension programs that require high payroll taxes and budget transfers to 
support an aging population). In addition, poor targeting of a given amount of resources can reduce 
financial efficiency and also compromise equity. On average, social protection program expenditure 
varies by level of income of the country, with higher income countries about 3 percent of GDP on social 
assistance, and a much higher proportion on social security. Spending for both categories is much lower 
for lower income countries although, at least in the case of South Asia, the distribution of expenditures 
across these categories is similar to that found in higher income countries. 
 
1.15 Programs need to take into account the economic environment and with strong 
implementation arrangements. The smaller formal sector and lower tax base of lower income countries 
as in the South Asia region implies that safety nets comprise the main social protection mechanisms for 
the poor. Social security programs which are linked to formal sector participation cover a very small 
proportion of the population. While some countries are attempting to expand social security coverage to 
the informal sector, financing and administrative arrangements are often not adequately fleshed out prior 
to program rollout, leading to a paralysis in implementation. That said, many innovations in social 
protection design have emerged precisely to adapt to low income environments. For example, as means 
testing of social assistance is difficult in countries where income is largely informal and often impossible 
to ascertain, many countries are using a ‘proxy means testing’ that relies more on categorical and more 
easily identifiable indicators for targeting benefits to the poor.  
 
1.16 Finally, social protection programs need to be politically viable, but also can provide 
political support for economic and structural reforms. There is often a trade-off between targeting and 
political/social support for a particular program. Some analysts argue that if anti-poverty programs are 
very narrowly targeted, they may lose middle class and political support. Good examples of this trade-off 
could be found in two of the region’s largest (and most popular) programs, the Public Distribution System 
(subsidized food) in India and the Samurdhi program (food stamps and cash transfers) in Sri Lanka, both 
of which spend around 1 percent of GDP, and neither of which are well targeted. The same reasoning 
would explain why most countries, including Pakistan, spend more on social insurance, which tends to 
benefit the non-poor, than on safety net programs, which target the poor (Figure 1.1). For the same 
reason, social protection programs are difficult to reform. Groups that may lose out from reforms often 
strongly oppose them. Still, many countries, from Jamaica to Poland to Bangladesh, have enacted difficult 
reforms to improve the functioning of social protection systems. Many countries have also used social 
protection programs strategically to cushion the social impact of major reforms, e.g., spur restructuring of 
enterprises or reduction in price subsidies, thereby reducing political opposition to reforms and promoting 
dynamic efficiency.  
 
1.17 With this framework in mind, we now turn to a discussion of the risk and vulnerability in 
Pakistan (next chapter) as a background for the discussion on social protection programs and policies that 
follows in the rest of the report. 
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Figure 1.1: Most countries spend more on social insurance than on social assistance (percent of GDP) 
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Source: World Bank (2005j) “World Development Report 2006” based on data on 74 countries taken 
from World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews or similar work. OECD data are from the OECD Social 
Expenditure database. The average for Africa is based on data for only two countries. OECD excludes 
those OECD members that are already accounted for in the regional averages. 
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CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFYING THE NEEDIEST AND MOST AT 
RISK: A PROFILE OF POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 Who are the poor and where are they located? How likely are poor households to exit poverty in 
the future? Are non-poor households prone to enter poverty? Are there significant differences between 
poor and non-poor households in terms of education and health outcomes? This chapter presents a basic 
poverty and vulnerability profile for Pakistan in order to answer these and other related questions. In 
doing so the chapter aims to provide the reader with an accurate picture of the main challenges facing the 
country in the area of social protection.  
2.2 The discussion is structured around three complementary issues: poverty, risk and vulnerability, 
and risk coping mechanisms. Section II provides a detailed discussion on the incidence and impact of 
shocks for recipients and applicants of safety net programs. Building upon the results from this 
discussion, it argues that vulnerability to poverty may prove to be a more informative measure of welfare 
in environments with high levels of risk and uncertainty. The section concludes by developing an 
operational measure of vulnerability. Section III combines these ideas to construct poverty and 
vulnerability profile, including a short overview of basic education and health outcomes among poor and 
non-poor households. Against this background Section IV examines existing informal risk coping 
mechanisms, their impact and effectiveness. Section V concludes the chapter. The chapter draws on two 
data sets: (i) the nationally representative Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS), and (ii) the 
Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II), which is representative of safety net recipients/applicants.17 The 
latter provides information, inter alia, on incidence and costs of shocks experienced by these households 
and thus cannot be generalized to the population as a whole.  
2.3 The chapter’s main findings can be summarized as follows: 
• Exposure to poverty and risk is high among Pakistani households. Some 24-29 percent (depending on 
choice of poverty line) of the Pakistani population was poor in 2004/05. Households are also subject 
to risks. The survey of safety net recipients/applicant households (PSNS II, 2005) finds that nearly 
two thirds of surveyed households—of which 80 percent are poor—suffered one or more severe 
shocks during the three years prior to the survey. 
• The same survey (PSNS II) finds that the frequency, nature and impact of shocks vary with socio-
economic characteristics and areas of residence of these households. While about the same number of 
poor and non-poor households in this group experienced shocks, conditional on suffering a shock, 
ultra-poor and poor households were more likely to suffer health shocks than non-poor households, 
while the latter were more likely to suffer economic shocks than the former. In addition, urban 
households are more prone to shocks than rural ones and, conditional on the occurrence of a shock, 
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 Applicants are actual and potential (that is, those who noted that they were in need but did not apply for benefit). 
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they are more likely to suffer health and economic shocks and less likely to suffer shocks related to 
natural disasters. Finally, shock-related expenses represent 54 percent of annual consumption for 
ultra-poor households compared to 27 percent for poor households and 18 percent for non-poor 
households. And households in rural areas spend 37 percent of their annual consumption coping with 
shocks compared to 30 percent for urban households in this group. 
• The notion of vulnerability, measured as the likelihood that households remain or become poor in the 
future, shows that approximately 56 percent of households are vulnerable (based on the nationally 
representative PIHS 2001/02). Half of this burden stems from vulnerability to chronic poverty (low 
levels of consumption), while the other half is associated with vulnerability to transient poverty 
(exposure to risk and variation in consumption levels). 
• Poverty and vulnerability levels, based on the above survey (PIHS 2001/02), vary with area of 
residence and with household and individual characteristics. They are highest among rural 
households, particularly those employed in the informal sector, in the agricultural sector or those with 
no access to land or other productive assets. They are also positively correlated with low levels of 
human capital, which makes observed differences in education and health outcomes between poor 
and non-poor children particular worrisome as they may contribute to perpetuate intergenerational 
poverty. 
• The survey of safety net households mentioned above (PSNS II) finds that these households employ 
various strategies to deal with shocks. These strategies can be asset-based (e.g., use of existing 
savings) or behavior-based (e.g., increase in labor supply). The non-poor among this group are more 
likely to use the former while the poor are more likely to use the latter. Strategies also vary in terms 
of their (short-term) effectiveness and their medium-term impact.  
• Evidence on low levels of effectiveness and potentially harmful medium-term welfare impacts of 
household risk coping strategies suggest that there is ample room for improving the effectiveness of 
public programs in the area of risk mitigation and risk coping.  
 
II. POVERTY, RISK AND VULNERABILITY18 
Poverty trends 
2.4 Recent economic growth has reduced poverty in Pakistan. Poverty fell from a high of 34.4 
percent in 2001/02 to 29 percent (using a unit price deflator) and 24 percent (using the consumer 
price index as deflator) in 2004/05. The incidence of poverty fell during the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
but had increased thereafter as a consequence of, among other factors, a series of severe droughts that 
affected the country in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This explains why rural poverty increased by about 
4 percentage points between 1998/99 and 2002/02, and significantly more so in Sindh, while few changes 
occurred in urban areas leading to an increase in the rural-urban poverty gap.19 (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
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 This section draws from World Bank (2004b) and original work commissioned for this report. 
19
 For Pakistan, the existence of different poverty lines and different methods of updating the poverty lines for 
inflation has given rise to the co-existence of multiple sets of poverty estimates. All these estimates, however, show 
that poverty rose before 2001/02 and fell significantly thereafter. 
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Figure 2.1: Poverty headcount in recent years Figure 2.2: Poverty headcount, by province 
30
34.4
29.2
21 22.8 19.1
33.8
39.1
34
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1998-99 2001-02 2004-05
National
Urban
Rural
0
10
20
30
40
50
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan
1998-99
2001-02
2004-05
 
Sources: World Bank staff calculations using nationally representative PIHS and PSLM data sets. Note that the 
estimated poverty rate in 2004/05 would be lower, at 24%, if the CPI was used as deflator instead of unit prices. The 
variation in poverty rates in Sindh and in rural areas are particularly striking. 
Shocks as sources of risk  
2.5 Despite large reductions in poverty, many households in Pakistan are poor and remain 
vulnerable to poverty. This report discusses vulnerability at some length to help scope out interventions 
that could help the country deal with the remaining burden of poverty and vulnerability. Poverty is a 
dynamic phenomenon, also at the level of the household. Although some households are both poor (non-
poor) and likely to remain poor (non-poor) in the future because of their endowments and other 
characteristics, most others experience shocks that affect their income, consumption and assets and can 
trigger entry and exit from poverty. In addition, certain characteristics of the poor such as limited savings 
capacity and limited access to financial markets and safety nets make them more vulnerable to shocks 
and, consequently, diminish their capacity to escape poverty in a risky or uncertain environment.20 
2.6 This section explores these issues in detail. We examine the question of risk by analyzing data 
on the incidence and impact of various types of shocks faced by safety net recipients/applicants, 
(PSNS II, 2005). In doing this, we pay special attention to potential differences between ultra poor (those 
with consumption less than the food poverty line), poor (those with consumption above the food poverty 
line but below the national poverty line) and non-poor households (those with consumption above the 
poverty line) among this group, both in terms of exposure to shocks and their impact. As noted above, 
while the results from this survey are not nationally representative, it provides some insight that shocks 
are important for the poor and that their potential impact on consumption levels and other welfare 
measures can be substantial. 
2.7 The main conclusion from this exercise is that the introduction of risk significantly expands 
the set of households in potential need of assistance at a certain point in time. And although in many 
ways vulnerable households are similar to poor households, there also exist important differences with 
potential policy implications. 
Incidence of shocks 
2.8 The PSNS II survey showed that safety net recipient/applicant households suffered one or 
more major shocks during the three years prior to the survey (PSNS II, see Box 1.1 and Appendix 1 
for details on the data). Health and economic shocks appeared to be the most prevalent types of shocks, 
accounting for 54 and 28 percent of all such occurrences respectively, followed by shocks related to 
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 The concentration of individuals around the poverty line in Pakistan means that small changes in income can 
result in large changes in poverty.  
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natural disasters (7 percent), agricultural and demographic (family-related) shocks (4 percent each), and 
shocks related to law and order (3 percent).21  
2.9 Some of these shocks affected only the reporting household (i.e., idiosyncratic shock), while 
others affected a large demographic group or even a whole community (i.e., covariate or aggregate 
shocks). According to the survey, the incidence of idiosyncratic shocks (health, family matters) was 58 
percent, significantly higher than the incidence of aggregate shocks (economic and natural/agricultural). 
Although idiosyncratic shocks appear more prevalent by these estimates, natural disasters and aggregate 
shocks generally clearly remain important in rural Pakistan, as evidenced by the earthquake and by the 
recurring droughts and floods. World Bank (2002a), for example, found that 63 percent of villages had 
experienced drought within a five-year period. While aggregate shocks can exhaust the coping capacity of 
community-based informal safety nets, individual shocks (such as non-epidemic disease) can potentially 
be managed through community-risk pooling as different households are affected at different points in 
time.  
 
Table 2.1: Incidence and Nature of Shocks 
 
Incidence of 
shocks 
Health Economic Natural and 
agricultural 
Family matters Law 
and 
order 
 
 % of all reported shocks 
All 64.8 54.6 29.2 10.0 3.5 2.6 
       
Ultra-poor 62.3 62.3 22.5 10.4 2.8 2.1 
Poor 65.3 55.3 29.8 8.6 3.6 2.7 
Non-poor 68.1 43.4 37.7 11.1 4.5 3.3 
       
Urban 71.5 58.9 32.9 3.6 3.2 1.4 
Rural 61.3 51.9 27.0 14.0 3.7 3.4 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II), which is 
representative of safety net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative. 
Note: Ultra-poor households are here defined as those with consumption below the food poverty line, poor 
households as those with consumption below the poverty line but above the food poverty line, and non-poor 
households as those who consume above the poverty line. 
 
2.10 The frequency and nature of shocks for this group varies with household characteristics 
and across areas of residence. Approximately 62 percent of the ultra-poor and 65 percent of the poor 
sampled in PSNS II report to have suffered at least one shock in the three years prior to the survey, 
compared to 68 percent of the non-poor. Conditional on suffering a shock, however, ultra-poor and poor 
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 Health shocks include illness, birth and death in the family, disability, surgical procedures and accidents. 
Economic shocks include change in employment status (e.g., job loss) and failure of own business. Shocks related to 
natural disasters include weather related events (e.g., drought, storms, flooding, landslides), pest attacks, fire, and 
earthquakes. Demographic shocks include marriages and other family events that may be associated with high 
financial costs. Finally, shocks related to law and order (or lack thereof), include theft and crime/violence, riots, land 
disputes, legal costs and police trouble. In interpreting these numbers it is important to note that the data was 
collected prior to the earthquake of October 8, 2005 (see Box 2.1 for more information on the earthquake) and that 
the PSNS focuses on households that benefited from or applied to social assistance programs, most of whom are 
poor. Moreover, rural Pakistan is often hit by drought, which can register as both an agricultural shock (for farmers) 
and employment shock (for laborers). 
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respondents22 were more likely to suffer health shocks than non-poor respondents, while the latter were 
more likely to suffer economic shocks than the former. In addition urban respondents are more prone to 
shocks than rural ones and, conditional on the occurrence of a shock, they are more likely to suffer health 
and economic shocks and less likely to suffer shocks related to natural disasters. 
2.11 These differences can be attributed to a number of factors. First, poor households exhibit 
lower levels of access to health care and formal labor markets than non-poor households. Second, lack of 
adequate infrastructure in rural areas, combined with higher dependence on the agricultural sector for 
survival, makes them more prone to weather-related shocks. 
 
 
Box 2.1: The Earthquake of October 8, 2005 
 
The earthquake caused great devastation. The worst affected parts of four districts including Mansehra, 
Basham, Muzzafarabad and Bagh were completely wiped out. According to the joint ADB-World Bank Needs 
Assessment, approximately 73,000 people died and more than 70,000 have been severely injured or disabled. 
Many of the injured had amputated limbs or severe spinal cord injuries that left them paralyzed or disabled. A 
very large and disproportional share of deaths and injuries were sustained by schoolchildren and women. An 
estimated 15,000 people sustained spinal cord injuries or amputation, and many more suffered psychological 
trauma. Over 2.8 million persons lost their shelter. 
The earthquake reminds us that the poor in rural mountain areas in particular face a considerable risk of 
loss of life or assets to natural disasters, small or large. There are few if any public programs offering 
prevention, mitigation, or coping with natural disasters ― after the earthquake, an assistance package and 
delivery mechanism had to be designed largely from scratch. 
 
 
Impact of shocks 
2.12 Shocks experienced by this subset of households are generally associated with income and 
asset losses and, potentially, a decline in household consumption levels. These losses arise from the 
direct impact of the shock (e.g., foregone wages associated with the loss of employment) and the cost of 
coping with the shock after it happens (e.g., medical costs associated with an illness). The average total 
cost of a shock as reported by households in the PSNS II survey was Rs. 14,000 (or $233).23 This amount 
is equivalent to more than one third of average annual household expenditures, or five months of income 
from daily labor, of this group of households. 24 
2.13 Total costs vary with the nature of the shock. These range from Rs. 42,000 for demographic or 
family-related shocks to Rs. 7,700 for economic shocks25 (corresponding to approximately 100 and 19 
                                                 
22
 We define ultra-poor households as those with consumption below the food poverty line, and the poor households 
as those with consumption below the poverty line but above the food poverty line. Data is from Phase II of Pakistan 
Safety Net Survey which focused on households that benefited from or applied to safety net programs; therefore not 
representative of the entire population of Pakistan. 
23
 Based on Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey and therefore not nationally representative. 
24
 This amount is much higher than that reported in the PIHS or PSLS and can potentially be explained by several 
factors (i) PSNS II data pertain to the worst shock experienced by households over three years; (ii) self-reported 
total losses and coping costs of shocks include loss of employment and foregone income as well as out-of-pocket 
costs (the PIHS/PSLS only report out-of-pocket health expenditures. Finally, (iii) it is also important to note that the 
sample of both surveys is different; the PIHS is nationally representative, while the PSNS II is representative of 
safety net recipients/applicants the majority of whom are poor. 
25
 Average costs of other shocks are: natural disasters, Rs. 20,700; law and order, Rs. 17,000; health, Rs. 13,000; 
agricultural, Rs. 12,300. As mentioned in the main text, these self-reported coping costs are defined differently and 
differ in magnitude from the out-of-pocket expenditures reported in the expenditure modules of PIHS or PSLS 
which, for example in the case of health expenditures, are no larger than 5 percent of total expenditures. 
12 
percent of annual household expenditures, respectively, for the low-income PSNS sample). The actual 
burden associated with each type of shocks also depends on how frequent they are. A better measure of 
the actual burden can then be calculated by multiplying the average cost times the frequency of each type 
of shock. Based on this measure health shocks account for most of the total shock costs to the PSNS 
respondents (51 percent), followed by economic shocks (20 percent), natural disasters (14 percent), 
family events (9 percent), agricultural shocks (4 percent), and law and order (2 percent). Within economic 
shocks, seasonal unemployment is widespread and very costly, with male workers on average idle for 
about two months in a year. This corresponds to an income loss of 17 percent, or nearly Rs. 6,000 per 
worker per year among the low income PSNS respondents. More stable employment would significantly 
reduce poverty. 
2.14 Information on average costs or average total burden masks important differences between 
poor and non-poor and between urban and rural safety net recipients/applicants in the impact of 
shocks. Specifically lower income and consumption levels among the poor and in rural areas generally 
translated into higher relative costs of shocks for these groups, even in the absence of significant 
differences in the absolute costs of shocks between them and others. Shock-related expenses represent 54 
percent of annual consumption for ultra-poor households in the PSNS (defined as those with consumption 
below the food poverty line), compared to 27 percent for poor households (defined as those with 
consumption below the poverty line but above the food poverty line) and 18 percent for non-poor 
households. Similarly, conditional on experiencing a shock, households in rural areas incur costs/losses 
equivalent to 37 percent of their annual consumption, compared to 30 percent for urban households 
(Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Coping with shocks can be a high share of household expenditures 
  
Direct and indirect cost of coping with shock 
(% of annual household expenditure)* 
Percent of households whose coping costs 
exceeded annual household expenditure 
Income level   
 Ultra-poor 54.3 15.7 
 Poor 26.8 5.4 
 Non-Poor 17.9 3.5 
Location   
 Urban 29.8 7.3 
 Rural 37.8 9.7 
Total  34.7 8.8 
Sample size 1,501  
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II), which is 
representative of safety net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative. 
Note: Calculations include households that reported zero coping costs. 
* Data pertain to the worst shock experienced by households over three years and self-reported total losses and 
coping costs of shocks include loss of employment and forgone income as well as out-of-pocket costs. 
 
2.15 Finally shocks can also cause non-monetary losses. The PSNS II contains information on 
events triggered by shocks, such as increases in child labor or reduction in household food intakes. These 
changes are not conceived as coping strategies per se but rather result from other existing constraints 
(e.g., unavailability of spare adult labor or low pre-shock consumption levels). Eight percent of all shocks 
among the low-income households sampled for the PSNS resulted in a child being taken out of school, 
and 10 percent led to a child being put to work. These percentages were higher for more costly shocks 
(Table 2.3). Similarly, one third of all PSNS respondents subject to a shock saw their food intake decrease 
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as a consequence. This effect was more severe among ultra-poor households (36 percent) and households 
in urban areas (35 percent) due to higher levels of food insecurity associated with lack of access to land. 
Table 2.3: Children withdrawn from school or put to work in response to shocks 
Reactions to economic shocks 
(households with children that experienced an economic shock) 
 Children taken 
out of school 
(%) 
Children put 
to paid work 
(%) 
Average cost 
of shock 
(Rs.) 
yes 7.7 10.3 17,441 
no 92.3 89.7 8,650 
Total 100.0 100.0 9,329 
Families with children only (sample size: 1,460) 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS 
II) representative of safety net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative 
 
2.16 While this survey is not nationally representative, these figures suggest that the potential 
impact of shocks can be devastating both in the short- and the medium-term. This is compounded by 
the fact that often coping mechanisms used by these households, although effective in the short term, 
severely jeopardize future livelihoods, as discussed below. 
2.17 Our discussion on shocks and their short- and long-term consequences makes it clear that a 
static notion of welfare such as that based on the traditional concept of monetary poverty is 
inadequate when it comes to informing social protection policy. For this reason we spend some time 
below investigating the idea of vulnerability to poverty as an alternative and broader concept that captures 
both the idea of material deprivation and of exposure to risks. 
 
Box 2.2: Regional and international evidence on the incidence and impact of shocks 
 
Growing evidence suggests that most households across South Asia and other developing regions face 
similar risks. Surveys have shown that health, employment, and natural disaster risks are the top three risk 
factors in other South Asian countries. The relative importance varies—in Sri Lanka, natural disaster tops 
the list, while disease is the leading risk in Maldives and, by some evidence, in Andhra Pradesh, India, 
where drought is another major concern. In Afghanistan, employment risk is the single most prevalent risk, 
closely followed by disease and death. Indeed, there is mounting evidence from many developing countries 
that health shocks are among the most sizeable and least predictable shocks, imposing very large coping 
costs in terms of medical expenses and loss of earnings. While for other shocks, increasing the labor supply 
is a common response, this is often not possible when breadwinners face ill health, and medical costs are 
therefore compounded by income loss and an absence of coping options (see Kochar, 1995 for India). A 
detailed study in China also finds a substantial and significant reduction in income and labor supply due to 
health shocks. The loss in income is a consequence of a reduction in labor supply for the head of household, 
which is not compensated by increase in labor supply of other members. Health insurance in China appears 
to offer very limited protection—surprisingly out-of-pocket health care expenditures increase more for the 
insured than for the uninsured in response to health shocks (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2005). In Indonesia, 
research by Gertler and Gruber (1997) using panel data found significant economic costs associated with 
illness, albeit more from income loss than from medical expenditures. The study found that households were 
unable to self-insure against illness. In fact, for illnesses that severely limit physical function, families were 
able to smooth less than 30 percent of the income loss from these illnesses. However, there is evidence that 
microfinance savings and lending institutions in Indonesia help families to self-insure consumption against 
health shocks (Gertler, Levine, and Moretti, 2003). 
 
 
14 
Vulnerability 
2.18 We define vulnerability as expected poverty, or the likelihood that households and 
individuals will remain or become poor in the (near) future. Our method assumes that the variation in 
households’ consumption over time is similar to the variation in household consumption across regions of 
Pakistan. The results are therefore only indicative, but can potentially help develop a better sense of who 
the vulnerable are (see Box 2.3). Although most ultra-poor and poor households will be considered 
vulnerable under this definition, the concept of vulnerability is broader than that of poverty and will 
therefore include some currently non-poor households with a high probability of falling into poverty. 
Similarly, it will exclude some currently poor households with a high probability of exiting poverty in the 
future given their endowments and other characteristics. 
 
Box 2.3: Measuring vulnerability – A brief methodological explanation 
 
In the absence of recent panel data representative of the whole of Pakistan, we employ a method for econometric 
estimation of vulnerability based on a single cross-section survey, following the methodology pioneered by 
Chaudhuri and others. The vulnerability estimation was carried out with the household data of the 2001/02 PIHS. 
The method consists in first estimating a consumption function based on cross-sectional survey data, and using 
the estimated model to generate household-level predictions of the probability of becoming poor in the future, 
defined in this report as a two to three year horizon. Households are classified as vulnerable if their probability 
of being poor is more than 50 percent. The crucial assumption behind this method is that the household inter-
temporal variance in consumption can be proxied by the cross-sectional variance. This is a strong assumption—it 
amounts to saying that the variation in households’ consumption over time is similar to the variation in 
household consumption across regions of Pakistan. The results should therefore be taken with a grain of salt: the 
results are potentially useful for establishing a profile of the vulnerable, but not as a point estimate of the level of 
vulnerability. Moreover, the method does not capture the potential impact of large aggregate shocks. We use the 
cross-section estimates at regional level to estimate the structure of variability, which we then use to derive an 
estimate of the vulnerability at inter-temporal level. After estimating the level of vulnerability for each 
household, we partition the sample according to predicted vulnerability and current poverty status. 
 
Sources: Del Ninno, Vecchi and Hussain (2006), based on Christiansen and Boisvert (2000), Christiansen and 
Subbarao (2005), Chaudhuri (2000, 2001 and 2003), and Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi (2003). Further details 
of the estimation methodology are discussed in Appendix 2. 
 
2.19 By broadening our definition of welfare to account for the risk of future deprivation, we 
also gain some insight into the role and relative importance of structural and transitory poverty. 
Specifically, we distinguish between the following three types of households according to their 
vulnerability status: 
• Chronically poor or vulnerable to chronic poverty. Vulnerability among these households is the result 
of low levels of consumption. Their poverty is structural in that their basic characteristics make them 
likely to remain poor. They correspond broadly to the group of ultra-poor defined above. 
• Transitorily poor or at risk of transitory poverty. Vulnerability among these households stems from 
income/expenditure volatility (most likely associated with positive/negative shocks). They are likely 
to transition in and out of poverty over time as a result of shocks and other factors. They overlap 
broadly with the group of poor (but not ultra-poor) defined above, but include also some who are not 
currently poor. 
• Non-poor or infrequently poor. Levels of vulnerability to poverty are extremely low among these 
households since they enjoy both high levels of current consumption and low levels of future 
consumption volatility. They are the most secure households and, therefore, unlikely to fall into 
poverty. 
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2.20 Using a nationally representative survey (PIHS 2001/02), we find that approximately 56 
percent of households can be classified as vulnerable when a 2-year horizon is considered, 
according to the above definition.26 That is, in 2001/02 around 56 percent of households were either 
poor or expected to be poor at some point in the next two years. And vulnerability levels increase to 67 
percent when a 3-year horizon is considered instead (although, as mentioned, not too much should be read 
into these point estimates due to the strong assumptions of the estimation methodology). The observed 
growth in the incidence of vulnerability as we move further into the future is a direct reflection of 
increased consumption risk—i.e., the probability of suffering (at least) one negative shock rises over time 
(Table 2.4). 
2.21 Approximately half of Pakistan’s burden of vulnerability stems from vulnerability to 
chronic poverty, and the other half stems from vulnerability to transient poverty, according to 
these estimates. One third of the population is estimated to be chronically poor or vulnerable to chronic 
poverty. Because this group is poor and likely to remain poor over time despite other developments, their 
relative numbers do not change as the time horizon expands from 2 to 3 years. An additional 24 percent of 
households are transitorily poor or vulnerable to transitory poverty. Because these households are exposed 
to high volatility in consumption, their relative numbers increase to 35 percent of the total as the time 
horizon expands from 2 to 3 years.  
Table 2.4: Type and Incidence of Vulnerability 
(in percent) 
Category Time horizon 
 3-year 2-year 
Total 67.0 56.2 
Total chronically poor or vulnerable to chronic poverty 
[Low consumption] 32.5 32.5 
Vulnerable to chronic poverty 10.6 10.6 
Chronic poor 21.9 21.9 
Total transitory poor or vulnerable to transitory poverty 
[High volatility] 34.6 23.8 
Vulnerable to frequent poverty 21.4 13.6 
Frequent poor 13.2 10.2 
Total non-vulnerable 
[High consumption, low volatility] 33.1 43.8 
Source: Del Ninno, Vecchi and Hussain (2006). 
Note: The estimated level of vulnerability is larger than the poverty rate since the vulnerable include 
households that are currently poor and expected to remain poor in the future as well as those who are not 
currently poor but face a larger than 50 percent risk of becoming poor in the next 2-3 years. 
 
2.22 The question then arises as to what explains a household’s vulnerability status. To answer 
this question we develop a poverty and vulnerability profile with the understanding that such a profile 
could be an informative tool when it comes to designing, targeting and maximizing the impact of various 
social protection programs. This profile also includes some basic information on differences in education 
and health outcomes between the poor and the non-poor. 
                                                 
26
 Analysis is based on the PIHS 2001/02. Since the PIHS 2001/02 was collected, poverty and vulnerability have 
reduced, but remain at high levels, and the characteristics and composition of the poor and vulnerable are unlikely to 
have shifted in very major ways. 
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III. POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY PROFILE27  
A basic profile 
 
2.23 The discussion is organized around three issues, location, household and demographic 
characteristics and other risk factors, and special attention is paid to potential similarities and differences 
between the determinants of poverty and the determinants of vulnerability. The discussion is drawn from 
the nationally representative PIHS survey. 
2.24 There are important differences in poverty and vulnerability levels across urban and rural 
areas and across regions. Sixty-three percent of rural households are considered vulnerable (compared 
to 40 percent of urban households), accounting for almost 80 percent of the country’s total number of 
vulnerable households, according to the vulnerability estimates. In addition, the incidence of chronic 
vulnerability is also higher in rural than in urban areas. Across regions, vulnerability rates are highest in 
rural Sindh, rural NWFP, and rural Baluchistan. They are lowest in urban Sindh and urban Punjab (Figure 
2.3).28 Chronic vulnerability follows the same regional pattern. Although these patterns mimic closely 
those arising from the discussion on poverty trends and incidence above, it is interesting to notice that 
most of the variation in vulnerability across areas of residence and regions can be explained by 
differences in chronic vulnerability—i.e., variation is explained by differences in structural rather than 
transitory poverty. 
Figure 2.3: Vulnerability headcount  
(in percent) 
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Source: Del Ninno, Vecchi and Hussain (2006). 
 
2.25 Certain household and individual characteristics appear to be positively correlated with 
higher levels of poverty and vulnerability. Larger households and households with higher dependency 
ratios are more likely to be vulnerable. Children aged 0 to 15 are the most vulnerable demographic group. 
They represent 43 percent of the population but make up 51 percent of those vulnerable to chronic 
poverty and 46 percent of those vulnerable to transient poverty. There is also evidence that vulnerability 
                                                 
27
 A full vulnerability profile is presented in Appendix 2, while the main results are summarized here. 
28
 Compare to Figure 2.2 in which Sindh shows the greatest variation over time in poverty rate, perhaps because of 
aggregate shocks such as droughts. The vulnerability estimation used here does not capture the impact of such 
shocks and for this and other reasons yield results that differ from provincial variation in poverty rates.  
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is high among socially excluded groups, defined along lines such as physical disability, 29  religion, 
language, and biraderi or social status. As before, some of the main factors (large household size, 
presence of children, disability) identified as correlates of vulnerability are also correlates of poverty. 
There are, however, some interesting differences. For instance, female-headed households are 
significantly less vulnerable than male-headed households, contrary to what a more traditional poverty 
profile may have suggested (female-headed households often benefit from remittances from absent 
males). Similarly the elderly do not appear to be any more vulnerable than adults of working age (Figure 
2.4). 
Figure 2.4: Vulnerability by household characteristics 
(Share of group estimated to be vulnerable and share of total vulnerability 
accounted for by group, in percent) 
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Source: Del Ninno, Vecchi and Hussain (2006). 
Note: HH=Household 
 
2.26 Household employment status also correlates with poverty and vulnerability. Households 
whose heads work in the informal sector and in rural areas tend to be poorer and more vulnerable than 
others. The Pakistan Labor Market Study (World Bank, 2006f) finds that formal employment is low in 
Pakistan and informality is pervasive and has been growing (from 65 percent of non-agricultural 
employment in 2001/02 to 70 percent in 2003/04, see Box 2.4; almost 81 percent of all workers are 
informal). According to the labor force survey, average earnings for salaried employees in 2003/04 were 
below Rs. 4,200 (or $70 per month) or Rs. 166 (approximately $3 per day), and place a typical family of 
six with one earner below the poverty line (Table 2.5). Average wages of self-employed workers are 
much lower. In PSNS, the average wage received by workers belonging to the bottom quintile was Rs. 86 
per day (or $1.4 per day). Aside from low wages, wage uncertainty is high. Most workers do not work all 
year long, due to the seasonality of rural work and chronic underemployment. According to the PSNS, 
rural self-employed and wage workers have several “inactive” months in a year where they are mostly 
unemployed, with some 40-60 idle days per year.  
 
                                                 
29
 The number of persons with disabilities and the causes of disability in Pakistan are not well known. The social 
safety net survey found very low incidence of any type of disability, apparently because of underreporting. There is 
an often-quoted standard global WHO estimate for the incidence of disability, broadly defined, at 10 percent. Other 
observers put the incidence of disabilities at 4-8 percent in most developing countries, with perhaps 12 percent 
disabled under the broadest of definitions. Persons with disabilities have lower education and income levels than the 
rest of the population. They are more likely to be poor than the non-disabled, and they are less likely to have savings 
and other assets. The poverty-disability relationship goes two ways—disability adds to the risk of poverty, and 
conditions of poverty increase the risk of disability. 
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Table 2.5: Key Labor Market Indicators for Pakistan (2003/04) 
(in percent) 
Labor force participation (refined participation rate) 47.1 
Unemployment rate 7.7 
Informality (share of all workers) 80.8 
Average monthly earnings of salaried workers Rs. 4170 / $70 
 
2.27 Ownership of livestock and agricultural land are closely associated with poverty in rural 
Pakistan. The poorest quintile of the rural population accounted for only 10 percent of the total estimated 
value of livestock in 2001/02, compared with 36 percent for the top quintile. Similarly, households with 
no land constituted 60 percent of the rural population in 2001/02, but accounted for 76 percent of those in 
the bottom quintile. Not surprisingly, households headed by individuals employed in the agricultural 
sector, sharecroppers in particular, exhibit high levels of vulnerability (Figure 2.5).30 
 
Figure 2.5: Vulnerability by education and employment 
(Share of group estimated to be vulnerable and share of total vulnerability 
accounted for by group, in %) 
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Source: Del Ninno, Vecchi and Hussain (2006). 
Note: HHH=Head of Household 
                                                 
30
 Special surveys of informal sector workers have revealed that they work long hours, in some case beyond 60 
hours a week (Kemal and Mahmood, 1993). 
19 
 
 
Box 2.4: Labor market outcomes in Pakistan 
 
Paid employment is scarce in Pakistan, where labor supply has grown faster than labor demand for some time. 
Thus, between 1984/85-1993/94, the labor force grew by 2.4 percent per annum while employment grew by 
2.3 percent per year, while from 1993/94-2003/04 the rate of labor force expansion speeded up to 2.7 percent 
per annum and employment grew by only 2.4 percent. Open unemployment peaked at 8.3 percent in 2001/02, 
before declining to 6.2 percent in second quarter of 2005/06. 
The quality of most jobs is low: wages are low and declined in real terms during much of the 1990s (they 
have since started to rise); informality is pervasive and spreading, accounting for 70 percent of non-
agricultural employment, and 55 percent of wage employment,31 job security is non-existent for a large and 
growing majority of workers, as the share of workers with job regularity fell from 55 percent in 1997/98 to 50 
percent in 2003/04 as the share of government employment declined; and most workers are either self 
employed or employed in the informal or agricultural sectors, often at very low productivity. The share of 
workers employed in manufacturing and mining today, at 13.8 percent, is the same as it was 20 years ago. 
 
Source: Pakistan Labor Market Study (World Bank, 2006f). 
 
 
2.28 Poverty and vulnerability are also associated with access to human capital, which bears a 
close connection with current and future income and thus poverty. The probability of being poor 
decreases as the education of the household head increases. This association is stronger in urban areas 
than in rural areas, particularly for higher levels of education. Households headed by individuals with low 
levels of education or skills exhibit also higher levels of vulnerability and chronic vulnerability than other 
households.  
2.29 It is important to point out that the relationship between poverty, vulnerability, 
employment and human capital (or the lack thereof) also extends to children. Working children, 
children not enrolled in school and those who are only partially immunized appear to be more vulnerable 
than others. In the case of children, however, poor human capital outcomes are likely to be the result of 
high vulnerability rather than the other way around, suggesting a perverse relationship between current 
and future poverty and vulnerability as worse off households lack the means to invest adequately in their 
children and public support falls short of compensating for these deficiencies. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the poor health and education outcomes for poor children in Pakistan, a function of both 
inadequate quality and limited access to education. In many countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Turkey, Brazil) 
the inability of public or private health and education systems to reach the poorest households have 
induced targeted cash transfer programs to make income support payments conditional on enrollment in 
health/nutrition and education programs. Many such experiments are also underway in Pakistan (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Defining the informal sector as firms with less than 10 workers and engaged in non-agricultural, non-
governmental activities. 
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Box 2.5: Education and Health Outcomes in Pakistan 
Education outcomes remain far below their potential in Pakistan. Primary enrolment and completion rates are 
relatively low in Pakistan, compared to countries with similar levels of income. Primary gross and net enrolment 
rates have improved but in 2005 still only stood at 86 and 52 percent, respectively. The large differences between 
net and gross enrollment rates are indicative of problems of late entry into school and grade repetition. Enrolment 
and completion rates are twice as high among better off households as among poor households demonstrating the 
strong association between economic status and educational attainment. Finally, enrolment rates are higher for boys 
than girls and these differences are larger among rural and poor households. These differences can also be observed 
at the secondary level. Finally, in a context of low quality public schooling, differences in education outcomes 
between rich and poor are compounded by differences in access to private schooling. Private schools account for 24 
percent of primary enrollment, but 48 percent of the enrollment of the 5th quintile and just 9 percent for that of the 
1st quintile. 
Figure 2.6: Education outcomes 
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Source: Staff estimates using 2002/02 PIHS data 
 
Pakistan has seen some improvement in child health and nutrition indicators, but significant challenges remain. 
The infant mortality rate (IMR) declined from 101 per thousand births in 1995-96 (for births occurring during 1991-
93) to 89 in 1998/99 (for births during 1995-97), and to 82 in 2001/02 (for births during 1997-99). Although 
different surveys yield conflicting trends, according to the National Nutrition Survey the percentage of underweight 
and stunted children declined from 51 to 41 percent and from 41 to 31, respectively, between 1985-87 and 2002/02. 
Important challenges remain however. In contrast with the developments described above, the last ten years have 
witnessed deterioration in the (full) immunization rate. This suggests that improvements in health outcomes may 
have been driven by factors other than better access to and quality of health services. In addition infant mortality, 
malnutrition and immunization rates are still significantly higher in rural areas and among the poor. And the same 
geographic and rich-poor gaps are visible when it comes to maternal health outcomes, such as prevalence of pre- and 
post-natal consultations and of assisted births. 
Figure 2.7: Child Health Outcomes 
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Source: World Bank (2005b) and staff estimates using PIHS (2001/02) for  
immunization rates and PSES (2000/01) data for malnutrition rates. 
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IV. INFORMAL RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
2.30 Given the evidence presented above on the incidence and impact of shocks, how do households 
cope with these shocks? Generally speaking, households can employ ex-ante strategies aimed at risk 
prevention and mitigation, and ex-post strategies aimed at correction and coping after a shock has 
occurred. Ex-ante strategies include savings, insurance, migration, and employment (and hence income) 
diversification.32 The ability of most households (and particularly poor households) to resort to these 
strategies, however, is severely limited by both financial, insurance and labor markets underdevelopment 
(World Bank, 2002a and 2004a), and the high opportunity cost of holding precautionary savings or 
insurance. As a result of limited ex-ante risk management, a sizeable share of uninsured risk remains. Ex-
post strategies can be divided into asset-based strategies such as use of existing savings and other assets, 
insurance and financial markets, and behavior-based strategies such as increased labor supply and reduced 
consumption. Assistance, both by private and public agents, also plays an important role. As we will 
discuss below, the consequences of choosing a particular strategy, in terms of both its short-term 
effectiveness and its long-term impact of household welfare, vary significantly across households. For the 
discussion in this section, we again turn to the survey of safety net recipient/applicant households (PSNS 
II), which contains information on risk management strategies of these households. While it is important 
to note that the results are not nationally representative, they still provide valuable information on the 
strategies followed by this particular group, comprised of largely poor households.33  
2.31 The survey contains information exclusively on ex-post strategies for sampled households 
and considers four broad categories: (i) reduction in household net worth (i.e., dis-saving), (ii) 
expansion of household labor supply, (iii) reduction in consumption, and (iv) use of assistance. 
Information is also collected on how these various strategies were implemented. For instance, in the case 
of reduction of household net worth a distinction is made between the use of loans/credit, the sale of 
assets/durable goods, and the use of existing savings. Similarly, information is collected regarding 
changes in labor market participation (both of adults and children) and in hours worked. More than 50 
percent of the households sampled for the PSNS II, who were subject to a severe shock (mostly low 
income), saw their net worth decline as a consequence; 11 percent increased labor supply, 10 percent 
received assistance and 1 percent reduced consumption. The remaining 24 percent declared to have done 
nothing in response to the shock.  
2.32 The use of a particular strategy is a function of the nature and magnitude of the shock and 
of available coping options. Use of existing savings and assets and of credit appears to be more common 
when law and order or health shocks occur; increased labor supply is used more often in the case of 
family-related or health shocks; and assistance is required more frequently when a health shock happens. 
Similarly, inaction is most prevalent in the case of economic shocks and least in the case of health shocks. 
In addition more “informal” strategies such as using savings, shopkeeper credit, and assistance from 
friends and relatives are more common when less costly shocks occur, while more formal strategies such 
as selling major assets, borrowing from a moneylender, and requesting government assistance are used in 
the case of costly shocks. 
                                                 
32
 Migration is a common strategy for coping with risks, with more than one in four rural Pakistani households reporting at least 
one migrant (Mansuri, 2006a). 
33
 See Appendix 1 on the sampling of the PSNS data used in this section. 
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Table 2.6: Coping Strategy by Nature of Shock 
 All 
shocks 
Health Economic Natural and 
agric. 
Family 
matters 
Law and 
order 
 Percentage of households that used each strategy  
Reduction in net worth 53.5 56.8 46.0 56.5 50.0 62.5 
Use of savings/assets 28.3 25.0 32.1 28.9 29.6 52.5 
Loan or credit 25.2 31.8 13.9 27.6 20.4 10.0 
Increased labor supply 11.2 13.7 6.5 9.9 14.8 12.5 
Decreased consumption 0.9 1.2 0.7 - 1.9 - 
Received assistance 10.2 14.0 6.1 3.3 11.1 - 
Did nothing 24.8 15.1 41.3 30.9 20.4 25.0 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II), which is 
representative of safety net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative. 
 
2.33 Responses to shocks also vary by household. Ultra-poor and poor34 households in this group 
are likely to use behavior-based strategies such as increasing labor supply or reducing 
consumption, while non-poor households are more likely to use asset-based strategies such as 
drawing down existing savings or requesting a new loan or credit. The same is true for rural and 
urban households. In addition, ultra-poor households and rural households are more likely to receive 
assistance than others.  
2.34 Because there are limits to the effectiveness of behavior-based strategies used by the poor, 
these differences have important implications. Individuals can only work so many hours and 
consumption cannot fall below subsistence levels. Households that are closer to these limits at the time of 
the shock will thus find it harder to overcome its effects. Because these households tend to be the neediest 
this could create a vicious cycle of poverty and vulnerability.  
Table 2.7: Use of Coping Strategies across Households 
 Reduced net worth Increased  
labor supply 
Decreased 
consumption 
Received  
assistance 
Did 
 nothing 
  Use of  
savings/assets 
Loan or 
credit 
    
Total 28.3 25.2 11.2 0.9 10.2 24.8 
       
Ultra-poor 23.4 31.0 13.8 1.2 13.7 18.3 
Poor 33.8 21.6 11.1 1.0 6.5 26.2 
Non-poor 28.3 21.7 7.8 0.5 9.9 31.8 
       
Urban 31.5 28.1 7.0 1.2 9.5 22.5 
Rural 26.3 23.3 13.9 0.7 10.6 26.2 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II), which is 
representative of safety net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative.  
Note: Ultra-poor households are here defined as those with consumption below the food poverty line; poor 
households are those with consumption below the poverty line but above the food poverty line; non-poor households 
consume above the poverty line. 
                                                 
34
 Ultra-poor households are defined as those with consumption below the food poverty line; poor households are 
those with consumption below the poverty line but above the food poverty line; non-poor households consume 
above the poverty line. 
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Effectiveness and potential impact of various coping strategies 
2.35 We argued above that the choice of a specific coping strategy had important short- and long-
term consequences, particularly among households with low consumption levels and limited access 
to markets. Spending precautionary savings and borrowing from friends and relatives may not carry 
drastic consequences. However, selling or mortgaging of land, house, and productive assets can 
jeopardize households’ livelihoods. Expanding the labor supply of adults is normally quite acceptable, 
while sending children to work can erode their human capital. Reducing consumption temporarily in 
response to an adverse event is rarely a problem for the well-off, whereas for the poor, lower consumption 
often translates into lower food, health and education expenditures. In fact, conditional on experiencing a 
shock, the ultra-poor safety net recipient/applicant households in the PSNS II are twice as likely to resort 
to child and bonded labor and four times as likely to sell their crop in advance as the non-poor, which 
may explains why it is so hard to escape poverty for these households. 
2.36 The (short-term) effectiveness of various strategies for this group of households appears to 
be fairly limited and varies with the type of shock. Approximately 43 percent of those reporting a 
shock declared that they had not recovered from it at the time of the survey, compared to 20 percent who 
declared to have fully recovered. The share of those who declared not to have recovered yet increases 
with the estimated costs of the shock, and is significantly higher in the case of health shocks. 
2.37 In addition the use of certain coping strategies can have harmful consequences over the 
medium term. The lack of retrospective questions makes it hard to assess the medium term impact of 
different coping strategies accurately. Instead, we use other data to provide a general discussion on the 
expected medium term effects of household coping strategies in the belief that this discussion is 
informative when it comes to policy making in the area of social protection. 
2.38 Reduction in net worth. More than half of all surveyed safety net recipient/applicant households 
(PSNS II) used this strategy to cope with shocks. About 50 percent of them used existing savings and 
assets, an additional 40 percent borrowed money, mostly from friends and relatives, and the rest took a 
mortgage on their house or land plot. The use of savings and, particularly, assets can have different 
consequences depending on whether they were held for precautionary or productive reasons. While the 
use of the former would indicate that the households have some self-insurance capacity, the use of the 
latter (i.e., a house or a plot of land) would suggest that the household is under extreme duress and forced 
to resort to extreme coping measures with potentially damaging long-term impacts. 35  Similarly the 
implications of borrowing can be very different depending on whether the money is obtained from 
friends, shopkeepers, landlords and moneylenders, or institutional lenders.36 Although borrowing is more 
common in urban than in rural areas, the ultra-poor are as likely to borrow as the poor and the non-poor 
among the sampled households.37 However, the sources of loans differ between groups. Ultra-poor in 
rural areas are more likely to borrow from landlords. These loans are part of the ‘patron-client’ 
relationship between rural landlords and the rural landless or near landless; a relationship that on the one 
hand provides a (minimal) safety net for the ultra-poor ‘clients’ but on the other hand can be exploitative 
(Aleem, 1990). Landlords often act as moneylenders, charge high, sometimes exorbitant interest rates, 
                                                 
35
 See Kochar (2004) and Adams (2000) for more detailed studies on the use of assets and savings as a coping 
strategy and its consequences. 
36
 People demand credit, regardless of whether they experienced a shock. Seventeen percent of households 
interviewed by the PSNS had taken a loan in the 12 months prior to the survey, almost all from informal sources. 
Most loans were made by friends and relatives (63 percent) with landlords (15 percent), shopkeepers (12 percent) 
and commercial/institutional sources (3 percent) providing most of the remainder. 
37
 Based on Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey and not nationally representative. 
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and may take over the land, house, or assets of debtors when they fall into arrears (Kabeer, Mumtaz, and 
Sayeed, 2006). There is circumstantial evidence that such debt traps can result in bonded labor (see Box 
2.6), and solid evidence that emergency asset sales and asset forfeiture due to loan default play a role in 
the unequal distribution of land by accumulating land in the hands of rural landlords and moneylenders 
(Heltberg, 1998). Distress asset sales also lead to underemployment when workers lack the land and 
animals that are complementary to their labor. 
 
Box 2.6: Coping with multiple misfortunes – The story of Tariq 
 
Tariq was a farmer in a small village in rural NWFP. He owned 10 kanal of land with a small stream running 
through it. From this land, he was able to feed his family, earn a small income, and send his sons to school. 
When his wife fell ill, he was faced with medical bills beyond his immediate ability to pay, and his brother, 
sister and neighbor lent him some money. Then it rained for five days. His house, made of mud-bricks and 
straw, started leaking, and on the fourth day the roof collapsed pulling with it two side walls. The house was 
destroyed and his donkey killed, but Tariq thanked God that no one was hurt and that his family was safe. 
The cost of rebuilding the house was beyond his capabilities because he had already exhausted his 
family’s and his neighbors’ capacity to help. His only alternative, he felt, was to take a loan from the local 
money lender and largest land owner of the village, Malik. Malik charged 18 percent interest, and wanted 
monthly payments. Tariq, his brother, and his neighbors rebuilt the house, during which time many jobs on the 
farm where left unattended, they were selling neither milk nor crops, and their income declined. By the end of 
the first month Tariq was unable to pay the first installment. For this default on the loan terms, Malik 
increased the interest rate to 21 percent, the first month’s interest was added to the capital, and a fee imposed 
for non-payment. Tariq’s debt had grown considerably, he still had not repaid the debt to his neighbor, his 
income had declined, and he had no cash to buy seeds. When his wife became ill again, he could not afford to 
take her to the doctor. 
Tariq sold the cows, which gave him a small cash injection, but which deprived him of a source of income 
from selling milk and also a source of food for his family. He sold his wife’s two gold bangles. Then Malik 
suggested that Tariq’s oldest daughter, aged 13, work as a domestic servant in his house. Her wage would go 
toward servicing a share of the interest on the debt. However, her share of the household and farm chores at 
home would then have to be picked up by her younger sister, who was eight years old. 
As the debt grew larger each month by compounding interest, Tariq’s second daughter went to work as a 
domestic servant too. Then his two sons left school and found work cleaning dishes in the bazaar earning Rs. 
50 a day plus a meal each. Even with this additional income, the family was unable to service the debt. 
Malik then took possession of Tariq’s land and house as a payment toward the debt. Malik paid Tariq a 
very small amount, much less than what Tariq estimated the land to be worth, and the debt was still largely 
unpaid. Tariq was now working as a tenant farmer on land that used to be his, and both his daughters were also 
working for the same man and their wages going directly to paying the debt, which nevertheless continued to 
grow. 
When Tariq was killed in an accident, his older son inherited the debt, and he became bound to work for 
Malik until the debt is fully repaid. Tariq’s son is now 28 years old, and he, his brother and sisters, and their 
spouses and children are still working as tenant farmers for Malik’s family. None of them receive wages 
directly because the debt has still not been repaid. 
 
Source: Schlichting (2005). 
 
 
2.39 Increased labor supply. Expanding the number of hours worked is the second most common 
coping mechanism for safety net respondents (PSNS II).38 This can be achieved by taking an extra job, 
working longer hours in an existing occupation, and increasing labor force participation among household 
members, sometimes in the form of bonded and child labor (see Box 2.7). The capacity of households to 
successfully increase labor supply depends on both household and labor market characteristics. As noted 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. 
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above, migration is very common in Pakistan, and has been found to exert a large influence on children’s’ 
education and nutrition, especially for girls, playing a positive role in cushioning child human capital 
from shocks (Mansuri, 2006a, 2006b). Poor households and those with low levels of education are less 
likely to find formal, well-paid employment than their non-poor, more educated counterparts. There is 
also evidence that caste and other social restrictions may limit access to better jobs among certain groups 
(Kabeer, Mumtaz, and Sayeed, 2006), while the lack of land, credit and other assets curtails options for 
self-employment. In addition, employment creation has been weak in recent years, the quality of the 
average available job is low (both in terms of pay and security), and informality is rampant. The 
combination of non-marketable household characteristics and weak labor market performance implies 
that the effectiveness of this strategy as a coping mechanism is somewhat limited among ultra poor and 
poor households, forcing them to resort to extreme and potentially harmful options. For instance, falling 
into bonded labor is particularly common among the rural poor and those with no assets (World Bank, 
2002b).39 Bonded laborers are tied by debt to a particular employer. They work at very low wages and 
sometimes only for food and clothing in order to pay back debts at very high interest rates. Debts are 
sometimes inherited, trapping several generations of the family in bonded labor. Bonded laborers are an 
extremely poor category of households with little chance of escaping poverty.  
 
Box 2.7: Child labor as a coping strategy – The story of Rukhsana 
 
Rukhsana used to go to school. When she was 11, her father had an accident and he has not been able to work 
since. The family was not poor, but not comfortable either. After her father’s accident, their living standards 
rapidly declined. First, they sold their assets including their goats and her mother’s jewellery. Rukhsana and 
her siblings started working and were pulled out of school. Then they sold their land and house, and spent a 
few years being moved from one relative’s house to the next. The children were never re-enrolled at school. 
Rukhsana worked as a domestic servant. Her employer started using her as a dancer at his business 
functions. Eventually she was required to provide sexual services as part of this work. Now, she is a full-time 
sex worker. She cannot pinpoint the time at which she became a prostitute, and baulks at the label, preferring 
to call herself a dancer. Rukhsana says that because she is not a sex worker, she does not need to take special 
precautions, does not use condoms, nor visits health clinics. Her parents believe that she works in an office, in 
a well-paid, respectable job. She brings home good money and the family is now able to rent a small space of 
their own. She has been able to enroll her youngest brother in school, is able to cover her father’s substantial 
medical costs, and supports the whole family. 
 
Source: Schlichting (2005). 
 
2.40 Reduced consumption. Although only a small percentage of safety net recipient/applicant 
households who suffered a shock (approximately 3 percent of the PSNS II respondents) reported cutting 
back on household expenditures, the fraction of households that resorted to reduced consumption as the 
main coping strategy is significantly higher among the ultra-poor and the poor than among the non-poor 
(Figure 2.8). Because these are households whose level of consumption is already low, the potential 
consequences of this action are particularly worrisome. In fact there is evidence that uninsured risk 
contributes in a major way to food insecurity as food is the short-term variable cost over which 
households can exert the most control, making it the first target when cutting expenses. Commonly 
households reduce the quality and diversity of their food first and, if this is not enough to make ends 
meet, they also decrease the frequency of meals and redistribute food toward the principal earner and 
away from women and girls. This can result in undernourishment or micronutrient deficiency among 
                                                 
39
 Although estimates of the extent of bonded labor vary widely (see World Bank, 2004a), available studies indicate 
that bonded laborers are concentrated in rural areas of southern Punjab and northern Sindh and that landless 
sharecroppers and brick kiln. 
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certain household members, including children and pregnant and nursing mothers, with devastating 
effects on their physical and cognitive development (World Bank, 2003; Schlichting, 2005). 
Figure 2.8: % Safety net recipient/applicant households experiencing food 
shortages as a result of shocks 
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Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety 
Net Survey (PSNS II) representative of safety net recipients/applicants 
and not nationally representative. 
 
 
2.41 Households’ capacity to implement the three strategies discussed so far depends almost 
exclusively on the ability of household members to change their behavior. Households in need, however, 
often look for help outside their own private sphere by requesting assistance from other private agents or 
from the government. We discuss below the role of private assistance, paying special attention to its 
effectiveness as a risk coping strategy, and postpone the discussion on government assistance to Chapter 
3.  
2.42 Received assistance. Conditional on suffering a shock, 10 percent of the households surveyed in 
PSNS II turned to private (75 percent) or public (25 percent) assistance as their main coping method 
(more may have relied on assistance as a secondary coping method).40 The ultra-poor households were 
more likely to use assistance (mostly private) for coping (13.7%) than the poor (6.5%) or non-poor 
(9.9%). Further analysis of the assistance data in the PSNS provides interesting insights that can help us 
assess the potential effectiveness of private assistance:41 
• Private assistance is quite generous compared to household income. Conditional on receiving private 
assistance, donations to ultra-poor and poor households in the 12 months prior to the survey were 
equivalent to 42 and 20 percent of household expenditures, respectively (Table 2.8). 
                                                 
40
 According to the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (1998), Pakistani households and organizations give and 
receive a substantial amount of private charitable assistance. A survey carried out by this organization in 1998 
showed that the value of cash, in-kind and time contributed towards private philanthropy in that year equaled around 
Rs. 70 billion, of which 42 percent was cash, 16 percent the value of in-kind contributions, and 42 percent the 
imputed value of time volunteering. Fifty-four percent of this philanthropic assistance went to individuals, the rest to 
organizations (see www.pcp.org.pk). 
41
 The Pakistan Safety Net Survey contains detailed information on private and NGO assistance, even where this 
assistance was not the main method used to cope with a shock. The survey focuses on cash and in-kind assistance, 
and no effort is made to quantify the time spent volunteering. These estimates are based on data from Phase II which 
focused on households that benefited from or applied to safety net programs and whose respondents are mostly low 
income and therefore not representative of the entire population of Pakistan. 
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• Private assistance appears complementary to public assistance. Larger amounts of private assistance 
go to beneficiaries of public programs, especially Zakat, suggesting that public assistance on balance 
does not crowd out private assistance.  
• Still, private assistance does appear to reach some of those in need. Expenditure inequality, measured 
by the Gini coefficient, falls by 1.9 percent from 0.324 to 0.318 once net private transfers are taken 
into account.  
• Private assistance was often relied upon for smaller shocks, while government assistance played a 
more important role in the case of catastrophic losses. 
• However, private assistance is concentrated at the time of religious festivals. Seventy one percent of 
all assistance given during the 12 months prior to the survey was collected during Eid or Ramadan. 
• Private assistance tends to be individual-based rather than institution-based, and thus has some 
reciprocal elements. Friends, neighbors or community members account for 75 percent of all private 
assistance, compared to less than 10 percent for charities, foundations, or religious groups. 
 
Table 2.8: Adequacy of Private Assistance 
(private assistance received 12 months prior to survey) 
  
Average annual 
private transfers 
received (Rs), 
conditional on 
receiving 
Private transfer 
receipts in % of 
household 
consumption 
Private transfer receipts 
as % poverty line (Rs. 
937 per month per 
person) for a family of 
six 
Private transfer 
receipts as % of 
average 
agricultural wage 
Ultra-poor 5664 42 8.39 21.0 
Poor 8692 20 12.88 32.2 
Non-poor 5523 13 8.18 20.5 
Total 6680 25 9.90 24.7 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS II) representative of safety 
net recipients/applicants and not nationally representative. 
 
2.43 These basic facts suggest that, although private assistance is widespread and significant in 
magnitude, there are limits to its effectiveness in combating poverty. First, clustering of private 
assistance at times of religious festivals makes it hard for the poor to meet emergency needs that arise at 
other times of the year. And though in principle donations could be saved, the fact that almost one-third of 
private assistance is in-kind makes it hard. Second, the fact that most assistance takes place at the local 
level and between households implies that aggregate shocks, such as natural disasters, can overwhelm the 
coping capacity of a particular community. Finally, the principle of reciprocity can cause exclusion of the 
very poorest, who have little to give back, or of those who do not belong to networks or communities with 
the capacity to support them. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
2.44 The discussion in this chapter has tried to alert the reader to a series of issues that we consider 
important when thinking about designing and implementing effective poverty reduction and social 
protection programs. First, we have shown that the poor suffer from material deprivation, both in their 
physical and human assets, particularly in the access to education and health services. Given that human 
capital accumulation is one of the most effective poverty exit strategies in the medium-term, persistent 
differences can jeopardize social mobility and perpetuate inter-generational poverty. Second, results from 
the PIHS survey suggest that the poor not only suffer from material deprivation, but are also exposed to a 
significant amount of (income) risk and uncertainty. Of concern is the large share of informal sector 
workers in Pakistan and their families who face considerable income risk because of limited access to 
social security or basic employment protection. Third, due to their restricted savings capacity and asset 
base, we have shown that the poorest among safety net recipient/applicant households (PSNS II) are often 
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not capable of self-insuring against risk and have to cope with the impact of shocks once these occur. 
Fourth, we find that the poorest among this group are likely to rely on behavior-based coping strategies 
such as increasing labor supply or reducing consumption (both of which affect their children), which may 
have potentially harmful long-term impacts. Finally, given the presence of risk, we have advocated for the 
use of a broader definition of welfare, based on vulnerability to poverty. This definition allows us to 
differentiate between current poverty and the risk of future poverty and between structural and transitory 
poverty.  
2.45 Following from the above, an effective social protection system would then have to achieve the 
following: (i) provide (minimum) income and other support for those with a small probability of exiting 
poverty (i.e., the chronic poor); (ii) support the implementation of mechanisms and strategies to exit 
poverty among those with a higher likelihood of succeeding, including increased access to economic 
opportunities and the promotion of human capital accumulation—particularly of children; and (iii) 
support (directly or indirectly) the implementation of effective risk mitigation strategies to help 
households smooth income over time. In addition, high exposure to risk and high vulnerability incidence 
for particular segments of the population (e.g., informal sector workers) requires that, to the extent 
administratively and fiscally feasible, the design and nature of social protection programs must be such as 
to allow the system to quickly react to individual and aggregate shocks. This implies that programs must 
be capable of deploying assistance at short notice and that they must be able to expand and contract their 
beneficiary base over time. 
2.46 The next chapter critically evaluates the extent to which Pakistan’s social protection system meets 
these challenges and provides help to those most in need. For this purpose the chapter examines both the 
social protection system as a whole and the various programs that integrate it, and analyzes if their design 
and implementation are the most adequate in terms of effectively providing income support and 
minimizing income volatility. 
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CHAPTER 3. FIGHTING POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY: 
PAKISTAN’S SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
3.1 How much does Pakistan spend on social protection? Is the combination of existing programs 
adequate given the country’s poverty and vulnerability profile? Are programs managed effectively? Do 
resources go to those who need them the most? Are benefits sufficient to achieve programs’ goals? This 
chapter presents a detailed discussion on Pakistan’s social protection system to try to answer these and 
other related questions. In doing so the chapter aims to provide the reader with sufficient knowledge 
regarding existing programs so as to allow her to evaluate the system’s overall efficiency and efficacy as 
well as to assess its adequacy given the challenges identified in Chapter 2. In this sense the chapter can be 
viewed as both the core of the report and a bridge between the diagnosis presented above and the policy 
agenda developed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2 The discussion is structured so that the reader moves from the big picture to the specifics of 
various programs. Section II presents an overview of Pakistan’s social protection expenditures and 
Sections III-IV provide information about existing programs. For this purpose programs have been 
divided into two categories according to their nature or main objective: (i) safety nets (a) programs that 
provide income and other support to the poor; (b) programs that promote sustainable poverty exit 
strategies; (c) programs that help households cope with aggregate shocks; and (ii) social security, or 
contributory ‘insurance’ programs. As noted in Chapter 1, the first set of programs help individuals cope 
with risk after the shock has occurred, while the latter allow households to mitigate risks prior. Finally 
Section V discusses the adequacy of the existing system and identifies the challenges ahead. The analysis 
in this section relies on the Pakistan Safety Net Survey (PSNS) I and II. PSNS-I is nationally 
representative while PSNS II is a survey of safety net beneficiaries and applicants (actual and potential) 
and is therefore not a nationally representative survey. 
 
3.3 The chapter’s main findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Pakistan implements a variety of social protection programs ranging from safety net (e.g., cash 
transfer programs and school feeding programs) to social security programs (e.g., pensions). Some of 
these programs hold significant potential for alleviating poverty and managing household risks, and 
recent attempts to experiment with more creative program designs and to evaluate program impacts 
are commendable. However, important constraints in terms of resources, coverage, targeting and 
implementation need to be overcome for these programs to have a real impact on poverty and 
vulnerability. 
• Aggregate social protection expenditures are low, spread too thin across too many programs, and 
biased toward social security. Moreover, expenditures have decreased (as a share of GDP) in recent 
years. The combination of these factors translates into insufficient program coverage given existing 
needs. For instance, 2 million households receive benefits from the two main cash transfer programs 
while the total number of households vulnerable to chronic poverty is close to 8 million. Finally, 
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approximately 80 percent of all resources allocated to social protection are devoted to social security, 
which tends to benefit the non-poor and those with access to formal employment. 
• The impact of safety net programs on poverty and inequality is almost negligible due to limited 
coverage and deficient targeting, small levels of benefits and irregular benefit payments.  
• Most programs lack an objective targeting instrument. For instance, between 20-30 percent of total 
resources allocated to the two main safety net programs accrue to the poorest 20 percent of the 
population, compared to 17-18 percent for the richest 20 percent. These figures compare poorly to 
similar programs in other countries.  
• Benefits are small. Cash transfers are equivalent to 10-15 percent of average household income 
among program beneficiaries, and actual annual payments frequently fall short of stipulated levels. 
Similarly, the average pension paid by private sector schemes is equal to 30 percent of the minimum 
wage. Aside from low coverage and benefits, safety net programs have limited exit strategies—
beneficiaries are not systematically provided incentives to improve current or future earning 
opportunities (through access to microfinance or health and education programs), although some 
promising (albeit early) pilots have been initiated.  
• The impact of social protection programs on vulnerability is also limited because programs focus 
either on the chronic poor or on non-poor formal sector workers. Safety net programs are biased 
toward income support for the chronic poor and are limited in their ability to expand in times of 
natural disasters or other aggregate shocks. The low coverage of programs means that poor and 
vulnerable households still have to deal with a significant amount of risk on their own, including that 
associated with idiosyncratic (health) and aggregate (economic shocks)—the most prevalent types of 
shocks and those which induce the highest losses on their own. Social security programs tend to 
provide insurance almost exclusively to the non-poor due to their strong links to formal employment.  
• Finally, social protection programs, both safety nets and social security, suffer from poor quality of 
service, deficient information, weak program management and excessive fragmentation, all of which 
detract from program effectiveness  
 
II. PAKISTAN’S SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
3.4 Social protection expenditure levels are low and skewed toward social security. The country 
spends about 1.4 percent of GDP on social protection (including civil service and military pensions), 
compared to 4.4 percent in India and 2.9 percent in Sri Lanka (Figure 3.1). Moreover approximately 75 
percent of these resources are allocated to public and military sector pensions, compared to 51 percent in 
India and 62 percent in Sri Lanka. 42  Even Bangladesh, which spends less than Pakistan on social 
protection (0.9% of GDP), devotes a significantly larger proportion of this budget to safety nets programs 
(0.6% of GDP) than to social security (0.3% of GDP). This bias in spending has important implications 
since social security tends to benefit the non-poor and those with access to the formal sector. Pakistan’s 
low spending on safety nets reflects the historically low importance attached to social protection and to 
the human development sectors generally. The fact that Pakistan spends little resources on these programs 
may have certain advantages, however. Limited resources prevent programs from growing too fast or 
excessively in response to reasons not entirely related to their main objective (say, for political reasons), 
and may contribute to keep program bureaucracy under control. Rather it is the combination of scarce and 
poorly targeted resources and a large number of programs that significantly undermine the effectiveness 
of these resources. 
                                                 
42
 Social assistance expenditures figures for Pakistan include pensions for private sectors workers, so that the actual 
safety net expenditure figure is below 0.5 percent of GDP (approximately 0.4 percent of GDP). 
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Figure 3.1: Spending on social protection in South Asia 
(% of GDP, 2004/05 or latest) 
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Sources: World Bank Staff estimates from country safety net and social 
protection reports and a regional pension study.43 Social assistance is for 
2004/05 and includes spending on those programs that each country report has 
considered part of the safety net/social assistance (such as targeted programs, 
workfare, food subsidies) which can give rise to some variation in what is 
covered by these estimates. Public sector pensions are for the latest year 
available and refer to spending on civil service and military pensions. Estimates 
are not fully comparable across countries, for example due to differences in the 
way that military and private pensions are included. The figure for Pakistan 
shown here includes spending on military pensions for comparative purposes, 
whereas the discussion in the remainder of this report excludes military 
pensions. 
 
3.5 In addition, social protection spending, as a share of total pro-poor spending, has declined 
significantly over time, primarily as a consequence of the reduction in the budget of three of the 
main safety net programs. This decline took place at a time of improved fiscal stance that was witness 
to increases in spending in other social sectors. Consolidated education expenditures increased from 1.5 
percent of GDP in 2001/02 to 1.78 percent in 2004/05, and total pro-poor, or PRSP expenditures, 
increased from 3.8 percent of GDP in 2001/02 to around 5 percent in 2005/06 according to the 
government. As a consequence, the share of social protection expenditures in PSRP expenditures fell 
from 7.2 to 3.3 percent between 2001/02-2005/06. 
 
3.6 Pakistan’s social protection system comprises a myriad of programs, ranging from cash 
transfer programs, to programs that supply textbooks to schools in poor areas, to pensions. 
                                                 
43
 Sources for social assistance are: Pakistan—this report; India—draft safety net study (forthcoming, 2007); Sri 
Lanka—“Strengthening Social Protection” (2007); Bangladesh—World Bank (2005c). Public pension spending 
estimates are from Palacios (2004) “Civil Service Pensions In South Asia: A Rising Tide Of Reform”. 
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Although generally conceived to alleviate poverty and fight vulnerability, these programs have different 
objectives, provide different types of benefits and target different groups of the population. The programs 
also vary widely in terms of their funding. The largest safety net programs are the Zakat, Bait-ul-Mal 
(both cash transfer programs), and the wheat subsidy. In 2003/04 these programs accounted for 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.14 percent of GDP, respectively. Social security includes both public and private pensions. As 
mentioned above, civil service pensions account for 0.50 percent of GDP, while private pensions account 
for 0.10 percent (Table 3.1). Not included in this account are the subsidies on power, water, gas, and 
fertilizer (see Box 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Spending and Beneficiaries of Main Social Protection Programs (2003/04) 
Expendi-
tures 
Share of 
GDP D 
Share of 
total SP 
budget 
  
(Rs. billion) (%)  (%) 
Source of 
funding 
Number of beneficiaries 
SAFETY NETS      
Income support and 
basic services 
     
Private  Zakat (guzara and other) 5.9 0.10 11.3 
(Zakat levy) 
1.6 mn A 
(guzara: 0.8 mn) 
 Bait-ul-Mal C 2.5 0.05 4.9 Federal budget 1.25 mn A 
 Social welfare services 0.5 0.009 1.0 Federal budget N.A. 
Exit Policies       
 Human capital 
accumulation--Tawana 
0.7 0.012 1.3 Federal budget 530,000 A 
Coping with Aggregate 
Risks 
     
 Wheat subsidy 8 0.14 15.4 Federal and 
provincial 
budgets 
N.A. 
TOTAL safety nets 17.6 0.31 33.9   
SOCIAL SECURITY     
Public sector      
 Civil service pension 
schemes (excl. military 
pensions)E 
28.0 0.50 53.8 Federal and 
provincial 
budgets 
0.8 mn retirees / 1.96 mn 
active workers 
Private sector      
 Employees Old Age 
Benefits (EOBI) 
1.7 0.030 3.3 Private sector 
employers 
225,000 retirees / 2.3 mn 
members / appr. 1.5 mn 
contributors B 
 Workers Welfare Fund 
(WWF) 
2.6 0.046 5.0 Private sector 
employers 
N.A. 
 Employees’ Social 
Security Institutions 
(ESSI) 
2.1 0.037 4.0 Private sector 
employers 
850,000 B 
TOTAL social security 34.4 0.61 66.1     
TOTAL 52.0 0.92 100.0     
Sources: Issues and Policies Consultants (2004); World Bank (2006a); and information from program managers. 
N.A. Not available 
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A
 Number of beneficiaries of recurrent cash and non-cash benefits. B Number of workers covered by insurance scheme. C 
Budget of Bait-ul-Mal has since been increased to Rs. 4.5 billion (0.08% of GDP) and the number of beneficiaries of 
FSP, its largest program, to 1.45 mn. D Based on revised estimate of GDP (at current market prices) for 2003/04 of Rs. 
5,641 mn. E Including military pensions would raise spending to Rs. 60 billion (1.07% of GDP), and beneficiaries to 1.9 
mn retirees and 2.9 mn active workers. Total SP spending including military would then be around 1.4% of GDP. 
 
3.7 The combination of low and declining expenditure levels and a large number of programs 
implies that resources are spread too thin, particularly in safety net programs. As a consequence, 
coverage is suboptimal, the benefits offered by these programs are often insufficient and their frequency 
is irregular. We discuss these issues in more detail below. 
 
Box 3.1: Fiscal expenditures on price subsidies are substantial, but do not provide social protection 
 
The federal government is planning to spend almost Rs. 90 billion on price subsidies in 2006/07, an increase of 75 
percent since 2004/05 in nominal terms (Figure 3.2). These subsidies—71 percent higher than total social 
protection spending and five times larger than total social assistance spending—cover the losses of utilities in the 
electricity, gas, and water sectors, lower the costs of fertilizers to farmers, and attempt to lower and stabilize the 
cost of basic food items. The bulk of the subsidy budget (82%) is spent covering the losses of WAPDA and KESC 
(Figure 3.3). This expenditure is as an attempt to provide energy and water to consumers (often urban and middle 
class) below cost. Most of these subsidies do not form part of a social protection ‘system’ as they do not target the 
poor, or mitigate against risk. Wheat subsidies are the exception, as they are aimed at consumer food security 
through wheat price risk management 
Figure 3.2: Federal Government Subsidies, 2004/05-
2006/07 (Rs. Million) 
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Figure 3.3: Most subsidies are for power and water 
(2005/06) 
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III. SAFETY NETS: PROVIDING INCOME AND SERVICE SUPPORT FOR THE POOR 
 
3.8 The main causes of high chronic poverty and vulnerability are low endowments of physical and 
human capital and limited access to basic services and markets, which in turn translate into low levels of 
consumption. For this reason the main objective of targeted safety net programs is to provide minimum 
income support or access to basic social services to the poor, particularly the most vulnerable within this 
group—normally children, the disabled and the elderly. Not all programs are designed to react quickly to 
the occurrence of shocks by, for instance, contracting and expanding, so that their overall impact on 
vulnerability is limited.  
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A. Cash Transfers (Income Support) and Basic Services 
 
3.9 Cash transfers to the poor and the provision of basic services for vulnerable groups (disabled, 
child labor, vulnerable women) are the main safety net programs in Pakistan. This section outlines the 
main issues facing the delivery of both of these services to the poor. 
 
1. Cash Transfers 
 
3.10 In Pakistan income support is provided through two cash transfer programs, Zakat and 
Bait-ul-Mal. Although similar in terms of their overall objective and target population, these programs 
have different histories, and are operated and funded in substantially different ways. Zakat is the Islamic 
term for charity and one of five pillars of Islam. The program, which is entirely based on private 
contributions, was initiated by President Zia ul-Haq in 1980. Interestingly, although the idea of private 
charity is clearly not exclusive to Pakistan, the fact that such a charity is administered by the government 
is uncommon (see Box 3.2 for a discussion of similar programs in other countries). In contrast, Bait-ul-
Mal (PBM), which was introduced in the early 1990s as a replacement for an existing food program, is 
both funded and administered by the government. 
 
 
Box 3.2: Zakat in other countries 
 
Zakat, or charity to the poor, is one of the pillars of Islam. Private, voluntary Zakat giving is an important part 
of the informal safety net in many Islamic countries. A study in Yemen, for example, found that overall Zakat 
transfers are quite well targeted to the poor. However, there is a heavy urban bias: 27 percent of urban 
households receive Zakat against 8 percent in rural areas. There is also a heavy concentration of giving at the 
timing of Ramadan. 
Only few countries have chosen to make Zakat part of their formal safety net system, among them 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan. Sudan’s Zakat Fund was established by law in the early 1980s with a 
setup that closely resembles Pakistan’s Zakat. It is a religious-based system of wealth redistribution founded 
on the moral responsibility of the rich toward the poor. Every Muslim whose wealth exceeds a certain level is 
obliged to give every year a fixed ratio of his accumulated wealth for the benefit of poor people. In 1984, the 
Zakat Act was passed and the fund was brought under the taxation department. In 1986, a Chamber was 
established to manage all Zakat operations, and in 1990 a new Act for Zakat was passed making the payment 
of Zakat mandatory for all wealthy persons and corporate bodies. The Chamber, which is independent of all 
other tax-raising agencies, is supervised by a board of trustees appointed by the President. It is audited by the 
Auditor General. States’ chambers and thousands of local committees at the level of villages and urban areas 
collect Zakat. Funds are disbursed to various categories of poor people. Sudan has been quite successful at 
raising revenues. Zakat resources have increased steadily over the years, and in 2001 US$51 million was 
collected, equivalent to 0.6 percent of GDP. The overall impact of the program remains to be evaluated. 
 
Sources: World Bank (2003a and 2003b). 
 
 
3.11 A detailed description of both programs is provided below combining administrative data and 
other information with new results from a special module of the PSNS developed for the purpose of this 
report. Conditional on data availability, the discussion focuses on the following issues: program 
objectives and benefits, institutional structure, financing, coverage and targeting, adequacy and impact of 
benefits, and quality of service provided by the program. 
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Zakat 
 
3.12 Zakat seeks to provide income and other support to the ‘Mustahiqeen’ (deserving needy) 
among the Muslims. Support under the program takes various forms, the most important of which are 
the subsistence (guzara) allowance and the rehabilitation grants for the establishment of small businesses. 
The guzara allowance is a recurrent monthly transfer of Rs. 500 per household, while rehabilitation grants 
are one-time payments that can range from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 30,000 per household. The program also 
provides education and health-related benefits to selected groups of beneficiaries (Table 3.2). 
3.13 Guzara accounts for the largest share of beneficiaries, while rehabilitation grants account 
for the largest share of program resources (Table 3.2). More than 800,000 households received income 
transfers from guzara, for an average annual value of Rs. 2,364. An additional 30 percent of households 
received education and health benefits, either in cash or in kind (see Box 3.3), while 10 percent received 
rehabilitation grants. Because these grants are significant, however, they account for 40 percent of all 
Zakat’s resources, followed by guzara, which distributes 30 percent of resources. All other programs 
under Zakat account for less than 10 percent of total resources each. 
3.14 Recent changes in the number of beneficiaries and the amount and distribution of resources 
have shifted the focus of the program, concentrating it on guzara and, particularly, the 
rehabilitation grants. The number of Zakat beneficiaries has declined slightly over time, from 1.7 
million in 2002/02 to 1.6 million in 2003/04, due mostly to a reduction in the number of households 
receiving educational stipends that was not fully compensated by the increase in the numbers of 
rehabilitation grants recipients (Table 3.2). The amount of resources distributed by the program stagnated 
in real terms during the same period.44 Because the growth in rehabilitation grants actually surpassed that 
of overall program resources (see discussion below), this change translated into a shift in program focus 
toward one-time grants despite the official rule that stipulates that at least 60 percent of program resources 
should be allocated to guzara. 
 
 
Box 3.3: Zakat for health care 
 
Around 3 percent of Zakat disbursements are used to finance healthcare. Under the program, the eligibility of a 
person is determined by the Local Zakat Committee of his permanent residence. However, in the event of an 
emergency, the Central Zakat Council is empowered to assess the eligibility of a patient. Presently, 80 national 
level hospitals/institutions are registered with the Central Zakat Council for eligibility to Zakat funds at the rate 
of Rs. 2,000 and 1,000 for in- and out-patient care, respectively. For treatments requiring larger sums of money, 
the Health Welfare Committees constituted in the eligible hospitals and headed by the Medical Superintendent of 
the hospital, are empowered to approve the medical treatment. 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Zakat expenditures grew in nominal terms from Rs. 5583 million in 2001/02 to Rs. 5861 in 2003/04, which 
represents stagnation in real terms.  
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Table 3.2: Overview of Zakat programs (2003/04) 
 (1) 
 
Budget 
(Rs. 
mn) 
(2) 
 
Expenditures 
(Rs. mn) 
(3) 
 
Total No. 
beneficiaries 
(4) 
 
Average 
annual 
benefit  
(5) 
 
Share of 
expenditures 
(%) 
(6) 
 
Share of 
beneficiaries 
(%) 
A. REGULAR 
PROGRAMS 
      
Guzara Allowance 2,168 1,923 813,642 2,364 33 51 
Educational stipends 650 409 289,181 1,414 7 18 
Stipends to Students 
of Deeni Madaris 
289 174 69,851 2,495 3 4 
Health Care 217 152 186,750 815 3 12 
Social 
Welfare/Rehabilitation 
145 121 25,544 4,740 2 2 
Marriage Assistance 
to Unmarried Women 
145 122 11,876 10,306 2 1 
Sub-total (A) 3,613 2,902 1,396,844 2,077 50 88 
       
B. OTHER 
PROGRAMS 
      
Eid Grant 210 209 0  4 0 
Leprosy Patients 1 0 56 8,214 0 0 
Permanent 
Rehabilitation 
Scheme, Phase III 
5,000 2,320 175,664 1,302 40 11 
Educational Stipends 
(Technical) 
1,000 429 22,310 19,240 7 1 
Sub-Total (B) 6,211 2,958 198,030 14,938 50 12 
       
Grand Total (A+B) 9,824 5,861 1,594,874 3,687 100 100 
Total as share of 
GDP 
0.17% 0.10%     
Source: Issues and Policies Consultants (2004) based on information from program administrators. Expenditures are 
in some cases lower than budget because of delays in disbursement.  
 
Institutional arrangements  
3.15 The government (through the federal Ministry of Religious Affairs and the provincial Zakat 
and Social Welfare Departments) supervises and regulates the program subject to the guidance by 
the Zakat Council, headed by a Supreme Court judge. Provincial Zakat committees are headed by a 
Provincial High Court judge. A system of voluntary Zakat committees at the local, district, and provincial 
levels implement the program and disburse the funds. There are almost 40,000 local Zakat committees in 
the country, staffed by some 400,000 unpaid volunteers, aided by a small support staff of clerks. 
Administrative costs are therefore very low (around 3 percent). However, there is no management 
information system and the system relies on paper records. Each Zakat committee is supposed to have 
nine members, of which two are women, and is meant to cover approximately 3,000 people. As a result it 
is common for larger villages to have multiple Zakat committees and for several small villages to be 
grouped under a single committee. Benefits are paid out through banks. 
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3.16 The system, however, is not free of flaws. Zakat committee members are supposed to be elected 
by villagers and to be apolitical, but field evidence indicates otherwise. As a consequence, 
implementation at the local level is often unsupervised and patronage is common (Box 3.4). In an attempt 
to correct this problem all local Zakat committees were dissolved in 2001 through a Presidential Order on 
charges of politicization and financial mismanagement of the system, and around 40,000 new Zakat 
committees were constituted. Unfortunately there is no systematic evidence on the impact of this measure, 
apart from the safety net survey which suggests that many issues remain unresolved (see below). In 2003, 
the Federal Cabinet appointed a Cabinet Committee to review these issues. Its report was submitted in 
November 2006 and is under consideration by the Cabinet. 
 
Box 3.4: Corruption and patronage in Zakat 
 
Based on field work in Sindh and Punjab, Kabeer, Mumtaz, and Sayeed (2006) report evidence of both 
corruption and patronage in the Zakat distribution system. People also perceived an apparent randomness and 
confusion in the eligibility decisions. Often, provision seems based on access to influential patrons or 
willingness to pay a bribe. They came across an area where multiple members of a single biraderi received 
Zakat while members of other, equally poor biraderis were completely bypassed. They also found evidence of 
petty bribes in getting access to the Bait-ul-Mal office, and in getting a government identity card. 
Writing about NWFP, Schlichting (2005) says that “Of all the people consulted for this report, the 
majority believed the current system of Zakat to be inefficient and ineffective… These criticisms are levelled 
at the current implementation of Zakat, and not the principle of Zakat. A commonly voiced frustration was 
over the large gap between the Zakat principle and its execution. The process of funds distribution is held to be 
highly politicised, and eligibility and selection for the program are both subjective…In one village in Swat, for 
example, people said that Zakat is a system to which the poor do not have access. A small group of landlords 
administers Zakat, and controls the selection process. They put only their own tenants and labourers on the 
Zakat list, and Zakat funds are then assigned to these people. However, because the tenants and labourers are 
in debt to the landlord, they are obliged to give the Zakat money directly back to their landlord.” 
 
 
Financing 
3.17 Zakat has a unique financing mechanism. The program does not receive public funding, but 
rather is financed through a special levy of 2.5 percent of the value of private financial assets (savings 
accounts and fixed financial assets, over a fixed threshold45). This levy is deducted at source at the 
beginning of the month of Ramadan and paid into a central fund administered by the autonomous Zakat 
Council and maintained by the State Bank of Pakistan.46 A part of the collected funds is disbursed to 
national institutions, such as hospitals, for providing free health care to the poor. The rest is forwarded to 
provincial Zakat councils for further distribution to district Zakat councils for ultimate delivery by local 
Zakat councils to the deserving poor. Zakat funds are allocated to provinces and districts on basis of 
population, while allocation within districts is based on needs, as perceived by the district committee, and 
no formal system exists to determine the intra-district allocation. Lack of geographic targeting is a major 
drawback, as discussed below. 
3.18 The program’s financial sustainability, however, is in question due to the decline in Zakat 
levy collections and the gradual depletion of program reserves. Contributions to Zakat declined from 
0.3 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 0.08 percent in 2002/03 (Figure 3.4). This decline can be attributed to 
a change in the regulation of the levy, which made payments voluntary after 1999 and allowed those with 
                                                 
45
 Only people who own assets the aggregate value of which is greater than 612.32 grams of silver are liable for 
Zakat, although there are several exceptions such as foreign denominated assets. 
46
 Ushr is a separate levy raised on the value of agricultural produce from large farmers; only very modest amounts 
of funding are raised in this manner. 
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a negative perception of the program (a majority) to stop contributions. Prior to 1999, all Muslim 
Pakistanis were obliged to pay Zakat, except those who filed a declaration that their ‘Fiqah’ (sect) does 
not permit payment of Zakat to the State, although loopholes made it relatively easy to evade the Zakat 
levy, for example by withdrawing funds from the financial system just prior to Ramadan. However, a 
1999 judgment of the Supreme Court made payment of Zakat voluntary for all. It allows all sects to file a 
declaration seeking exemption from paying Zakat on financial assets. Steps taken by program 
administrators to improve public opinion have so far proven insufficient to reverse the drop in funding. 
This problem is compounded by the gradual depletion of program reserves that has taken place in recent 
years (Figure 3.4). The accumulation of Rs. 15.0 billion in reserves between 1980 and 2003 prompted the 
government and the Central Zakat Council to introduce a new benefit, the Permanent Rehabilitation 
Scheme (rehabilitation grants), aimed at increasing access to economic opportunities among recipient 
households through the promotion of small businesses. In three years the program has distributed Rs. 5 
billion in grants, bringing reserves down to Rs. 10 billion. Once the accumulated reserves have been 
exhausted, which is set to happen around 2008, it will not be possible to sustain the current level of 
disbursements if declining levy collections remain the only funding source, which raises the question of 
the program’s long-term sustainability. 
Figure 3.4: Zakat revenue, in real and relative terms, 1980-2003 
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Source: Derived from information provided by Issues and Policies Consultants (2004) and by 
program administrators. 
 
Coverage  
3.19 Zakat’s coverage is very limited compared to Pakistan’s needs, stemming in part from a low 
budget. According to survey data,47 only 3 percent of all households receive benefits, mostly under the 
guzara (2.2 percent) and rehabilitation grants (0.4 percent) modalities (administrative data show higher 
coverage). Coverage is slightly higher in rural than in urban areas. Similarly coverage is highest in NWFP 
(5 percent of all households), followed by Balochistan (3.9 percent), Punjab (1.4 percent) and Sindh (1.3 
percent). These numbers fall abysmally short of the country’s needs measured in terms of poverty and 
vulnerability incidence. In fact only 50 percent of those who felt they needed assistance applied for it and 
                                                 
47
 This is based on PSNS Phase I which is nationally representative and has a sample size of 30,005 (see Appendix 
1).  
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only 22 percent of all program applicants received any benefit. Many of the rejected applicants were 
among the poor. The main reasons given for seeking assistance were widowhood, disability, health 
shocks and family-related shocks (e.g., daughter’s marriage), while those not applying for assistance did 
not do so because their expectations of receiving any were low. Low coverage results in part from limited 
resources. Zakat’s budget is equivalent to 0.13 percent of GDP and has been declining over time. 
Coverage levels are also low when compared to those of other countries. For instance, 20 percent of the 
population received government cash transfers in Vietnam in 1997 (Prescott, 1997) and more recently 
Oportunidades in Mexico paid transfers to 20 percent of the population. 
Targeting  
3.20 The targeting of Zakat has some pro-poor elements but could perform better. According to 
PSNS Phase II, around 27 percent of guzara beneficiaries and 37 percent of those receiving rehabilitation 
grants are not poor, accounting for 32 and 45 percent of the resources distributed under each modality 
(Table 3.3). Comparisons of (pre-program) average consumption levels among beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households tell a similar story. Average expenditure levels among guzara beneficiaries are 11 
percent higher than those of non-recipient households, while no significant differences exist among those 
in the rehabilitation grant program. Comparing to other countries, the targeting performance of Zakat is 
worse than poverty-targeted conditional programs in Bangladesh, Mexico, and Central America (see 
Table 3.4 based on expenditure quintiles from PSNS Phase I). 48  In Honduras, some 80 percent of 
conditional cash transfers reach the bottom 40 percent, in Mexico it is 62 percent, and in Bangladesh 
around 48 percent of Food for Education resources go to the bottom 40 percent. In Pakistan, Bait-ul-Mal 
delivers around 46 percent of its benefits to the poorest 40 percent of the population, while Zakat overall 
has around 43 percent of resources flowing to the bottom 40 percent of the population (for guzara, the 
figure is 33 percent; for rehabilitation, 47 percent; and for other Zakat such as stipends, 55 percent).  
Table 3.3: Distribution of benefits and beneficiaries  
Ultra-poor Poor Non-poor   
% of 
beneficiary 
households 
% of 
program 
funds 
% of 
beneficiary 
households 
% of 
program 
funds 
% of 
beneficiary 
households 
% of 
program 
funds 
Total 
Guzara 39 33 33 35 27 32 100 
Rehabilitation 44 23 19 32 37 45 100 
Bait-ul-Mal 46 45 30 32 23 23 100 
All sample households 38  35  27  100 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey (representative of safety net 
recipients/applicants).  
Note: Before forming the income groups, expenditures have been adjusted to counterfactual pre-program levels by 
subtracting half of the average monthly program receipt over the last 12 months from the total expenditure.  
3.21 The question then arises as to what factors may explain the mixed targeting record of Zakat, 
both in terms of beneficiary selection and benefit allocation. We consider three such factors 
below: (i) lack of an objective targeting tool, (ii) selective program access, and (iii) biased 
benefit level determination. 
                                                 
48
 Phase I, which was nationally representative, did not contain a consumption module, so the quintiles here are 
based on short, self-reported adult equivalent expenditures which have been adjusted to reflect pre-program levels 
by subtracting half of benefits. There is one exception, rehabilitation grant, where quintiles have not been adjusted 
for benefits, because these benefits represent one-off investment grants rather than consumption support.  
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Table 3.4: Targeting performance of cash transfers in Pakistan and internationally 
(Cumulative share of benefits, by quintile, in percent) 
  Zakat   
Quintile 
Bait-
ul-
Mal  
  
Guzara Rehabilitation 
Other 
Zakat 
a/
 
All 
Zakat 
  
 
PRAF 
(Honduras) 
PROGRESA 
(Mexico) b/ 
Food for 
Education 
(Bangladesh) 
Lowest 16 16 42 21 29  43 40 - 
2 33 47 55 43 46  80 62 48 
3 52 73 77 64 67  94 81 - 
4 71 89 91 82 83  98 93 - 
Highest 100 100 100 100 100   100 100 100 
Sources: Pakistan data are staff estimates based on data from Phase I of Pakistan Safety Net Survey, which was 
nationally representative, and quintiles are based on short, self-reported adult equivalent expenditures adjusted to 
reflect pre-program levels. International data are from World Bank (2005j). See also Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 
2004. Notes: a/ Other Zakat include stipends, marriage grants, etc. b/ PROGRESA is now called Oportunidades.  
3.22 Broadly speaking, Zakat aims to target the ‘deserving needy’, but no objective targeting 
tool is used. The ‘deserving needy’ are understood to include widows, orphans, the disabled and others 
living in genuine poverty, but no operational definition of poverty or targeting mechanism exist, leaving 
eligibility decisions in the hands of the chairmen and members of the local Zakat committees. Although 
allowing for subjective judgment can help officials reach decisions that take into account a variety of 
circumstances not captured by a pre-set formula, these decisions are often based on subjective judgment 
and can be easily twisted for patronage and political purposes or even exploited by corrupt individuals. In 
fact econometric analysis of the determinants of beneficiary selection shows that, although selection does 
depend positively on some pro-poor factors (e.g., female-headed household, illiterate household head, 
presence of elderly, etc.), others appear to have no explanatory power (e.g., mud house, large household 
size, high dependency ratio, amount of cultivated land), corroborating the idea that selection decisions do 
to a large extent respond to the discretion of the Zakat committee, which sometimes leads to inclusion 
errors.49 As a result, while both the need for assistance and program applications are more common 
among the poorest, selection rates are only modestly higher among low income quintiles. Moreover, most 
of the rejected applicants belong to the lowest quintiles–there are large exclusion errors. In fact, the 
rejected applicants tend to be poorer than the accepted applicants (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Distribution of PSNS Phase I sample by program status and quintile 
(in column %) 
Quintile
1 21.3                36.8                   28.8                       16.1               20.1                  
2 19.6                23.2                   23.1                       19.0               20.0                  
3 20.5                18.1                   19.7                       20.4               20.0                  
4 16.3                12.4                   15.9                       21.8               19.9                  
5 22.3                9.5                    12.6                     22.7             20.0                  
Total 100.0              100.0                 100.0                     100.0             100.0                
Beneficiary of 
cash transfer
Applied, did not 
receive
Felt the need but 
did not apply
Did not feel 
the need All households
 
Source: staff estimates based on data from Phase I of Pakistan Safety Net Survey, which was 
nationally representative; quintiles are based on short, self-reported adult equivalent expenditures 
adjusted to reflect pre-program levels. 
 
3.23 In addition, although Zakat has extensive field presence, program offices tend to be located 
in relatively better off localities. Approximately 88 percent of all localities covered by the PSNS had a 
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 See Appendix 3 for a detailed discussion of the econometric analysis. 
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Zakat committee and in 80 percent of these the committee was active and met on a regular basis. Sindh 
constituted the main exception to this overall pattern, with committees in only 75 percent of localities, and 
functioning committees in only 55 percent. Communities with active Zakat committees, however, appear 
to have higher (pre-program) income per capita than those without. This difference was more marked in 
rural areas and among communities with beneficiaries of the rehabilitation grant program. This is 
confirmed by multivariate analysis of program placement, which shows that Zakat is more likely to cover 
locations with relatively more developed village infrastructure and where other development programs 
exist50 (Table 3.6). As a result, it becomes difficult or impossible for those living in the poorest, and often 
most remote communities, to access Zakat.  
Table 3.6: Average household income according to program presence 
(Rs. per month) 
 Guzara Rehabilitation Bait-ul-Mal 
 No 
presence 
Present No 
presence 
Present No 
presence 
Presence 
Rural 5,314 6,074 5,659 6,214 5,762 5,725 
Urban 7,984 7,054 7,453 8,447 7,796 6,934 
Total 6,450 6,381 6,343 6,823 6,495 6,413 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase I of Pakistan Safety Net Survey 
(nationally representative, but based on brief self-reported incomes).  
 
3.24 Finally, benefit levels under Zakat appear to increase in absolute value with household 
income and other measures of welfare. Average benefit payments paid by guzara are 5 to 10 percent 
higher among the non-poor than among the poor or the ultra poor (both for the last installment and when 
all payments over a 12-month period are taken into account). Again the non-poor bias is more marked in 
rural than in urban areas. As before, regression results tend to confirm that differences do exist, even after 
controlling for other factors—i.e., conditional on receiving benefits, amounts paid by the programs are 
positively correlated with factors associated with lower levels of poverty and vulnerability, such as low 
dependency ratios, ownership of arable land, ownership of dwelling and other assets (e.g., television). 
3.25 In sum, discretion in program selection, combined with biases in program location and benefit 
allocation that result in relatively better access and higher levels of benefits for the non-poor, explain why 
Zakat exhibits targeting outcomes that are below those observed for similar programs both inside and 
outside Pakistan (see discussion below on targeting of Bait-ul-Mal). 
Adequacy and impact of benefits  
3.26 Zakat’s (guzara) benefits have a limited impact on poverty and income distribution. Guzara 
transfers and rehabilitation grants represent 14 and 23 percent of average recipient household income, 
respectively (Table 3.7). These figures are higher among ultra poor households (25 and 42 percent) and 
lower among poor and non-poor households (around 6 to 8 percent for each program modality). In 
comparison conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico and Nicaragua provide approximately 21 
percent of average household expenditures. Given the relatively small size of program benefits, it is not 
surprising for poverty and inequality to decline only slightly as a consequence of these transfers.51 
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 Ibid. 
51
 Inequality in household expenditures, measured by the Gini coefficient, declines by 2.5 percent from 0.326 to 
0.318 once public cash transfers are taken into account (similar to the impact of private transfers on inequality). In 
addition, given that benefits account for a larger portion of household income among poorer households, it is likely 
that program impact on poverty is larger when using poverty indicators that weight extreme poverty more heavily, 
such as the poverty gap and the severity of poverty. Unfortunately these calculations are not available.  
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Although the fact that transfers represent a reasonably high share of household income among the ultra-
poor could suggest that they can potentially create disincentives for program exit, it is important to keep 
in mind that (i) consumption levels are extremely low for these households (i.e., less than one third of the 
poverty line) and that (ii) poor household characteristics and endowments make this group relatively more 
unlikely to benefit from initiatives that support sustainable poverty exit strategies. 
Table 3.7: Adequacy of program benefits 
(benefits received 12 months prior to survey) 
 Average annual benefit 
received (Rs), conditional 
on receiving 
Benefit in % of 
household 
consumption 
Benefit in % poverty line 
(Rs. 937 per month per 
person) for a family of six 
Benefit as % of 
average 
agricultural wage 
Zakat guzara    
Ultra-poor 3235 25 4.79 12.0 
Poor 2602 8 3.85 9.6 
Non-poor 2762 6 4.09 10.2 
Total 2892 14 4.28 10.7 
Zakat Rehabilitation    
Ultra-poor 5435 42 8.05 20.1 
Poor 2277 7 3.37 8.4 
Non-poor 3683 8 5.46 13.6 
Total 4751 23 7.04 17.6 
Bait-ul-Mal   
Ultra-poor 1886 11 2.79 7.0 
Poor 2318 8 3.43 8.6 
Non-poor 1545 5 2.29 5.7 
Total 1949 9 2.89 7.2 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net Survey, (representative of safety net 
recipients and applicants). 
 
3.27 Low poverty and inequality impact can be attributed to low benefit levels, and particularly 
to irregularities in benefit payments. It is common for beneficiary households to receive less than the 
stipulated benefit from Zakat. The total amount received by the average household from guzara during the 
last 12 months prior to the survey was Rs. 2,892, equivalent to 5-6 monthly payments of Rs. 500, 
compared to a full entitlement of Rs. 6,000 (or 12 monthly payments of Rs. 500). The main reason behind 
underpayment is the widespread custom of local Zakat committees to ‘make the Zakat money go further’ 
by paying smaller amounts to a larger number of households than what the stipulated rules and their 
available budgets would otherwise allow. Although each Zakat committee is supposed and budgeted to 
distribute guzara allowance to a fixed number of beneficiaries (often ten), many local Zakat committees 
choose to stretch their funds to cover double or triple the number of beneficiaries through fast entry and 
exit or decreasing payment frequency among beneficiaries (i.e., payment rotation).52 In this context a 
recent recommendation by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to increase guzara monthly allowances from 
Rs. 500 to Rs. 700 may fail to produce the expected results. 
3.28 Evidence on the impact of Zakat’s second most important component, the rehabilitation 
grants, is limited but positive. Results from a beneficiary survey by Gallup show that most beneficiaries 
had indeed used the grant to open a shop or a small business, and that almost three out of four of these 
                                                 
52
 Zakat has no official graduation or recertification policy for ceasing benefits; in practice, local Zakat committee 
chairmen use their judgment. Moreover, the report of the Auditor General Pakistan for 1995-98 maintains that, in a 
large number of cases, prescribed rules were not followed, and required standards of financial discipline were not 
observed (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2004). 
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shops and businesses remained viable at the time of the survey. Moreover, the data appears to suggest that 
75 percent of these businesses would not have come into existence had the money not been granted. 
Caution is needed in interpreting these results, however, since alternative programs and initiatives in 
support of small businesses exist such as microfinance and the like. 
3.29 Finally, in its current design, Zakat does not seem to have a positive impact on schooling.53 
Children in beneficiary households exhibit lower school enrolment rates than their counterparts, even in 
the same quintile (after income differences are taken into account). Although this could be explained by 
the low level of benefits relative to household income, international evidence suggests that tying benefits 
to school attendance, as increasingly done all over the world and also in the new Child Support Pilot (see 
Box 3.12), could improve human capital outcomes for the poor. 
3.30 In sum, Zakat’s potential poverty and inequality impact is undermined by the fact that 
benefits are small relative to household income, and paid irregularly. These outcomes result from the 
combination of the decline in program resources and the relative shift in program focus toward one-time 
benefits, such as the rehabilitation grants. Although these grants could hold promise in terms of 
improving access to economic opportunities among the poor, a careful evaluation is needed regarding the 
impact that their growth is having on Zakat’s coverage and overall capacity to alleviate chronic poverty. 
In fact modest, frequent, reliable, long-term cash transfers may be a better option to achieve this goal 
(DFID, 2005). 
Quality of service and beneficiary satisfaction  
3.31 The most common complaints about Zakat’s service concern the response time for payment 
activation after program registration, the cost associated with cashing program benefits, and the 
irregularity and lumpiness of benefit payments. The time elapsed from the submission of an 
application to Zakat’s to the moment the first payment becomes effective varies significantly. While 25 
percent of all applicants received their first payment within a month of application, 15 percent had to wait 
6 months and an additional 13 percent declared to have waited more than a year (Figure 3.5). In addition 
the cost of obtaining benefit payments is high both in terms of time and cash. One in ten households had 
difficulty accessing the funds after being approved for assistance. Zakat beneficiaries on average needed 
to make 1.8 visits to the payment center to obtain their assistance and more than one in six had to go three 
times or more. To this we need to add that one of every twelve beneficiaries declared to have paid a bribe 
to obtain their benefits at some point, with bribes averaging 10 percent of the transfer. Bribes were most 
often paid to the local Zakat chairman. Finally, beneficiaries complain about installments being infrequent 
and lumpy. Although payments are supposed to be made monthly, the average beneficiary waited 8.6 
months between guzara payments, with waiting times being higher in urban areas (Figure 3.6), and often 
received several installments at the same time. Unfortunately payment infrequency and lumpiness, which 
can be attributed to delays in the release of funds at the central, province and district levels, seriously 
undermine beneficiaries’ capacity to use payments to effectively smooth consumption over time. 
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 It is also possible for cash transfers to have a negative impact on labor supply due the income effect generated by 
the transfer. This could be further aggravated in the presence of special conditions for benefit recipiency, such as 
lack of employment. Although we have no information on the relationship between benefit recipiency and labor 
supply, the absence of work-related conditions in the case of Zakat no doubt mitigates potentially negative effects. 
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Figure 3.5: Waiting time for obtaining Zakat  
(from application to receipt, in months) 
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Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan 
Safety Net Survey (representative of safety net recipients 
/applicants) 
 
Figure 3.6: Average waiting time between guzara payments 
(in months) 
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Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety 
Net Survey, which is representative of beneficiaries all over the country  
3.32 Although a majority of beneficiaries expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects of Zakat, 
they still viewed the assistance provided by the program as positive. One in four beneficiaries said 
that benefit amounts were too low and infrequent, while fifty-five percent complained that funds were not 
given to deserving people but rather were allocated at the discretion of the local Zakat committee. In 
addition, some beneficiaries declared to have been victims of stigma (21 percent) or jealousy (16 percent) 
as a result of their affiliation with the program. Despite all of this, however, almost three quarters of Zakat 
beneficiaries believed assistance provided by the program to be helpful. 
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Bait-ul-Mal54 
Table 3.8: Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal expenditures, by subprogram 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
 Rs. 
(mn) 
% Rs. 
(mn) 
% Rs. 
(mn) 
% 
Food support program (FSP) 1834.5 85.6 1046.0 72.6 2062.9 81.1 
Individual Financial Assistance (IFA) 35.3 1.6 149.2 10.4 228.6 9.0 
Miscellaneous projects 41.5 1.9 70.3 4.9 94.1 3.7 
Prime Minister’s Kidney Centre 150.0 7.0 50.0 3.5 - - 
Bugti tribes 16.2 0.8 18.5 1.3 5.7 0.2 
Institutional rehabilitation (NGOs) 12.1 0.6 20.2 1.4 40.5 1.6 
Larkana housing scheme 5.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.3 0.1 
Administrative expenses 48.2 2.2 85.9 6.0 110.7 4.3 
       
Total 2142.8 100.0 1440.2 100.0 2544.9 100.0 
Total as % of GDP 0.072  0.060  0.057  
Source: Issues and Policies Consultants (2004) and program administrators. 
3.33 The Food Subsidy Program (FSP) constitutes the core of Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM), 
although the Individual Financial Assistance (IFA) has grown significantly in recent years. The FSP 
accounts for 75-80 percent of total PBM resources and most of PBM beneficiaries. It was launched in 
2000 with the objective of replacing a series of existing programs aimed at compensating the poor for 
rising wheat prices. 55  Since its creation the FSP has provided cash transfers to 1.2-1.25 million 
households, a number which has recently been increased to 1.46 million (Figure 3.7). The IFA is the 
second largest initiative under the PBM. It currently accounts for 10 percent of all programs resources, up 
from 1.5 percent in 2002/02. Assistance is supposedly restricted to needy individuals with no other means 
of income support, and is given on a first-come, first-serve-basis to approximately 30,000 households a 
year. Assistance can be granted under the following circumstances: reimbursement of medical expenses in 
government hospitals (up to a maximum of Rs. 300,000), reimbursement of education expenses for higher 
studies, support to creation of own business (up to Rs. 40,000), and other emergencies (up to Rs. 30,000). 
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 Of the 2,548 households covered in Phase II of the survey, 177 households received assistance from PBM, and 
these results are based on those beneficiaries as well as on findings from the community questionnaire, administered 
to key informants in all 300 sample sites. 
55
 The Federal Government had initially launched a Food Stamp Scheme in 1992 for in-kind food subsidies, which 
was discontinued owing to poor implementation. A re-designed Food Subsidy Scheme was initiated in 1994, which 
was renamed the Atta Subsidy Scheme in July 1997 aimed at providing a cash grant of Rs. 200 per month per family 
to 520,000 poor households across Pakistan. To qualify for the scheme, household income had to be less than or 
equal to only Rs. 1,500 per month. The number of beneficiaries and the amounts disbursed were well below the 
targets. The scheme was withdrawn in 1999, and FSP was then launched. 
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Figure 3.7: Number of Bait-ul-Mal beneficiaries, 1997/98-2006/07 
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Source: Issues and Policies Consultants (2004) based on PBM documents. 
 
Institutional structure  
3.34 Program support is delivered through the PBM provincial and district branches, which run 
independently of both the Zakat structure and the provincial and district social welfare systems. 
Applications are submitted at the district level and are processed by the District Food Support Steering 
Committees with assistance from PBM’s district office. Although district offices of PBM verify the 
information submitted by applicant through selective home visits, decisions about eligibility are made by 
the District Food Support Steering Committees headed by the District Nazims and remain essentially 
administrative judgments. Benefits have up to now been paid out through Post offices, but a technical 
review is underway to assess the most effective disbursement channel (Post offices or banks). 
3.35 PBM’s administrative costs are low and its management information system, though not 
without flaws, is significantly more developed than that of Zakat. Overall administration costs 
represent 4 percent of total resources (2 percent for FSP). This is relatively low compared to other cash 
transfer programs, which often run administrative bills in the order of 5 to 10 percent of total resources. In 
addition basic information on program beneficiaries is stored in a database accessible to program 
administrators—a significant advantage over similar programs, such as Zakat. Although this database is 
of limited use in its current format, a few improvements could transform it into an effective tool for 
monitoring the program in the future. For example, information could be collected on applicants who are 
not selected, and more could be done to systematically record key characteristics of all beneficiaries in a 
similar format. An agreement has been signed with NADRA for development of a new monitoring and 
information system. 
3.36 The system, however, still faces important institutional and administrative challenges. It has 
become clear in recent years that the PBM’s administrative capacity is insufficient to effectively manage 
all program components. District offices, in charge of administering an average of 10,000 cases on a 
regular basis, have until recently been staffed with one PBM officer, one data-entry operator, and a few 
support personnel. As a result PBM receives many more applications than it can process and eventually 
attend. Improvements in program capacity and coverage (see discussion below) will require additional 
financial and human resources. It is therefore welcome that PBM has taken recent steps to strengthen its 
district offices by creating new posts there. In addition, although program officials defend that eligibility 
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is determined exclusively on the basis of merit, there is no guarantee that in the future the system can be 
safeguarded from patronage, a risk which only strong management can fend off.56 
Financing  
3.37 PBM is financed with public resources and budgetary allocations have increased 
significantly in recent years. Unlike Zakat the PBM is fully financed through the government’s budget 
(Figure 3.8). Growth in the level of resources allocated to the program has been driven by the creation and 
expansion of the FSP, including recent increases during 2005/06 in the number of beneficiaries (from 
1.25 to 1.46 million households) and the transfer amount (from Rs. 2,400 to 3,000 per year), and by the 
creation of a new conditional cash-transfer program (Box 3.12). Nevertheless increases in PBM resources 
have only partially compensated for the decline in Zakat funding so that the combined budget of both 
programs has fallen from around 0.4 percent of GDP in 1991-1992 to spending of about 0.15 percent of 
GDP in 2003/04, and dropping further to 0.14 percent of GDP in 2004/05 (Table 3.9). 
Figure 3.8: Bait-ul-Mal’s revenue and expenditures, in real and relative terms, 1992–2006 
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Source: Derived from Issues and Policies Consultants (2004). 
Table 3.9: Combined expenditures by Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal 
(in Rs. million) 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Zakat 5583 8510 6027 6274 
Bait-ul-Mal 2232 2235 2804 2703 
     
Total 7815 10745 8831 8977 
     
In % of GDP 0.18 0.21 0.15  0.14 
Source: Derived from program documents 
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 In the absence of a formalized grievance addressal mechanism, politicians routinely make calls to the management 
and offices of PBM to enquire or complain about particular cases. The present management of PBM may have been 
able to avoid systematic mistargeting, but there is a concern that it may be far easier for the relatively better 
connected among the poor and destitute to get included. 
48 
Coverage  
3.38 PBM’s coverage is very limited as the result of limited administrative presence and lack of 
resources. Only 0.6 percent of all households interviewed by the PSNS receive PBM benefits (again, 
administrative records show higher coverage). Coverage is higher in rural than in urban areas (0.8 and 0.5 
respectively). Similarly coverage is highest in Balochistan (1.3 percent of surveyed households) and 
lowest in Punjab and Sindh (0.5 percent each). As discussed earlier, these numbers fall very short of 
existing needs, measured using either aggregate poverty and vulnerability figures or the number of 
applications received by safety nets programs such as Zakat and PBM. Low coverage appears to be the 
result of several factors, chiefly the lack of resources for expansion. First, only 26 percent of all localities 
covered in the survey have a PBM office and (maybe as a consequence) knowledge about the program 
among potential beneficiaries is limited (i.e., only 6 percent of all households sampled for the PSNS 
declared to know about the program). Second, PBM’s administrative capacity and budgetary resources 
are insufficient to effectively handle all existing beneficiaries and new applications, as mentioned above. 
Finally, despite similarities in their objectives, the demographic composition of PBM beneficiaries is 
somewhat different from that of Zakat. While Zakat provides support almost exclusively to Muslims, and 
within these more to Sunnis, PBM provides higher coverage to Shiites and to religious minorities, such as 
Hindus (Table 3.10). 
Table 3.10: Coverage by religion and sect  
(in percent) 
Religion Guzara Bait-ul-Mal 
Muslim 2.3 0.6 
 of which: Sunni 2.3 0.6 
 of which: Shia 1.7 1.1 
Christian 0.0 0.0 
Hindu 0.0 0.3 
Other 0.0 0.0 
No answer 0.9 0.0 
Don't know 0.0 0.0 
Total 2.2 0.6 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase I of 
Pakistan Safety Net Survey (nationally representative). 
 
Targeting 
3.39 Despite the fact that no formal mechanism is used, the FSP benefits of PBM are targeted 
toward the poor. Although PBM’s targeting appears somewhat more pro-poor than Zakat’s, it 
could still do better. Approximately 45 percent of PBM beneficiaries are ultra-poor and 30 percent are 
poor, accounting for almost 80 percent of total program resources (Table 3.3). Locations where PBM is 
present tend to be poorer than locations where it is not (Table 3.5). Some 46 percent of program resources 
flow to the bottom 40 percent of the population, less than in good conditional transfer programs 
internationally (Table 3.4). These results are confirmed by econometric analysis on the determinants of 
program selection, which show that eligibility is negatively correlated with household expenditure levels 
and positively correlated with some pro-poor factors (i.e., female- or elderly-headed household, mud 
house, etc.). Other important factors such as land ownership did not appear to play a role in determining 
selection though. 
3.40 Some differences in targeting exist, however, between FSP and IFA. Survey data shows that 
per-capita consumption levels are lower among FSP beneficiaries than among Zakat beneficiaries, both in 
rural and urban areas. In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists room for improvement in 
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the targeting of IFA (which gives higher benefits) since its beneficiary selection process depends heavily 
on recommendations by elected representatives to trigger a home visit. These results are similar to those 
described for Zakat, where the cash transfer components of the program also appears to be better targeted 
than the grant component (Permanent Rehabilitation).  
3.41 In addition, the PBM lacks a formal exit policy, jeopardizing the program’s capacity to 
respond to changing population needs. Once households are selected into the program, particularly into 
the FSP, they continue to receive assistance indefinitely irrespective of whether their (economic) 
circumstances have changed, while new applicants are only accepted into the program to the extent that 
resources are available. This implies that the FSP is more likely to provide support to the chronically 
poor, particularly those who were poor when the program was created, than to the transitorily poor. In 
addition, although the IFA is supposedly designed to provide assistance to those in transitory need, lack 
of transparency in the selection seriously undermines the program’s complementarity with FSP. 
 
Adequacy and impact of benefits  
3.42 FSP benefits are small relative to total household income and thus their potential impact on 
poverty and inequality is quite limited. FSP benefits are equivalent to 11 percent of household income 
among the ultra poor, and to 8 and 5 percent among the poor and the non-poor respectively (Table 3.7). 
The low level of benefits, combined with the program’s limited coverage, imply that the potential impact 
of PBM on poverty and inequality—and their ability to distort work incentives—is at best small at present 
levels of funding. 
3.43 Small benefits and low frequency of benefit payments may also jeopardize PBM’s 
effectiveness as a safety net. FSP benefits were until recently paid on a bi-annual basis and recently the 
payment frequency was reduced even further to one single annual installment. Even though small benefit 
levels may justify some clustering of payments in order to minimize transaction costs for both program 
administrators and beneficiary households, clustering undermines the extent to which program transfers 
contribute to consumption smoothing over time. As argued in Chapter 2, the combination of high levels 
of vulnerability and limited savings capacity among the poor and the vulnerable constitutes a strong case 
for programs that support minimum income levels on a continuous basis, instead of providing a one-time 
income windfall without further provisions or conditions regarding the use given to these funds. 
Quality of service and beneficiary satisfaction  
3.44 As with Zakat, the most common complaints about PBM’s service concern the response 
time for payment activation after program registration, the costs associated with cashing program 
benefits, and the irregularity and lumpiness of benefit payments. According to the PSNS, the time 
elapsed from the submission of an application to PBM to the moment the first payment becomes effective 
varies significantly. While 20 percent of all applicants received their first payment within a month of 
application, 50 percent had to wait 1-6 months and an additional 8 percent declared to have waited more 
than a year.57 In addition the cost of obtaining benefit payments is high both in terms of time and cash. 
One in ten households reported difficulty accessing the funds after being approved for assistance. FSP 
beneficiaries on average needed to make 1.6 visits to the payment center to obtain their assistance and 
more than one in twenty had to go three times or more. To this we need to add that one of every ten 
beneficiaries declared to have paid a bribe to obtain their benefit at some point, with bribes averaging 10 
percent of the transfer (similar to Zakat). Bribes were most often paid to the PBM officer or the person in 
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 The timing would depend on the next installment of FSP benefits. 
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charge of payments at the local post office.58 Finally, beneficiaries complain about installments being 
infrequent and lumpy. Although payments were supposed to be made bi-annually at the time of the 
survey, the average beneficiary waited eight months between FSP payments, with waiting times being 
higher in urban areas (Figure 3.9). 
 
Figure 3.9: Average waiting time between FSP payments 
(in months) 
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Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase II of Pakistan Safety Net 
Survey, which is representative of beneficiaries all over the country. 
 
3.45 Although a majority of beneficiaries expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects of PBM, 
they still viewed the assistance provided by the program as positive. Fifty percent of beneficiaries said 
that benefit amounts were too low and infrequent, and a third of beneficiaries were dissatisfied with 
program officials. In addition, some beneficiaries declared to have been victims of stigma (18 percent) or 
jealousy (14 percent) as a result of their affiliation with the program. Despite all of this, almost three 
quarters of Zakat beneficiaries believed the assistance to be helpful. 
 
Common challenges for Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal 
3.46 The Zakat and the PBM are among Pakistan’s most important safety nets programs, both 
in terms of coverage and resource allocation. As the discussion above illustrates, however, both 
programs fall short of their objective of providing adequate support for the poor and the vulnerable. 
Interestingly, different as they are in terms of their funding and business model, Zakat and PBM share 
some important common features and face similar challenges on the road to increased effectiveness and 
efficiency. We highlight some of those challenges here and take up a more detailed discussion on possible 
reform options until Chapter 4. 
3.47 The potential impact of Zakat and PBM is restricted by (i) their limited coverage and low 
and irregular benefits, (ii) their less-than-stellar targeting, and (iii) the low quality of their services. 
Limited coverage is primarily a function of insufficient resources that are spread too thin across too many 
subprograms and initiatives, resulting in serious exclusion errors. Both Zakat and PBM could benefit 
from some consolidation in terms of the various benefit modalities they offer. Benefits are low and 
irregular, and while they do not provide disincentives to work also are not likely to help households meet 
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 Although PBM establishes inquiry committees upon receipt of complaints, this has not been sufficient to wipe out 
bribery, at least as indicated by the PSNS. 
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even very minimum needs. Inclusion errors in targeting result from the lack of an objective targeting tool, 
combined with significant levels of discretion among program officials and others regarding program 
eligibility. Although PBM’s targeting is better than that of Zakat, both compare poorly with similar 
programs in other countries. The use of a reliable targeting tool, together with clear selection rules for 
program entry and exit could go a long way in improving program effectiveness in terms of both reaching 
the poorest, helping the poor escape poverty, and adapting to changing circumstances over time, including 
aggregate shocks. (We take up exit options for program participants and program response to aggregate 
shocks in section B and C below). Both programs also suffer from serious service problems concerning 
the delivery of benefits. Strengthening Zakat’s and PBM’s technical and human capacity, including 
information management capacity, and better monitoring and evaluation would constitute a step in the 
right direction. Finally, there is an issue of overlap of programs, as both programs provide income support 
to the poor.  
 
Box 3.5: Cash versus in-kind Transfers 
 
In designing social safety nets, developing country governments are faced with the choice between cash and 
in-kind transfers. A range of economic, administrative and political considerations influence this choice 
(Grosh 1994; Jimenez 1993). 
Economic Considerations: From an economic efficiency perspective, cash transfers are generally deemed 
to be superior to in-kind transfers because they do not directly influence market prices and because they offer 
recipients with greater freedom of choice and give them a higher level of satisfaction at any given level of 
income than is the case with in-kind transfers (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988). 
Administrative Considerations: Cash transfer systems require a larger and more sophisticated institutional 
structure than in kind transfer systems. Once that administrative system is in place, however, the costs of 
operating a cash transfer system are likely to be lower than that of an equivalent in-kind transfer system, such 
as a food stamp, public works, or commodity subsidy scheme (Grosh 1994). Unlike, food stamp or voucher 
programs, cash transfer programs do not need to incur the costs of printing, securing, collecting, or processing 
quasi-cash claims. Unlike food transfer programs, they do not require procurement, distribution, storing and 
distribution networks. Unlike public works programs, there is little need for site-specific design or technical 
supervision services. Also, the logistics of moving cash from one point to another are fairly straightforward 
compared with moving large quantities of a subsidized commodity. Cash is less costly to the recipient because 
it is universally accepted. 
Targeting Considerations: One administrative disadvantage of any form of cash transfer is the fact that 
cash cannot be self-targeted. Unlike basic foodstuffs or housing services, an "inferior" category of cash cannot 
be created to ration access to the needy. Criteria for program eligibility must be established, cash must be 
provided only to those whose eligibility can be verified, and their eligibility must be periodically reconfirmed. 
This imposes a significant administrative burden even for the simplest cash transfer scheme (Blackorby and 
Donaldson 1988). In addition, while cash transfers are rarely distributed as "cash" per se but are more often 
distributed in the form of personalized checks or postal money orders, or as direct deposits (as in the US and in 
almost three quarters of beneficiaries in OECD countries (OECD, 1999)), many developing countries may not 
have the administrative infrastructure needed to operate an extensive cash transfer system. Some poor rural 
households may be located in areas in which home production and barter are the predominant forms of 
exchange, meaning that cash is only of limited use to them. However, a small (vs. large) cash transfer may 
achieve this goal, given high opportunity costs in claiming benefit for the non-poor vs. poor, and, targeting of 
food transfers can also be fraught with difficulty given the challenges of food procurement, distribution, 
storage and leakage. 
Political Considerations: Despite the economic and administrative advantages of cash-transfer programs, 
it is often difficult to mobilize sustained political support for them. The fact that cash transfers convey greater 
freedom of choice to the recipient also creates the possibility that household members will use transfers to 
purchase goods and services that many governments would prefer not to directly finance, such as liquor, 
cigarettes, or gambling. To the extent that cash assistance is associated in the minds of the voters with 
consumption of “demerit” goods, this may weaken the appeal of cash assistance programs to a broad 
electorate. There are other reasons why politicians may favor in-kind transfers rather than cash assistance. 
Providing in-kind assistance is a more visible way for politicians to assure their electorate that the basic needs 
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of the poor have been provided for. Producers of basic goods and services (for example, builders, farmers with 
excess commodities, and health care providers) are also more likely to lobby politicians to provide social 
assistance in the form of the goods or services that they produce than they are for cash transfers. Nevertheless, 
recent innovations in cash transfers that condition their receipt on participation of poor in health and education 
programs and other income earning activities are in part addressing this concern, while at the same time 
improving prospects for households to exit poverty (See Tabor, 2005). 
 
 
2. Social Welfare and Care Services 
 
3.48 Several social assistance programs attempt to support specific vulnerable groups by 
complementing income transfers with social services. The main rationale for providing social services 
is that sometimes access to specific services, rather than or together with lack of income, constitutes the 
most important limitation for poverty alleviation and welfare improvement. These programs help 
individuals who experience welfare losses, e.g., loss of parents, disability, divorce/other family, through 
improving their access to a range of services, including, inter alia, legal services, psycho-social support, 
community-based rehabilitation, foster and adoptive care. Social welfare and care services are publicly 
financed, but service delivery can be, and is increasingly being, contracted to private providers. 
 
Table 3.11: Budget for federally implemented social care services, 2003/04 
Agency / program  Budget / Expenditure 
 (Rs. Million) % of total social assistance budget 
Directorate General of Special Education 177 0.90 
National Commission for Child Welfare and Development 4 0.02 
National Council for The Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons 23 0.12 
National Trust for the Disabled 147 0.75 
Bait-ul-Mal social care programs:  0.00 
Institutional rehabilitation (NGOs) 43 0.22 
National centers for the Rehabilitation of Child Labor 147 0.75 
Dastkari vocational training schools 24 0.12 
Total 565 2.88 
Total as % of GDP 0.01  
Source: Yearbook 2003/04, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education. 
 
3.49 The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education has been active in designing and 
providing several types of social welfare and care services programs for vulnerable groups, e.g., 
working children, vulnerable women and disabled. The programs are publicly financed and administered 
by the federal government in some instances (e.g., special education schools for children with disabilities; 
PBM child labor or vocational training centers); provincial governments (beggar and drug addict homes; 
Punjab Child Protection Bureau); and districts (district social welfare offices). Some of the main service 
initiatives are:  
 
• To address child labor, the Bait-ul-Mal runs several National Centers for Rehabilitation of 
Child Labor (NCRCL). By 2007, PBM had established 149 NCRCL across Pakistan and another 1 
is planned. Children enrolled in NCRCL receive free primary education (completed in three years 
instead of the usual five), clothing, footwear, books and stationery. To compensate families for the 
opportunity cost of sending their children to school, enrolled children receive a stipend of Rs. 10 per 
day and their parents are paid Rs. 300 per month, translating into a total incentive of Rs. 600 ($10) 
per month. The program also offers teachers a higher-than-average salary to teach in NCsRCL in the 
hope of attracting academically better-qualified teachers capable of imparting primary level education 
in a reduced time. The maximum enrollment per centre is 120 children and around 18,000 children 
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are currently enrolled under the program. The program has a budget of Rs. 147.2 million (around 0.75 
percent of the total social assistance budget), or the equivalent to Rs. 1.9 million per centre or Rs. 
15,000 per child per year.59 
• To improve employment prospects of vulnerable groups. The Bait-ul-Mal provides training to 
orphans and poor girls and widows. The Dastkari/Vocational Training Centers, implemented by 
PBM, provide free training to widows, orphans and poor girls in different skills with the overall 
objective to make them self-reliant. Some 124 schools are operational, and another 26 are planned. 
An independent review of the Dastkari Schools, commissioned by the Ministry of Women 
Development, concluded that unless the program is revamped with a greater focus on market oriented 
skills it is unlikely to have any significant impact on skills development of women in the targeted 
segments of the population. 
 
• To address disability. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education implements several 
programs and has formulated a national policy and plan of action for addressing disability. To 
promote inclusive education, Pakistan has a network of Special Education Centers and other similar 
facilities providing education to students with more severe disabilities. Official estimates suggest that 
only 1.7 percent of students with special needs are served by these schools. The Government also 
encourages employers to hire workers with disabilities and has raised the job quota for persons with 
disabilities from 1 to 2 percent of all formal sector jobs. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
these provisions are not enforced.  
 
• To develop an over-arching framework and develop a more consistent approach to addressing 
disability. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education formulated the National Policy 
for Persons with Disabilities. The policy and its associated action plan aimed to create an 
environment in which persons with disabilities could realize their ‘full potential’ through ‘inclusive 
mainstreaming’ and ‘empowerment’. Areas of focus include prevention, early detection, provision of 
services, inclusive education, vocational training and employment, research and advocacy. Since the 
plan’s approval some efforts have been made toward implementation, but important challenges in 
mainstreaming disability remain.  
 
3.50 Current programs are fragmented and no over-arching framework for service provision to 
vulnerable groups exists. The fragmentation of programs across groups, e.g., for child labor, vulnerable 
women and children and disabled and across several public agencies without clear prioritization of 
services reduces the impact of programs and their ability to address welfare. The lack of clear 
identification of vulnerable (e.g., using a similar or the same criteria as cash support programs) likely 
impedes the targeting of program resources (together with income support) to those truly in need.  
3.51 Public financing of social welfare and care services is low relative to existing needs, 
resulting in deficient coverage. Federal government expenditures on social care services in 2003/04 was 
around Rs. 565 million (less than 3 percent of total social assistance spending, Table 3.11). These low 
aggregate levels of resources (coupled with program fragmentation noted above) inevitably lead to poor 
coverage and weak administrative capacity to deliver services and monitor and evaluate initiatives.  
                                                 
59Aside from this initiative to limit the supply of child workers, there are efforts to reduce the demand of child 
workers from employers. Recent pressure from foreign corporations on local companies that employ child labor 
(e.g., export oriented sports and surgical goods industries) has also helped reduce the demand for child labor in the 
country. However, these efforts are limited and the incidence of child labor remains considerable—2.5 million 
children aged 10-14 (16 percent of all children in that age) and an unknown number below age 10 are working. 
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3.52 The public sector’s role in service provision is currently focused on delivery instead of 
policy development, setting service standards, regulation and supervision. The Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Special Education, its associated agencies, and provincial governments are involved in 
program delivery (e.g., through the National Disability Trust), and contracting of services with private 
providers (see below) has not been fully exploited. The more appropriate role of the Ministry in policy 
development and overall regulation and supervision of services needs to be considerably strengthened. 
This includes determining eligible vulnerable groups (in conjunction with the income support programs), 
developing a menu of priority services, establishing service standards, licensing, regulating, and 
supervising service providers, and monitoring and evaluating program impact. Funding service provision 
through public-private partnerships could also be considered. 
3.53 Private provision of services by NGOs to vulnerable groups exists, but their coverage is also 
limited. Several NGOs are involved in providing services to vulnerable groups, often financed through 
charitable donations and, to a lesser extent, through public funding. Several NGOs such as the Edhi Trust 
are well known and have been active in providing a range of services (often related to health or education) 
to poor and vulnerable groups. For the disabled, there are also a number of organizations that provide 
services, e.g., Khalid Nizami Disability Fund, the Organization for the Rehabilitation of Disabled 
Persons, STEP and Milestones Society for Special People. However, most of these organizations are 
based in urban areas and concentrated in Punjab and Sindh, leaving large rural areas and other provinces 
uncovered. More recently, in response to the earthquake, the provision of community based welfare and 
care services to disabled groups in earthquake affected areas is being implemented through the partner 
organizations (e.g., Rural Support Programs) of the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund.  
 
Box 3.6: Disability in India 
 
A careful assessment of disability in India concludes that a multifaceted approach is needed for disabled 
people to realize their full individual potential and to maximize their social and economic contribution to 
society. The situation of PWDs is heterogeneous, and so are the policy options for different groups of disabled 
people. There are substantial differences in socio-economic outcomes, social stigma, and access to services by 
disability type, with those with mental illness and mental retardation in a particularly poor position. Among 
other things, the study concludes that: 
• The official estimates of the incidence of disabilities, around 2 percent of the population were found to 
underestimate disability. The true incidence is more like 4-8 percent of the population. 
• Physical and mental impairments are compounded by poor education outcomes. PWDs have excess 
illiteracy rates and children with disabilities have out of school rates five and a half times the general rate. 
• Efforts to minimize disability (e.g., immunization, early detection, better outreach for rehabilitation) will 
be critical, but more effective efforts to ensure inclusion of disabled in basic services (e.g., inclusive 
education, health, social protection programs) will also be required. 
• Prevention will require strengthening preventive and curative health care services. 
• Inclusion can be strengthened through improvements in available information on disability and reducing 
stigma. 
• Better outcomes will require stronger coordination of efforts within the public sector, engagement 
between public and non-public actors, and mobilization of actors in local governments and community 
institutions. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2006c. 
 
 
Challenges for Social Welfare Services 
3.54 The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education is aware of these issues and has 
announced its intention to strengthen service provision to special vulnerable groups. The Ministry 
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has signaled its intention to strengthen social welfare services, particularly at the community level, in 
partnership with private providers. To do, so the Ministry intends to strengthen program administration 
(human and physical resources), in particular its ability to develop policies and its capacity to fund, 
monitor, and regulate and evaluate services (see Box 3.7).  
 
Box 3.7: Earthquake social protection response 
 
The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education has formulated a plan to strengthen its organizational, 
institutional and human capacity, as well as that of the Provincial and District Social Welfare departments, to 
implement the National Social Protection Strategy (under preparation) and the National Plan of Action for the 
Protection of the Most Vulnerable Population in Earthquake-affected areas. The plan includes (i) the 
establishment of a dedicated Social Protection Unit within the Ministry with the capacity to guide and evaluate 
pilot programs; (ii) strengthening of core competencies of senior and mid-level staff; (iii) launch of a staff 
development program; (iv) conducting a rapid assessment of institutional, organizational, and human capacity 
in earthquake affected areas, to pilot an assessment methodology for a country wide assessment; and (v) 
building the capacity of Social Welfare departments in earthquake-affected areas.  
 
 
B. Supporting Exit from Poverty 
 
3.55 Basic income support and services help address chronic poverty and provide minimum 
support those who fall into poverty because of a shock, but more effort is needed to help the poor 
escape and remain out of poverty. Several programs are geared to promoting exit from poverty. For the 
working poor, these programs include microfinance programs that provide access to credit (and hence 
income) for the poor and public works programs that generate employment (and infrastructure). For 
children, these programs include conditional cash transfer programs that make income support conditional 
on participation in health and education programs. As was the case with income support and basic 
services programs, if well designed these initiatives can also be used by the poor and the vulnerable as 
coping mechanisms in the event of a shock. 
 
1. Access to income earning opportunities for the poor 
 
3.56 Efforts to increase access to income generating opportunities among the poor of working age in 
Pakistan have been concentrated around microfinance (MF) programs and public works programs.60  
Microfinance  
3.57 Because of extensive market failures in financial markets, microfinance institutions can 
potentially play an important role in providing credit and other financial services to low income 
households. 61 International evidence suggests that microfinance programs can have very positive impacts 
on reducing poverty. The most successful MF programs are profitable and depend little or not at all on 
donor funding, relying instead on commercial sources of funds. They offer loans and an array of financial 
services, including micro-insurance. Program evaluations indicate that microfinance programs have had a 
positive impact on the welfare of their clients. By increasing earning and savings, financial services have 
allowed poor households to make the transformation from ‘every-day survival’ to planning for the future. 
                                                 
60
 The country has also developed many training programs (see for example discussion of Bait-ul-Maal above), but 
an in-depth discussion on these is outside the scope of this report and is being handled in a contemporaneous World 
Bank report on Labor Markets. 
61
 For a review of literature, see del Ninno and Dorosh, 2001, Matin and Hulme, 2003, CGAP, 2006, Littlefield, 
Murdoch, and Hashemi (2003). 
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Improving the permanent earnings of their clients has led households to send their children to school, 
increased nutrition outcomes and reduced poverty.62 
3.58 In Pakistan, MF is offered mainly through the banking sector (Khushali Bank) and a 
number of NGOs, many of them affiliated with the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). All 
these institutions provide lines of credit for rural and urban low-income households. Khushali Bank offers 
short-term loans ranging up to $500 for working capital and purchase of productive assets. It also 
proactively mobilizes deposits and provides financial counseling to its clients. The bank promotes its 
business through community meetings in which potential borrowers are identified, and after due 
diligence, credit is advanced. It also offers repeat lending to borrowers with good repayment record, 
opening up a “line of credit”. The PPAF is a wholesaler of funds to partner organizations (NGOs) offering 
three main products: lines of credit for expansion of poverty-targeted micro-credit programs, grants and 
loans for building community infrastructure, and grants to strengthen and build the institutional capacity 
of partner organizations. After the earthquake of October 8, 2005, PPAF also entered into relief and 
reconstruction. Many of the partner organizations are members of the Rural Support Network of NGOs, 
including the National Rural Support Program (NRSP). NRSP now operates in 73 districts, has extended 
credit to over a million individuals, and has financed a large volume of community level physical 
infrastructure. 
 
Box 3.8: Bangladesh: Vulnerable Groups Development Program 
 
Bangladesh has addressed this problem through an innovative program called Vulnerable Group Development 
(VGD). VGD assists almost half million very poor households by providing first food aid, as a breathing 
space, and later training for life-skills and skills needed for income generation. After this, most beneficiaries 
‘graduate’ to become MF clients, building new livelihoods based on micro assets. Graduation allows the 
program to continuously reach new beneficiaries among the very poor. Impact evaluations of VGD show that 
program participation helps increase consumption and income levels for beneficiary households compared to 
non-beneficiary households (World Bank 2005c). 
 
 
3.59 The MF sector has limited coverage in Pakistan relative to other countries in the region. 
Pakistan has around a half million active MF clients (Figure 3.10). The coverage of micro-finance 
organizations in Pakistan is lower than most South Asian countries. After only four years of operations, 
the coverage of microfinance was already higher in Afghanistan than Pakistan. The slow growth of MF in 
Pakistan is caused in part by the lack of a solid and profitable core business, relying on subsidized donor 
funds instead of profitability (Rasmussen, 2005).  
                                                 
62
 See del Ninno and Dorosh (2001), Matin and Hulme (2003), CGAP (2006), Littlefield, Murdoch and Hashemi 
(2003). 
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Figure 3.10: Coverage of microfinance in South Asia 
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Source: Rasmussen (2005). 
 
3.60 The impact of existing MF schemes for those who do receive credit appears positive. An 
assessment of Khushali Bank’s micro credit program concludes it has positive impacts on both economic 
and social indicators of welfare, as well as on income-generating activities, especially among the very 
poor (Montgomery, undated). There is evidence of positive impacts on agricultural and non-agricultural 
sales, expenditures on children’s education and health care (Montgomery, undated). The bank has 
generated these impacts while remaining focused on the goal of financial sustainability. Similarly an 
evaluation of PPAF’s conducted by Gallup showed that borrowing households were better off than non-
borrowing household, with the former realizing gains in income, consumption, and personal and business 
assets. The mean return on investments financed through loans was approximately 30 percent per annum 
(PPAF, 2004).  
3.61 However, MF fails to target the poor and the ultra poor. Most Pakistani MF institutions do 
not offer loans that are sufficiently small to be of relevance to the poorest. As a result less than 2 percent 
of poor households borrowed from NGOs or banks (Figure 3.10). Instead low-income households borrow 
from friends and relatives, but also from shopkeepers, moneylenders, and landlords, often at usurious 
rates. Lack of outreach to the ultra-poor also plagues other micro-credit programs, given that the very 
poor need extra training and outreach to become successful clients, and not all poor have entrepreneurial 
skills. However, this problem is more severe in Pakistan. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, over 60 percent of 
the poor are micro-finance clients. The microfinance coverage of the poor is lower in India and Nepal, 9 
and 14 percent, respectively, but still far higher than in Pakistan.  
3.62 For this reason, microfinance organizations are increasing their outreach to safety net 
programs which serve the poorest groups. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and 
other microfinance organizations are placing considerable emphasis linking up with safety net schemes 
(that reach the poorest groups) to help beneficiaries with entrepreneurial ability gain access to micro-
finance programs (Hashemi, 2006). Training poor beneficiaries in the bureaucratic formalities (forms, 
etc.) for accessing microfinance schemes, helping them to start-up savings, and giving them small start-up 
loans are some of the ways in which the poor can become viable clients of microfinance organizations. 
Similarly, many safety net schemes are increasingly finding it important to train their clients to access 
micro-credit (and training/skills) in order to escape poverty. The most successful example of a program 
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that has exploited this synergy between safety nets and microfinance schemes is the Bangladesh VGD 
program, which has helped many extremely poor women escape poverty through training that enables 
them to access and use micro-credit schemes (Box 3.9). 
3.63 Important challenges remain, however. These can be summarized as follows: 
• The MF sector needs to expand coverage. Achieving impact requires scaling up and deepening 
outreach. MF institutions have failed to grow their outreach at the speed seen in other developing 
countries. Although more research is needed on the reasons for slow MF expansion in the country, 
regulatory constraints do not appear to be a major issue. Pakistan needs to build strong, profitable MF 
institutions that are able to expand outreach using low cost approaches. 
 
 
Box 3.9: Moving from Income Support to Self-Employment 
 
Microfinance may reach low-income households, but many countries have found that the very poor are 
unlikely to benefit, because of social stigma and inability to repay loans. Bangladesh has addressed this 
problem through an innovative program called Vulnerable Group Development (VGD). VGD assists almost 
half million very poor households by providing first food aid, as a breathing space, and later training for life-
skills and skills needed for income generation. After this, most beneficiaries ‘graduate’ to become MF clients, 
building new livelihoods based on micro assets (World Bank 2005c). Graduation allows the program to 
continuously reach new beneficiaries among the very poor.  
Sequencing for Graduation to MFIs
Guranteed 
Employment
Food Aid
Cash Grants
Increased Food 
Security
Skills Training
Savings
Small Subsidized 
Loans
• Asset Creation
• Micoenterprise 
  Experience
Graduation to 
Conventional 
MFIs
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
 
Impact evaluations of VGD show that program participation helps increase consumption and income levels for 
beneficiary households compared to non-beneficiary households. Most households benefiting from cash 
transfer programs have increased household income and the quality and quantity of food-intake, reducing the 
poverty level of beneficiaries. 
Source: del Ninno and Dorosh, 2001, Matin and Hulme, 2003, CGAP, 2006, Littlefield, Murdoch, and Hashemi (2003). 
 
• The MF sector needs to increase its menu of financial products. Few products are offered apart from 
loans. Some of the potential microfinance products in Pakistan are savings services, health insurance, 
group life insurance, money transfer services, housing loans, etc.  
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• Pakistan’s MF sector could better target the poor and women, for example, through very small and 
flexible loans. The microfinance sector could also consider expanding its efforts in conjunction with 
income support programs—to meet the existing demand for credit among low income groups—
particularly for the entrepreneurial poor, through appropriately designed and privately provided 
training programs. 
 
Workfare Programs 
 
3.64 Public works or workfare programs have the objective of creating critical local 
infrastructure that can help generate income earning opportunities for the poor. Depending on the 
complexity of the works, these programs are often contracted to the private sector and use skilled labor. 
However, sometimes there are stipulations on private contractors to use local or poor labor. Other works 
programs, often far less complex (seeding, cleaning up, small works.) can, if wages provided are low and 
programs are well administered, be self-targeted to the poorest households. These programs can act as a 
screening device for cash transfer programs (i.e., cash transfer is provided conditional on work). If 
undertaken in slack seasons or in times of natural disasters, can also can help smooth household 
consumption against shocks in employment (seasonal unemployment or natural disasters)—a topic taken 
up in the next section.63 
 
3.65 Pakistan has implemented several public works type programs to provide temporary 
employment to vulnerable groups. While the country has several small-scale rural infrastructure 
programs, the main public works programs that have been implemented in Pakistan include: workfare for 
Afghan refugees, the Khushal Pakistan Program, and the Rural Support Program. However, at present the 
country does not have any major workfare program. There may be scope for developing workfare 
programs in Pakistan to meet the needs of generating infrastructure, local employment and seasonal 
downturns.  
 
3.66 Three public works projects targeted to the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan were 
implemented in the 1984-1996 period by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees with World 
Bank assistance. While no rigorous randomized evaluation of the program was undertaken, a program 
evaluation concluded the program had met its employment creation objective very successfully: Nearly 
22.6 million person days of employment was created over a 12-year period, of which refugee person days 
amounted to 17.2 million and local Pakistanis accounted for the rest, exceeding planned levels. There was 
also a transfer of skills to participants enabling some Afghan laborers to successfully assimilate and seek 
employment in the Pakistani economy as skilled workers (World Bank, 1996). The program was labor 
intensive. Overall, 295 labor-intensive projects were executed by contractors, and these projects created 
many durable assets for the benefit of local host populations (Sub-projects included tree seedling 
production, home energy conservation, road construction, drainage and flood control works, and forestry 
and conservation projects). The wage rate was set low―15 to 20 percent below the local market wage 
rate for casual unskilled labor―to attract the most vulnerable workers. However, the regular employment 
provided by the workfare program was attractive for poor refugees. Key factors that contributed to the 
success of the program included a capable and experienced implementing agency, clearly established 
criteria for selection of projects, effective monitoring and supervision, and the willingness of the refugees 
themselves to work and earn rather than being dependent (World Bank, 1996). 
 
3.67 For Pakistanis, the government later launched the Khushal Pakistan Program aimed at 
generating economic activity and employment through public works. Khushal Pakistan covered 17 
                                                 
63
 In this sense, though non contributory, workfare programs act as an informal unemployment ‘insurance’ program 
for the poor. 
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types of activities such as farm-to-market roads, water supply, sanitation, etc., and the program provided 
temporary employment to 0.9 million persons. No targeting was employed. The character of the program 
was later changed and renamed Tameer-e-Pakistan under which each member of the National Assembly 
was allotted Rs. 10 million per fiscal year for small infrastructure schemes in their constituencies. Under 
the revised Tameer-e-Pakistan program, the emphasis is more on providing access to basic utilities and 
infrastructure in the constituencies than on providing temporary employment generation for the poor. 
Work is performed by contractors using crews of professional workmen, who may or may not be local, or 
poor, Tameer is therefore not a workfare program in the conventional sense. It remains to be evaluated. 
Most recently the government has announced a new Khushal Program, though its parameters are yet to be 
fully defined. 
 
3.68 Finally Pakistan’s Rural Support Programs, modeled after the Aga Khan Rural Support 
Program, generate employment for communities, though its primary purpose is social mobilization. 
Rural support programs empower communities to improve their own well-being by mobilizing village 
savings. Matching grants to communities are provided to identify and develop viable small scale 
infrastructure or other projects chosen by village organizations to benefit the community as a whole. 
Villagers are employed for building the infrastructure (e.g., feeder road, well, etc.), which contributes to 
higher income for the community as a whole, but is not a workfare program per se. Program evaluation, 
taking into account the many objectives of the program, is currently underway.  
 
2. Promotion of human capital accumulation for the poor: Conditional Cash Transfers 
 
3.69 As the discussion in Chapter 2 made clear, education and health outcomes for the poor and 
vulnerable are significantly worse than those of their non-poor counterparts. These differences not 
only jeopardize the ability of the poor to access productive economic opportunities in the short-term, but 
also significantly diminish the probability that future generations will be able to escape poverty and 
vulnerability, hence contributing to the perpetuation of these problems. Although there is no doubt that 
sound education and health policies constitute the basis to improve social outcomes, social assistance can 
also play a role in providing families with complementary services (for instance, through feeding 
programs) and additional incentives to increase utilization of existing facilities (for instance through 
conditional cash transfer programs that make the receipt of a social assistance conditional on participation 
of children in school and children (and sometimes their mother) in health and nutrition programs.  
 
3.70 In Pakistan, there are currently several cash/in kind income support initiatives, mostly 
pilots, aiming to increase human development outcomes. There are three cash transfer programs that 
aim to increase school enrolment and attendance, one in-kind transfer program that aims to improve both 
the nutrition and education status of the poor children, and one cash transfer program that targets 
improvement of health status alone.  
3.71 First, the provinces provide free textbooks to all students enrolled in public schools and, in 
some cases, provide income support via education stipends to girls in middle school from poor 
districts. Provinces, particularly Punjab also have designed their own stipend programs. Data from 
the PSNS shows that the provincial free textbook programs have extensive coverage and are well 
targeted, while the stipend program has very limited coverage. More than 40 percent of all children ages 5 
to 9 receive free textbooks. Coverage is higher in rural than in urban areas (64 and 30 percent 
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Box 3.10: Workfare Programs: Experience from Argentina and India 
 
Well designed workfare programs (e.g., Argentina Trabajar Program and the Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme) can provide employment to help the poor manage unemployment risks, help create public 
infrastructure that helps poor increase long term income, with spillover benefits in terms of social gains. If wage 
levels are kept low enough (sometimes a political issue), programs also have the advantage of self-targeting to 
the poor. 
Self-Targeting: In 1996, the government of Argentina responded to high levels of unemployment by 
starting Trabajar, a public workfare program. The program was designed to provide temporary employment 
benefits to poor participants. The main targeting mechanism adopted was the low wage rate, supplemented by a 
sub-project selection process that geographically targeted poor areas to receive projects. To avoid political 
problems over ‘minimum wage’, the payment to a worker is not called a “wage,” rather it is termed 
“subsistence” or “economic assistance.” In India, The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) 
also provided every registered participant guaranteed employment at the minimum wage rate within a radius of 
five kilometers from his or her home. Targeting outcomes for both programs were excellent. Nearly, 60 to 70 
percent of households participating in India’s nationwide program, the MEGS, and in Argentina’s Trabajar 
program belonged to poor households (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999 and Subbarao, 1997). Raising wage rates can 
reduce targeting impact. In 1998, the MEGS program had to raise its wage rate in response to increases in the 
national minimum wage. Research by Datt and Ravallion (1994) has confirmed that the upward revision of the 
wage rate in 1988 contributed to job rationing and eroded the “guarantee” of employment expected of the 
program. Gaiha (2000) also noted that targeting efficiency was eroded by the wage hike. 
Consumption Smoothing: India’s nationwide program of Jawahar Rojgar Yojnna (JRY) operated 
intensively during agricultural off-peak seasons; annually as many as 55 million people were employed through 
this program during the off-season. Thus, the JRY conferred significant stabilization (consumption-smoothing) 
benefits (the transfer benefits were lower than in the case of MEGS and Trabajar) The Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), also conferred consumption smoothing benefits to workers. Walker 
and Ryan (1990) showed that the risk (stabilization) benefits conferred by the scheme remained significant and 
continued to be so even after 1988 wage hike because the scheme continued to operate intensively in off-peak 
agricultural seasons (Subbarao, 1997). 
Labor Intensity: To generate employment, it is important that workfare programs have high labor intensity: 
In the MEGS, the wage bill represented 60 to 70 percent of total cost. Similar ratios were realized in the 
Bangladesh Food for Works Program. In Argentina’s Trabajar program, depending on the type of project that 
was being built, the share of labor costs ranged from 30 to 70 percent. The average share of labor costs for the 
program as a whole was 40-50 percent of total project costs. In Korea too, labor costs amounted to close to 70 
percent. 
Social gains and poverty reduction: It appears that well-designed workfare programs do have the potential 
to confer significant social gains. For example, India’s Maharasthra Employment Guarantee Scheme was 
designed to encourage the participation of women. Employment was provided close to their places of residence, 
creche facilities were provided, and male-female wage discrimination was eliminated. As a result, close to half 
of all participants were women. Datt and Ravallion (1992) have quantified the impact of the program and found 
that the severity of poverty has fallen from 5.0 percent to 3.2 percent owing to participation in the MEGS. 
 
See Subbarao (2000). 
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Box 3.11: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs – Mexico’s Progresa Program 
 
Conditional cash transfer programs target income support to households conditional on their participation in 
health and education programs. 
Conditional cash transfer programs seem to have originated in South Asia before being reinvented in Latin 
America. In 1993, Bangladesh launched the Food for Education, replacing a poorly targeted rural food rationing 
system. Households received 15 kg wheat per child per month (but maximum 20 kg per family) conditional on 
all their children enrolling in primary school. Because of the difficulty of managing the logistics of food 
distribution, the government decided to switch from food to cash for education. Very small amounts are given—
the average transfer corresponds to US$2.4 per household per month or 4 percent of the poor’s total 
consumption. Yet the impacts have been favorable—targeting outcomes are excellent, there has been a sharp 
increase in enrolment, especially for girls, who now outnumber boys in terms of enrollment, and child labor has 
been reduced. The program covers 2.1 million students with a budget of around US$77 million. 
The most recent or second generation conditional transfers were initiated in Latin America. These 
programs provide a single uniform cash benefit to the poor (targeted) conditional on their participation in 
health, nutrition, and education programs. Mexico’s Progresa is an example of this type of unified program. In 
1995, a new government in Mexico was faced with a macroeconomic crisis which sent poverty skyrocketing. 
Given a history of ineffective programs in the past, the government decided that a new approach to poverty 
alleviation was needed. The new approach had four goals; it would encourage long-term investment in human 
capital by the poor; it would recognize the synergies between health, nutrition, and education; it would aim to 
change attitudes and behaviors; and in order to counter political interference, the program’s goals, rules, 
requirements, and evaluation methods would be widely publicized. The resulting Progresa program linked cash 
transfers, administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare, to health clinic visits, nutrition and hygiene 
information, and school attendance—in partnership with other line Ministries (Health and Education). Several 
rigorous impact evaluations have shown impressive results: 
(a) Very good targeting—60 percent of benefits went to households in the bottom quintile and 80 percent to 
households in the bottom 40 percent (none of Pakistan’s programs come near to this). 
(b) Girls’ enrolment in middle school increased from 67 to 75 percent, and boys’ from 73 to 78 percent. 
(c) Child labor was reduced, and school retention was improved. 
(d) The incidence of low height for age was reduced, and preventive health care visits improved, helping 
illnesses to drop 25 percent among newborns and 20 percent among children under 5. Anemia in children 2-4 
fell 19 percent, and adult health also improved. 
On the basis of this evaluation, the new Government decided not to disband the program, but rather to scale 
it up. The only change was a renaming of the program to Oportunidades. The program now covers around 21 
million beneficiaries, one-fifth of Mexico’s population. 
The success of Progresa—demonstrated by the impact evaluations—has led to the development of CCT 
programs in many other countries, including Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, and Turkey. A number of rigorous scientific impact of these programs have documented that well 
implemented CCT programs designed appropriately for their settings can have a wide range of desirable 
outcomes: excellent targeting, increased quantity and quality of food consumption, increased use of preventive 
health services (immunization, growth monitoring). School enrollments have improved in many countries and 
grade-for-age levels and child labor decreased in some programs.  
 
Sources: World Bank (2003), Rawlings (2004); Maluccio and Flores (2004); Das, Do, and Özler (2005); 
Skoufias and McClafferty (2001). 
 
 
respectively) and in Punjab than in other provinces (Table 3.12). In contrast only 2 percent of all surveyed 
children receive a stipend (Rs. 200 per month). Conditional on attending school, poor children and girls 
are more likely to receive free textbooks than non-poor, both in rural and urban areas.64 In the absence of 
an objective targeting tool, good targeting outcomes can be attributed to poor households having more 
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 The incidence of stipends is too low to assess its distribution.  
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children than non-poor ones and, conditional on enrolment, public school enrolment being higher among 
poor than non-poor children. In addition, it is important to point out that books seem to be delivered 
timely at the beginning of the school year in 95 percent of the cases. Finally, although results from an 
ongoing impact evaluation are not yet available, preliminary evidence for Punjab’s stipend program 
suggests positive impacts of the education sector reform program (of which free textbooks and stipends 
form part) on overall enrolment rates. Specifically, enrolment rates increased from 45 percent in 2001 to 
58 percent in 2004/05. This translates into one million more children enrolled in Punjab schools since the 
launch of Punjab’s education reform program.  
Table 3.12: School attendance and receipts of free textbooks, by sector, quintile, and program status 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Quintile
1 58.9      48.3      68.9      70.2      41.6      33.6      55.1      90.2      54.8      46.7      85.2      67.3      
2 64.2      55.5      68.6      60.3      59.6      34.1      78.6      93.2      50.1      45.8      84.9      76.6      
3 67.0      60.1      55.3      50.8      45.8      65.8      43.7      44.1      48.2      43.1      68.4      72.2      
4 69.4      65.2      45.8      47.6      60.6      61.1      44.3      23.6      70.8      76.5      83.6      73.6      
5 75.2      71.7      33.3      33.2      40.6      38.8      23.7      52.4      93.6      48.1      44.3      -       
Total 65.7     58.0     56.7     54.3     50.1     43.4     54.3     57.1     55.7     48.8     79.1     67.3     
Location
Urban 73.5      71.6      31.1      30.8      54.3      44.4      53.3      54.3      46.6      42.7      62.7      80.4      
Rural 61.7      51.5      68.5      67.8      51.4      44.9      56.2      57.5      61.6      52.9      80.8      64.3      
Total 65.2     57.9     55.7     53.2     51.9     44.8     55.6     56.8     56.5     50.0     75.4     68.3     
Province
Balochistan 53.4      52.7      26.9      28.3      68.3      84.4      4.4        11.7      43.9      63.8      57.1      36.0      
NWFP 70.7      59.0      66.9      60.7      46.1      37.3      39.2      62.4      58.6      50.7      75.3      75.6      
Punjab 72.3      66.1      61.8      58.5      58.5      49.5      81.4      83.9      68.1      57.6      75.7      74.1      
Sindh 49.3      40.0      36.6      37.3      46.5      29.9      46.9      54.3      37.7      34.6      79.9      64.9      
Total 65.2     57.9     55.7     53.2     51.9     44.8     55.6     56.8     56.5     50.0     75.4     68.3     
Sample size= 13,123  10,884  264     200     168     143       
Notes:
Textbook receipt is conditional on child attending school. No filter to distinguish between public and private schools.
Totals for quintiles and province/rural/urban are different since household expenditure information is missing for some households.
Quintiles are calculated based on self-reported monthly household expenditure on food and non-food items (12 month recall)
Expenditure aggregates are deflated with provincial and rural/urban deflators.
Attending school
Received free 
textbooks
Children aged 5-9 in families 
receiving GuzaraChildren aged 5-9
Children aged 5-9 in families 
receiving Bait-ul-Mal
Attending school
Received free 
textbooks Attending school
Received free 
textbooks
 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from Phase I of Pakistan Safety Net Survey. Quintiles in this table are based on 
brief, self-reported income, not a full expenditure module. 
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Box 3.12: Bait-ul-Mal is Piloting a Conditional Cash Transfers in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan is beginning to implement a new Child Support Program (CSP). CSP is a conditional cash transfer for 
education targeted to existing beneficiaries of the Food Support Program (FSP). CSP will provide an additional 
benefit, over and above the regular FSP benefit, to FSP beneficiaries provided their children of school-going 
age regularly attend school. 
Under CSP, a family with one child aged 5-12 will receive additional Rs. 200 per month, while a family 
with two or more children between 5 and 12 years will receive additional Rs. 350 for as long as they keep all 
their children 5-12 enrolled in school and attending at least 80 percent of the time. Families with no children of 
school going age or whose children do not attend school will continue to receive the regular FSP benefits and 
will therefore not lose out as a result of this new program. 
CSP started as a pilot in five districts during 2006/07. A rigorous scientific impact evaluation, based on 
comparisons of outcomes with a control group of FSP beneficiaries not receiving the CSP transfers, is ongoing. 
Depending on the outcome of this evaluation, the pilot could later be scaled up to cover the entire country. 
 
 
3.72 Other education based income support programs provide monthly cash transfers to poor 
households conditional on school enrolment and attendance.  
 
• The first program, headed by National Education Foundation, pays Rs. 200 per month to poor 
households conditional on their children enrolling in primary school. The pilot operates in a few sites 
in Punjab, Northern Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory, targeting households with (self-reported) 
income below Rs. 3000 per month.65  An interesting feature of the program is the provision of 
complementary financial support to participating schools intended to help schools raise their 
standards of education quality. The ongoing program evaluation can potentially measure the impact 
of both demand and supply-side factors on school enrollment and attendance.  
• The second conditional cash transfer program, the Child Support Program (CSP), is linked to the 
safety net and managed by the Bait-ul-Mal (Box 3.12). The program pays additional income support 
to current recipients of the FSP program conditional on school enrolment and attendance. The 
targeting of the CSP is therefore similar to the FSP, although targeting improvements are envisioned 
over the course of the pilot. A rigorous impact evaluation is being designed for this pilot program.  
3.73 The school-feeding program (Tawana) is an in-kind transfer program intended to improve 
both health/nutrition status and enrollments in education. The Tawana program is implemented by 
the Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education in collaboration with Bait-ul-Mal, provincial and 
district authorities and NGOs. It targets girls in 3,414 rural schools in 29 poor districts schools, but 
cooked mid-day meals are also provided to boys in co-ed schools. The total budget for the program is Rs. 
700 million (3% of the total social assistance budget), or around Rs. 7 per day per student. The impact of 
the program is not well known. However, the program has encountered resistance for expansion and has 
been subject to criticism from province and district authorities, who argue that its somewhat complex 
design, together with the need to comply with public sector procurement rules pose an undue burden. 
These implementation issues are not dissimilar to those affecting other school meals (and other in kind) 
programs worldwide, including issues of distribution, leakage, and storage of food (see Box 3.13).  
3.74 Finally, there is also a new pilot program that provides cash incentives for tuberculosis testing 
and treatment with the objective of increasing detection and compliance rates. The design of the 
tuberculosis (TB) program envisages improving the utilization of TB DOTS services by provision of 
incentives (Rs. 1000 in two installments) to TB patients that test positive, where the second installment is 
conditional on completing the treatment. The program is expected to be self-targeted given the much 
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 This pilot is supported by the World Bank and the Government of Japan (through a grant). 
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higher prevalence of TB among the poor, and the fact that the program focuses exclusively on patients 
that report to the public health system. In the pilot phase, the program will target 10 districts and conduct 
a thorough impact evaluation to assess the feasibility and impact of the program. 
 
 
Box 3.13: School Meals – International Evidence 
 
School meal programs tend to very popular with policy makers worldwide and enjoy wide political support, as 
they are seen to be supportive of health and education status of poor children. School meals, which usually 
constitute the provision of a meal or snack to children at school, serve a wide variety of purposes. The programs 
are intended to act as an incentive for attendance at schools, provide nutrition to children and alleviate 
children’s short-term hunger during the day to enhance their attention and learning capacity. School meals can 
also be considered an income transfer as the program eases the household food budget. The benefits of school 
meals have to thus be measured against the objective for which they are used and in comparison with other 
means (e.g., cash transfers) of achieving the same objectives. 
In terms of increasing school attendance, several studies have found that school snacks and cash-like 
transfers increase children’s attendance and progress through school in Jamaica (Simeon and Grantham-
McGregor, 1989), Honduras (Rogers et. al), India (Dreze and Goyal (2003) and the US (Meyers et. al, 1989). 
While some studies have shown an effect of school meals on test performance (for the US, Meyers et al, (1989; 
for Peru: Pollitt, Jacoby and Cueto, (1995), for Jamaica, Simeon and Grantham-McGregor, (1989), others have 
found no difference (Rogers et al, 1995 and Dixit, 1994). Many experts have noted that the nutritional impact of 
school meals is limited because nutritional gains for children occur prior to school going age, but others find 
that school meal program can alleviate hunger in school going children (Afridi, 2005). Given the wide variety 
of designs and the contexts in which they operate, it should not be surprising that their effectiveness has been 
shown to be variable. The cost effectiveness of school meals relative to cash transfers has also been investigated 
in several studies. Rogers et al (1995); Sanghvi et al, 1995; and Horton, 1992) find that compared with a cash or 
cash-like (for example, coupons or food stamps) transfer, the cost of delivering a unit of value in a school meal 
may be several times higher. This is perhaps not surprising. Rogers and Coates (2002) note that school meal 
programs can face considerable administrative challenges, including logistical problems with food delivery, 
leakage, food handling, storage, ensuring nutritional content of meals-yet taking into account cultural norms and 
ensuring adequate training of food preparation experts. 
 
See Rogers and Coates (2002). 
 
 
3.75 Pakistan’s conditional cash/in-kind transfer initiatives are reflective of a growing 
international trend to include incentives in cash transfer programs for poor beneficiaries to avail 
health and education services and escape inter-generational poverty. Many countries facing 
dependency problems in cash transfer programs and the need to break the inter-generational cycle of 
poverty have provided incentives in their income support programs for recipient families to send their 
children to health and education programs. The impact of these programs—called conditional cash 
transfers (or CCTs) has been very positive, with measurable increases in enrollment and nutritional status 
of children (Box 3.11).  
Challenges for Human Capital Access Programs 
3.76 As positive as it is to see numerous conditional cash and in-kind transfer initiatives 
flourishing in various areas of the country, it is important that experimentation leads to overall 
consolidation rather than fragmentation of cash support programs. Assessments of ongoing initiatives 
must pay attention to the extent to which these can be successfully scaled up and integrated as part of the 
main income transfer programs, e.g., Bait-ul-Mal, to improve living standards among the target groups. 
Similarly, the need for expansion of Tawana needs to be assessed relative to other potentially more cost-
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effective programs for improving enrollment and nutrition and reducing hunger of children. As noted 
above, experience from other countries indicates that a more coordinated approach on targeting and 
conditioning of cash transfers, given limited fiscal resources and administrative capacity, could be a more 
efficient way of meeting program objectives.  
C. Programs for Coping with Aggregate shocks 
3.77 Most of the discussion presented in Chapter 2 revolved around the idea that both poor and non-
poor households are subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and that the consequences of these 
shocks in terms of lost income and assets can be dire. Although households have developed informal 
mechanisms to cope with these shocks, the discussion has also made it clear that these are often 
insufficient and can even cause more harm than good in the long-term. As a result we concluded that 
there was significant space for government intervention in the area. While income support and basic 
services programs could protect households from falling into poverty as a result of a shock, these 
programs (other than workfare) are not ideally equipped to expand in times of natural disasters or 
aggregate shocks. In this section we examine existing programs specifically designed to address aggregate 
risks, particularly those associated with changes in agricultural prices (particularly the price of wheat) and 
those associated with natural disasters.  
 
1. Coping with agricultural price shocks 
 
3.78 The government intervenes heavily in the wheat market with the understanding that wheat 
is a major staple for Pakistani households and, consequently, changes in wheat prices directly 
impact welfare, particularly of poor consumers and producers. Government interventions take 
various forms, the most important of which is the purchase of wheat from producers at guaranteed 
minimum prices during the harvest time to sell it to consumers at guaranteed maximum prices during the 
second part of the season. Grain stocks are held by provincial food departments and by the Pakistan 
Agricultural and Service Corporation (PASSCO). Stocks held by the former are sold to flourmills at pre-
determined prices negotiated between the mills and the government. A suggested sale price for flour is 
also negotiated. Stocks held by the latter are used for distribution to the armed forces, Northern Areas and 
AJK, as well as for transfers to provincial food departments (mainly NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh). In 
recent years, government domestic procurement of wheat by various agencies has averaged 4 million tons 
of grain, corresponding to 20 percent of national production and about half of marketed grain. The 
government also sells Atta flour, and other essential commodities at government utility stores located 
around the country, at fixed prices that are approximately 5 to 10 percent lower than market retail price.66  
3.79 Since resell prices are not high enough to cover payments to producers and for storage and 
handling costs, the government incurs significant fiscal expenses. The system also introduces 
market distortions. Over the last 10 years, annual wheat subsidy expenditures have averaged around Rs. 
6.8 billion, with the subsidy fluctuating from 0.1 to 0.5 percent of GDP (Figure 3.11). This is much higher 
than the safety net budget and the total public sector development program for the health division 
(2004/2005). About one-third of the total subsidy accrues to millers, to cover the difference between the 
guaranteed purchase and resale prices, and the other two-thirds finance the relative inefficient government 
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 See Dorosh (2005), from which this section is drawn, for a more complete discussion of the issue. There are 
currently about 500 utility stores and 12 warehouses with a capacity to sell up to 50,000 metric tons of Atta flour a 
month, although actual sales are about half this amount. 
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grain procurement and handling procedures.67 Aside from fiscal costs, there are major economic costs of 
the system. For example, domestic procurement efforts, in line with poor harvests in 2004 led the 
Government of Punjab to impose movement restrictions on wheat. However, grain still flowed despite 
movement constraints though with increased costs for unofficial payments to officials, raising prices to 
millers by about 4 percent. 
Figure 3.11: Fiscal cost of wheat subsidy 
(Rs. billion) 
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3.80 In addition to its high fiscal costs, the program suffers from other serious problems, including 
creating distortions in wheat markets and its failure to benefit the poor. Flour market prices are 
generally higher than the recommended government price, suggesting that prices are largely determined 
by overall demand and supply. Since government-subsidized wheat supplies are insufficient to serve total 
demand, the question then arises as to who benefits from the program in the presence of rationing. 
Although more in depth analysis is needed, preliminary evidence seems to suggest that the current system 
favors millers and the non-poor. Subsidies are given through millers and utility stores, so that only those 
consumers that purchase flour from these outlets benefit. Moreover per-capita wheat consumption 
increases with income, likely rendering the subsidy regressive (to the extent it has any impact on 
consumer prices).  
3.81 The high fiscal costs and poor targeting of food subsidies have led several countries to move 
to targeted subsidies, cash or in kind transfers. Bangladesh moved from a food subsidies to food for 
work and finally to a cash for education program. The program has had a major impact on girls’ 
secondary school enrollment (World Bank, 2005c). Similarly, Jamaica and Chile moved from food 
subsidies to self-targeted food subsidies via food stamps and provision of food supplements at health 
clinics, respectively. Tunisia has also moved to a targeted subsidies program, with subsidies only 
applying to inferior quality foods that are consumed by the poor, with significant improvement in 
targeting outcomes (Tuck and Lindert, 1996). Jordan eliminated food subsidies after improving the 
administrative and institutional capacity for targeting cash transfers (World Bank, 2005e). Pakistan might 
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 For example, the total subsidy from 2001/02 to 2003/04 was Rs. 13.6 billion; about 33 percent of this accrued to 
millers through purchases of government wheat at below-market prices. Note that since market prices and quality of 
grain vary across markets, these calculations are only rough approximations of the breakdown of the subsidies.  
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also consider moving away from costly and potentially untargeted subsidies toward more targeted cash 
transfer programs (see discussion in chapter 4). 
2. Coping with natural and other disasters 
 
3.82 Pakistan lacks a comprehensive system to deal with natural and other disasters and, as a 
result, government-led relief efforts often fail to provide assistance in a timely manner. This was the 
case after the earthquake that struck Northern Pakistan on October 8, 2005. Since no safety net structure 
existed that could be rolled out quickly, interventions had to be designed from scratch. An initial response 
in cash transfers came from Bait-ul-Mal, which quickly commenced distributing a cash transfer. This 
assistance was later discontinued awaiting a comprehensive assessment of needs and levels of assistance. 
The package that was subsequently designed provided far more generous benefits than the initial Bait-ul-
Mal disbursements. The final relief package combined short-term income support with long-term aid for 
reconstruction. Short-term support consisted of in cash payments to affected households. The amount of 
these payments varied with households’ circumstances: Rs. 175,000 (in several installments) for those 
that had lost their house, conditional on rebuilding the house to seismic resistant standards; plus Rs. 
100,000 for those that had lost at least one family member as a consequence of the earthquake (with 
smaller compensation for injury ranging from Rs. 15-50,000); plus monthly livelihood grants of Rs. 3,000 
for 250,000 vulnerable households for six months (see Box 3.14). 
 
 
Box 3.14: Responding to the Earthquake of October 8, 2005 
 
The government and donors responded to the devastating earthquake with comprehensive assistance for relief 
and rehabilitation. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster focus was on delivering in-kind emergency 
assistance such as food, blankets, tents and roofing sheets, followed later by a package of financial assistance to 
the affected households comprising the following elements: 
Housing. The government’s owner-driven housing reconstruction program aims to reconstruct the 
damaged houses to seismic resistant standards. By November 2006, the program had completed detailed housing 
damage assessments of 600,000 houses, signed MoUs with 528,000 owners, and begun disbursing housing 
reconstruction grants of Rs. 175,000 per house unit in four tranches to owners completely destroyed houses. The 
disbursement of the tranches is under way and is contingent on the owners rebuilding their house using specified, 
seismically resistant designs. Partially damaged houses are eligible for restoration and strengthening grants of Rs. 
75,000 per housing unit disbursed in one tranche.  
Payments for death and injury. Each family that suffered a death of a next of kin received Rs. 100,000 
(families who suffered multiple deaths also got Rs. 100,000). Compensation for injuries ranged from Rs. 15,000 
to 50,000, with the highest payments going to amputees. Cash transfers. The government is in the process of 
providing cash grants to a targeted group of the most vulnerable households among the earthquake-affected 
population. The assistance comprises of six monthly grants of Rs. 3,000 per household, to 250,000 households. 
This assistance aims to provide short-term relief and stimulate economic activity and small businesses. 
Households that report housing damage, contain no senior government employee (at or above grade 17), and are 
either headed by women not currently married, or contain a disabled member, or contain five or more children 
(incl. orphans) are eligible. The total cost for this program is Rs. 5 billion. Other forms of livelihood support 
such as microfinance, business grants, and workfare may also be considered. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the earthquake response. There is a high need for assistance in the 
wake of major aggregate shocks and political support for such assistance. Assistance in the form of cash is 
appropriate and feasible. Emergency assistance can be delivered faster and better if investments in targeting and 
delivery mechanisms have been made before the disaster strikes. An unresolved question is how much the 
political support for disaster assistance translates into support for assistance toward idiosyncratic shocks and 
chronic poverty. 
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3.83 The Government also initiated support for the care of individuals who suffered from 
disability as a result of the earthquake. Aside from cash transfers, the earthquake demonstrated the 
need for social welfare and care services for individuals who suffered in the earthquake: disabled, widows 
and orphans. The Government stepped up its efforts to help these vulnerable groups after the disaster. The 
Government has developed the National Strategy and Plan of Action for Vulnerable Populations in 
Earthquake Affected Areas and the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency has approved 
its draft social protection strategy. Among other things, the strategy envisages continued cash transfers to 
the most vulnerable (e.g., widows and others without economic support) and community-based 
rehabilitation (CBR) support to the disabled. The Government is initiating a program of CBR anchored in 
four resource and information centers for persons with disabilities in the earthquake-affected areas. These 
centers will help coordinate a program of expanded outreach of rehabilitation services to persons with 
disabilities, working also with the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund.  
 
Challenges ahead for risk coping in natural disasters 
 
3.84 As agricultural and natural disaster shocks account for 10 percent of all shocks reported by 
households in the PSNS, the current safety net program mix leaves a significant amount of risk 
uncovered. There is very low coverage and support provided by safety net programs primarily designed 
to address chronic poverty. The wheat subsidy program most likely fails to benefit those who need it most 
while taxing away significant amounts of resources. On the other hand, no comprehensive system is in 
place to allow the government to respond to natural and other disasters in a timely and effective manner, 
leaving affected households to deal with the event’s immediate aftermath on their own. It is also unlikely 
that similar packages to the one provided to earthquake victims will be made available to those affected 
by future disasters. 
3.85 The lack of an effective safety net to cope with aggregate agricultural and natural disaster 
risks is at best inadequate, and a more comprehensive approach to helping households cope with 
disasters is required. As noted above, safety net programs as currently designed are not particularly 
effective in dealing with shocks. They are not designed to expand and contract quickly or to deploy 
resources fast enough to affected populations. Strengthening cash transfer and social welfare and care 
service programs overall and providing them with some flexibility to expand in times of natural disasters 
will be important. However, as discussed in the previous section (and Box 3.10) many countries in the 
region and worldwide have turned to well designed self-targeted workfare programs to provide fast relief 
in case of natural disasters and more generally as a way to provide temporary employment opportunities 
in case of income shocks. We examine the potential for a workfare program for Pakistan in Chapter 4.  
 
IV. PROVIDING INSURANCE THROUGH SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
3.86 While safety nets can address poverty, social security programs, e.g., insurance and long-
term savings can prevent households from becoming poor in the first place. As discussed in Chapter 
2, social security programs help mitigate risks and hence smooth consumption over time. They provide 
ex-ante protection to individuals against unpredictable idiosyncratic (or individual specific shocks) such 
as health or economic shocks, against age-related shocks such as retirement or death, or against shocks 
that undermine an individual’s capacity to provide for herself, such as disability.68 69 
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 Insurance also provides protection against aggregate e.g., against floods and crop losses though the discussion of 
these is outside the scope of this paper. 
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 In most South Asian countries, only the formal sector has access to publicly provided pensions (or insurance 
against longevity, disability and survivor-both civil service and the private sector. Civil service pensions often have 
two parts: one defined benefit (pension is calculated formulaically based on among other, years of service, last 
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3.87 Although given their limited saving capacity the poor stand to benefit relatively more from 
having access to social security than the non-poor, social security programs tend to 
disproportionately cover the latter due to the strong link between coverage and access to formal 
employment. As in other South Asian (and low income) countries, Pakistani formal sector workers have 
access to pensions, to health, sickness and maternity insurance, and even to unemployment insurance, 
while informal sector workers are completely unprotected. Micro-insurance coverage is negligible. Aside 
from a pilot scheme in NWFP, the country does not have a social pension program. In this section we 
briefly describe the existing social security programs and identify the challenges ahead, particularly in 
terms of expanding coverage in a low income setting. 
Formal Sector 
3.88 Article 38 of Pakistan’s constitution explicitly refers to compulsory social insurance. Yet 
coverage in such programs is limited to the minority of better-off workers employed in the formal 
sector (30 percent of the non-agricultural labor force in 2003/04). Civil service pensions for the public 
sector are the most important social security scheme, providing benefits to a relative elitist group of 
workers against old age, disability and survivorship. Outside the public sector, the risks covered are 
mostly limited to old age, disability, and survivor pensions for formal sector workers—also not among the 
poorest—although some workers also have access to health and maternity benefits. The two main 
schemes are discussed below. 
Civil service pension scheme 
3.89 In terms of spending and coverage, the civil service pension scheme is by far the largest 
program. Pensions are financed directly from the budget in the same way as salaries, and can 
indeed be seen as deferred payment. Together federal and provincial civil servants comprise 1.97 
million workers. There are no contributions nor is any fund accumulated to offset the liability. The size of 
this unfunded liability (or ‘pension debt’) is large when compared to published public debt figures. But its 
exact magnitude is difficult to ascertain and is not reported in the fiscal accounts. 
3.90 Benefit levels are relatively high for civil servants. Individual benefit levels, covering death, 
disability and old age are determined by a formula. The calculation takes into account final basic wage, 
dearness allowance and the length of service. Other allowances are not considered in the calculation. 
Since 2001, the replacement rate at retirement (i.e., the ratio of pension to pensionable earnings) is capped 
at 70 percent (of the basic wage in the final year) for a worker with 30 years of service. This implies an 
accrual rate of 2.33 percent per annum. Up to 40 percent of the pension can be commuted and taken as a 
lump sum. The remainder is paid as an annuity until death. A survivor’s benefit of half the pension of the 
deceased is paid. Disability benefits are also provided. The annuity is not indexed, but increased on a 
discretionary basis. Employees of state-owned enterprises are covered by separate DB schemes that are 
similar (and sometimes more generous) to those for civil servants.  
                                                                                                                                                             
wage, etc.) and generally financed by government contributions and the other defined contributions (or benefit is the 
return on the amount contributed to a fund). Private sector pensions are generally defined contribution based, though 
funds are publicly managed. In higher income countries, social security programs are mandatory, funded out of 
payroll taxes, and provide a minimum benefit against shocks. They are mandatory because it is assumed that 
individuals if left to themselves are myopic and do not save adequately against risks. Most often social security 
programs are pay as you go (with current taxpayers financing current pension benefits) and publicly managed, but 
an aging population and poor resource management is leading in some countries to defined contribution of (some or 
part of the pensions) and private management of fund assets (e.g., Chile, Poland).  
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3.91 There is substantial early retirement in the scheme. The normal retirement age is 60, subject 
to having completed 10 years of service. If the worker leaves service prior to 10 years, a gratuity (lump 
sum) is paid. Importantly, retirement is possible with just 25 years of service regardless of age 70 There is 
no adjustment to the level of the pension to take account of the fact that its ultimate value and cost are 
higher the earlier the pension is drawn. In addition to the DB scheme, workers are required to contribute 3 
to 8 percent of basic salary to the Government Provident Fund (GPF – the contribution rate is higher for 
higher earners.) The contributions are recorded in the government accounts, but are not invested. The GoP 
determines the interest rate each year. The role of the GPF in providing for retirement is limited by 
withdrawals for various purposes before retirement. 
 
Table 3.13: Overview of Private Sector Social Security Programs 
Name of 
scheme 
Source of 
funding 
Target group of 
beneficiaries 
Implementing 
agency 
Type of 
benefits 
provided 
Issues 
Workers 
Welfare Fund 
(WWF)  
2% of the 
taxable income 
of the enterprise  
 
 
 
Workers of 
registered 
organizations 
earning less than 
Rs. 5,000 per 
month are 
eligible  
Projects are 
planned and 
implemented by 
Provincial 
Workers Welfare 
Board (WWB)  
Construction of 
houses, 
establishing 
schools and 
health facilities, 
bicycles, sewing 
machines and 
fans for workers, 
provide grants 
for education 
and marriage  
Allocations for WWB 
only about half of 
collections; duplicate 
activities; workers in 
the companies that 
contribute the most, 
benefit the least since 
their salaries generally 
exceed the Rs. 5000 
monthly ceiling. 
      
Education 
Cess 
 
Rs. 100 per 
worker per year 
Workers in 
establishments 
with more than 
10 workers and 
earning below 
Rs 3000 per 
month 
Special schools 
run by WWF 
Free schooling 
of two children 
of each eligible 
worker 
Most children enrolled 
are from families that 
do not work in cess-
paying enterprises; 
duplicates regular 
government schools 
Provincial social 
security 
(Employees 
Social Security 
Institutions) 
Employers 
contribute 7% 
of the wage of 
workers earning 
up to Rs. 5,000 
per month 
All workers of 
an enterprise 
registered with 
an ESSI, earning 
less than Rs. 
5,000 per month.
Employees 
Social Security 
Institutions 
(ESSIs), run by 
the provinces 
Insurance 
against natural 
death, disability, 
and injury; 
medical care, 
cash benefits, 
and survivors’ 
pensions 
covered. Health 
care provided in 
specially-run 
hospitals. 
Firms may underreport 
the number of their 
employees, despite 
allegedly intrusive 
inspections by ESSI 
staff. High 
administrative costs 
and poor quality of 
services delivered; 
duplication of health 
facilities 
Group insurance  Premia paid by 
employers 
  Employers are 
required to 
provide life 
insurance by 
covering each 
employee for a 
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 Armed forces and frontier guards are eligible for the pension after only 18 years of service and have a higher 
accrual rate.  
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Name of 
scheme 
Source of 
funding 
Target group of 
beneficiaries 
Implementing 
agency 
Type of 
benefits 
provided 
Issues 
minimum of Rs. 
200,000 
Employees Old 
age Benefit 
(EOBI)  
 
6 % of 
minimum wage 
(Rs. 3000 as of 
July 2005). 
Workers in 
establishments 
with 10 workers 
or more (defense 
police, railway, 
local bodies, 
banks and the 
carpet industry 
are exempted) 
EOBI is headed 
by a Board 
which works 
under the 
guidance of the 
federal 
Government 
Old age 
pensions of 2% 
of the wage in 
the final year, 
with a minimum 
pension of Rs. 
1000 per month, 
payable for life 
to males of 60 
years and above 
and females age 
55 and above, 
with a minimum 
of 15 years of 
service  
Financially 
unsustainable 
(contributions will not 
cover promised 
benefits); Very high 
administrative costs 
(35% of benefits paid 
out); investment 
regime 
Workers Profit 
Participation 
Fund (WPPF) 
 
5% of the 
annual profit tax 
of the enterprise 
  Funds 
distributed 
among the 
workers of the 
company up to a 
maximum of Rs. 
5,000 per 
worker  
 
 
10C Bonus All companies 
declaring a 
profit are 
required to pay 
bonus 
  Bonus equal to a 
minimum of one 
month’s salary 
 
 
Gratuity   Firms 
themselves 
30 days wages 
for each 
completed year 
of service in 
excess of 6 
months 
 
 
3.92 The scheme just described applies to civil servants at both the federal and provincial level, 
and has the largest coverage of any social insurance plan in the country. The armed forces and 
frontier guards are eligible for the pension after only 18 years of service and have a higher accrual rate. 
Employees of state-owned enterprises are covered by separate DB schemes that are similar (and 
sometimes more generous) to those for civil servants. Together, federal and provincial civil servants 
comprise 1.97 million workers. 
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Social security in the private sector 
3.93 EOBI is a compulsory federal social insurance scheme for private sector workers. The 
coverage for the EOBI scheme is shown in Table 3.15 below. The table also shows some disparity across 
regions with EOBI coverage in Balochistan only around one percent.  
3.94 The EOBI pays rather limited pensions to formal, private sector workers. Its contribution 
rate for employers was increased from 5 to 6 percent of the minimum wage (currently Rs. 3,000 per 
month) in July 2005 and is legally mandated for firms with at least 10 employees. There is an employee 
contribution of 1 percent of the minimum wage. Men aged 60 and women aged 55 with at least 15 years 
of contributions are eligible for benefits. The pension is not indexed after retirement but the minimum, 
currently Rs. 1000 per month, has been increased sporadically over the years. An estimated 1.5 million 
were actively contributing to the scheme in recent years, although the reported number of members is 
much higher reflecting movement in and out of the formal labor market and other factors. 
3.95 The pension provided for EOBI is generally much lower than that provided by the civil 
service pension scheme. Survey data reveal that the average pension in the civil service was 
approximately 45 percent higher than the EOBI. Combined with the relative immaturity of the EOBI 
scheme and a demographically older civil service, expenditures on EOBI pensions came to only around 
five percent of spending for combined provincial and federal civil service pensions. The fraction would be 
even smaller if military pensions were counted. 
3.96 This disparity between public and private sector pensions is exacerbated by the striking real 
decline in EOBI pensions over time due to lack of indexation. Between 1988 and 2000, the minimum 
pension declined by half in real terms and remains lower even after the most recent increase. 
 
Table 3.14: Financing of Social Security 
Structure of levies mandated for private formal sector employers 
Tax on profits Tax on payroll Tax on number of workers 
WWF (2%) EOBI (5%) Group insurance 
WPPF (5%) ESSI (7%) Education access (Rs. 100 
per year) 
 Gratuity (implicitly 8.3%)71  
 10C bonus (implicitly 8.3%, 
if there is a profit) 
 
Total 7% of profits Total 28.7% of wage bill  
Note: Table shows the statutory costs. De facto costs are lower because of evasion. 
 
3.97 Apart from pensions, formal private sector workers in Pakistan are covered by a patchwork 
of social programs and mandated benefits The rules and financing for social security programs, as well 
as a number of benefits that must be provided by larger private sector formal sector employers, are 
summarized in Tables 3.13 and 3.14. In the private sector, coverage is generally limited to salaried 
workers in larger firms. Government mandates that these firms provide certain forms of non-wage 
benefits directly and levies charges used to finance three separate types of funds. Two of these–the 
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 Gratuity is one month salary for each year of service, corresponding to an implicit levy of 1/12 of the wage cost, 
or 8.3%.  
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Workers’ Welfare Fund (WWF) and the Provincial Social Security (ESSI) scheme–are managed at the 
provincial level  
3.98 Provincial social security programs have more restricted coverage than the civil service and 
EOBI schemes, but their benefit levels are not well known. Levies on employers are used to finance 
the Workers’ Welfare Fund (WWF) and the Provincial Social Security (ESSI) scheme, both administered 
at the provincial level. The WWF provides a wide range of benefits ranging from housing to dowry 
payments and maternity benefits, but covers only 600 companies. The ESSI provides health services and 
covers about 850,000 workers and their families through its own facilities. Additional employer mandates 
include an education cess (used to finance education for up to two children),72 mandated bonuses, group 
life insurance, profit-sharing schemes and severance payments (gratuities). Firms offering provident funds 
are exempted from the gratuity mandate, although a few firms offer both. Little is known about the 
application of these mandates or whether they provide significant benefits to workers.  
Figure 3.12: Real minimum pension paid by EOBI, 1987-2005 
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Source: Aries Group et al., (2001); staff calculations.  
 
Table 3.15: Coverage of EOBI, 2005 
Province Members Contributors* Labor force Members/ Contributors/ 
    
labor force 
(in %) 
labor force (in 
%) 
Punjab 1,344,488 876,936 25,800,000 5.2 3.4 
Sindh 766,583 500,000 9,790,000 7.8 5.1 
NWFP 155,354 101,329 4,410,000 3.5 2.3 
Balochistan 33,322 21,734 1,750,000 1.9 1.2 
Total 2,299,747 1,500,000 41,750,000 5.5 3.6 
Source: EOBI; Labor Force Survey 2003/04. Notes: Labor force is for 2003/04. 
*Contributors are estimated based on ratio of total contributors to members. The latter refers to anyone 
with a contribution record since the scheme began in 1976. 
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 Eliminated in Punjab recently. 
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Figure 3.13: Incidence of different social security benefits by quintile 
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Source: Staff estimates based on PIHS 2001/02. 
 
Informal sector  
3.99 To our knowledge there are currently no major schemes providing pensions to the informal sector 
in Pakistan. However, some programs are under development:  
• For example, the rural support programs have recently linked up with Adamjee Insurance to provide 
hospitalization insurance to members of the community organizations they work with. So far, about 
130,000 members have signed up for a program that charges an annual premium of about $4 for 
hospitalization coverage with a cap of about $400. Given the devastating impact of health shocks in 
the country, it will be useful to follow the implementation of this scheme and evaluate its experience. 
• The NWFP has also initiated a cash transfer to the elderly (often called social pension) in selected 
districts, with a view to expanding the program to the province as a whole. Social pension schemes do 
exist in neighboring countries—e.g., Nepal (targeted to all elderly above 75) and India (targeted to the 
poor) and also in many countries around the world. However, these schemes can be very costly, 
depending on the benefit and age cut offs employed. Effective implementation of social pensions has 
similar requirements as other cash transfer programs, e.g., investment in record keeping and benefit 
delivery systems. The need for social pensions should also be evaluated in light of competing social 
assistance needs of other poor groups.  
Challenges ahead for social security 
3.100 Low coverage of social security schemes is a key challenge for addressing risk and vulnerability 
of the population. However, the financially sustainability of schemes, and improvements in administration 
will be required before coverage can be expanded. Thus, the three key challenges discussed below – 
coverage expansion, administration and recordkeeping and sustainable financing – are interlinked. These 
are discussed in turn. Modes of expanding coverage to the informal sector, e.g., via micro-insurance and 
social pensions (cash transfers to the elderly) are discussed in chapter 4.  
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Low coverage 
 
3.101 The most salient policy issue in the area of social security is the lack of coverage of the 
existing schemes, especially the most extensive private sector program administered by the EOBI. 
Combined with civil servants, total pension coverage would reach about 8.4 percent of the labor force. 
With less than one in ten workers in Pakistan covered by social security schemes, it is not surprising that 
expansion of coverage is a high priority. The EOBI, for example, has made this one of its key objectives 
in its 2004 Institutional Strategy.  
3.102 The limited coverage tends to reach better off workers. Those that did receive pension income 
tended to be in the higher income quintiles as shown in Figure 3.13. This is not surprising given the 
nature of the mandate – larger firms – and the fact that these are insurance rather than transfers schemes. 
Nevertheless, it does suggest that even a dramatic expansion of coverage will not do much in terms of 
insuring workers in the lower part of the income distribution. This will require separate solutions (see 
next section).  
3.103 Low coverage is a pattern observed in low income countries across the world.73 Part of the 
reason is that not all workers are mandated to participate. Agricultural workers, for example, are not 
included in either the EOBI, WWF or ESSI schemes. Of the remainder of the labor force, about 30 
percent are public sector workers covered under a different pension system. Nevertheless, even after 
excluding informal private sector workers this implies that as many as half of the eligible employees are 
not contributing to EOBI. Extending legal mandates, such as the proposal to lower the required number of 
employees at a firm that should participate, are unlikely to result in significant coverage expansion.  
Improving administration and recordkeeping 
3.104 Administration and recordkeeping affect system coverage as well as performance. Poor 
service in the form of delays, lost records or even outright corruption inevitably lead potential members 
and employers to avoid contributing to these schemes when possible. Conversely, weak monitoring and 
supervision allows greater evasion to take place. In this section we focus on EOBI due to the lack of 
information available for WWF and ESSI. The latter, in particular, due to its direct financing of health 
infrastructure, would require a separate analysis. The common denominator of all three schemes however, 
is that no independent monitoring takes place of what are essentially public monopolies.  
3.105 In the EOBI, there are concerns about efficiency in administration. The collection of 
contributions and payment of benefits operate through the network of bank branches. At the time of 
contribution payment, employers submit special payment declaration that facilitates identification of 
payment source. The same document provides information on total number of employees covered by the 
payment (so EOBI can assess the total number of active and insured individuals). Details of the 
employees, however, get submitted on a separate annual report. There are significant delays and lack of 
compliance with the reporting requirements. The benefit payment system relies on banks playing a key 
role in keeping records of eligible beneficiaries. 
3.106 Operational costs have not fallen over time relative to standard comparators. With only a 
very small fragment of labor force being covered by the scheme, operational cost of the EOBI run at least 
20 percent of the collected contributions and almost one third of benefit payments as shown in Figure 
3.14. Despite growing assets, the ratio of expenses to assets has remained flat at about 0.8 percent. While 
it is difficult to determine when administrative costs are excessive in public pension schemes, the current 
ratios clearly reduce the long term sustainability of the scheme (see next section below).  
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 See Palacios and Pallares (2000). 
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Figure 3.14: Administrative costs as share of benefits and contributions in EOBI, 
1993-2003 
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3.107 There appears to be considerable gaps in information regarding workers covered by the 
scheme. This is due to several factors: First, the institution is struggling to maintain and consolidate 
several legacy databases. Second, many employers, while making required payments, fail to submit 
individual payroll reports. In part, this has been attributed to lack of enforcement powers, e.g., there is no 
penalty for no/late reporting. This leads to the situation where at the time of a benefit claim, it is often 
very difficult to assess individual eligibility. The benefit claim process typically involves verification of 
records with employers, and reportedly may be lengthy and not sufficiently based on evidence.  
3.108 Looking beyond EOBI, the current system is highly fragmented resulting in duplication of 
costs. Both ESSI and EOBI offer disability and survivors’ pensions, for example. There is overlap in the 
coverage and lack of harmonization in administrative procedures. Some schemes offer education benefits 
and special health care, duplicating this provision with health and education services. This duplication 
raises costs of delivering services, and increased costs of participation for employers, potentially 
increasing evasion.  
Table 3.16: Number of beneficiaries receiving cash benefits, ESSI and EOBI, 2004 
Benefit ESSI EOBI 
Sickness Benefit 35,310 n.a. 
Maternity Benefit 134 n.a. 
IDDAT Benefit 20 n.a. 
Old age pension n.a. 167,171 
Death Grant 1,564 n.a. 
Old Age grant n.a. 6,091 
Partial and Total Disablement Pension 5,580 5,877 
Survivor’s Pension 1,564 67,203 
Other Benefits 2,502 n.a. 
TOTAL 56,895 246,342 
Source: Adapted from GVG (2004). 
3.109 According to federal officials, an effort is currently being made to consolidate legislation in 
this area. While an important first step, ultimately the problem may lie in the lack of oversight in the 
system and mechanisms for enforcing the legislation. Boards are tripartite in nature, but employer and 
employee representatives are appointed by government and have little autonomy. International experience 
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with tripartite and government-controlled boards of monopoly social insurance institutions has shown that 
there is some need for external oversight. In a few countries, the financial sector regulator provides 
guidelines on basic governance issues such as reporting practices. 
Financial sustainability  
3.110 Civil service pension benefits are financed directly from the budget and represent a large, 
hidden liability. There are no explicit contributions. The unfunded liabilities have recently been 
estimated by the World Bank to be on the order of 25 percent of GDP, although this estimate is based on 
very partial data.74 The projected expenditures suggest that provincial government pensions will become a 
heavier burden in the coming two decades as the civil service demographics play out.  
3.111 Currently, contribution rates in the schemes covering private sector workers appear to be 
determined in an arbitrary manner. To our knowledge, no actuarial calculations are available for the 
provincial programs such as ESSI. In the case of the EOBI, actuarial reports find that long term benefits 
are not sustainable under current contribution rates. The latest independent actuarial report finds that cash 
flows become negative in less than two decades.  
3.112 Another important aspect of financial management is how reserves are invested. During the 
last two decades, the EOBI has relied almost exclusively on investment through the National Savings 
Scheme. The National Savings Scheme was introduced at a point when the Government of Pakistan 
needed to raise domestic savings in the face of a difficult external environment. Interest rates paid on 
these accounts were higher than market rates and the EOBI and other institutional investors reaped 
relatively high returns. From 2001, however, the EOBI was no longer allowed to invest in National 
Savings Scheme bonds and has been forced to look for alternatives. With over 100 billion rupees in assets 
at the end of 2005 and most of the portfolio maturing in 2006, the situation has become critical.  
3.113 Little information is available on the management of other funds and there is generally a 
lack of independent oversight. The annual collections of WWF are less than Rs. 1 billion but only a part 
of the receipts of the WWF are transferred to the Workers Welfare Board (WWB), which implements the 
program, and more than Rs. 18 billion is held in trust (earning no interest) by the federal Government 
(54% of the actual collections to date). Investment policy statements and process are not clearly defined 
and disclosure is lacking. Expenditures of the ESSI were around 1.7 billion rupees of which only 100 
million was in the form of cash transfers. Meanwhile, revenues collected totaled more than 2.4 billion 
rupees yielding a surplus of about 775 million rupees.  
3.114 Managing social security reserves, at the provincial or federal level institutions, requires 
professional asset management, modern accounting standards, and an appropriate investment 
policy, unencumbered by political interference in investment decisions.75 These elements do not 
appear to be in place in the public institutions that manage funds today.  
 
V. CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR PAKISTAN’S SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 
3.115 In this chapter we have shown that Pakistan’s social protection programs comprising safety nets 
and social security hold significant potential and recent attempts to experiment with more creative 
program designs and to evaluate program impacts are commendable. However, important constraints in 
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terms of resources, coverage, targeting, fragmentation, and implementation need to be overcome for these 
programs to have a real impact on poverty and be able to respond to vulnerability. 
3.116 Coverage of both safety net and social security programs is extremely low and targeting of safety 
nets programs is not as good as it could have been if objective targeting instruments were used. The 
combination of limited aggregate coverage and inadequate targeting significantly undermines the 
potential impact of already scarce resources on poverty and vulnerability. Lack of poverty and inequality 
impact is exacerbated by the fact that benefit levels are small and paid irregularly. Finally social 
protection programs suffer from poor quality of service, deficient information management, and excessive 
fragmentation, all of which detract from program effectiveness and efficacy. 
3.117 More generally limited resources and the lack of a comprehensive framework that holds existing 
programs together as a system exacerbate some of the problems detected at the program level. Aggregate 
social protection expenditures are low and biased toward social security, which tends to benefit the non-
poor and those with access to formal employment. In addition, despite the high levels of vulnerability 
documented in Chapter 2, existing safety net programs tend to focus on income support and poverty 
alleviation rather than on risk coping, so that poor and vulnerable households still have to deal with a 
significant amount of risk on their own. 
3.118 Going forward, the chapter suggests that to address poverty and vulnerability, a key priority for 
Pakistan will have to create a strong safety net, with flexible instruments to address shocks and with 
adequate incentives to exit poverty. While reforms are and should be initiated in the social security, and 
innovations in micro-insurance (particularly health) will be critically important, it will take some time 
(growth in income and the formal sector, and improvements in financial viability and administrative 
capacity of the formal sector) to extend social security coverage to the population as a whole. 
3.119 The government is aware of these gaps and shortcomings and has already taken initial steps to 
rectify some of them. Although social protection cannot address all of Pakistan’s poverty and 
vulnerability in the absence of sustained economic growth, job creation, and macro economic stability, it 
can help ensure that the benefits of growth reach those who need it most through redistribution and risk-
pooling. In other words, a well-designed social protection system can help make economic growth more 
pro-poor. Recent economic progress provides the fiscal space and the opportunity to address some of the 
issues identified in the chapter. We discuss some options for social protection program design in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. AN AGENDA FOR BETTER SOCIAL 
PROTECTION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
4.1 Recent economic growth in Pakistan has provided the opportunity and fiscal space to protect the 
poor and vulnerable in the country. What should be the priorities for the Government of Pakistan in 
effectively tackling social protection reform? How much would a comprehensive reform package that 
addresses the most important challenges identified above cost? What would this imply for specific 
programs? In response to the government’s request to evaluate its social protection programs and propose 
options for improvements, this chapter makes the case for the development of a comprehensive social 
protection reform agenda that attends to existing vulnerabilities, while being affordable and gradually 
phased in. In doing so the chapter attempts to present options and stimulate discussion rather than to 
prescribe a blueprint for reform. 
4.2 This chapter is structured as follows: Section II identifies broad areas for reform and discusses the 
estimated aggregate costs associated with implementing the proposed reform package; Section III then 
provides details on reforming specific safety net and social security programs along the general lines 
identified in Section II. Special attention is paid in the case of safety nets to strengthening cash transfer 
programs and social welfare and care services, and to the introduction of workfare; and finally, Section IV 
concludes the chapter. 
4.3 The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
• Pakistan could benefit from a social protection reform agenda that helps protect the poor and 
vulnerable through a combination of existing and new programs, within the fiscal resources 
available to the country. Given Pakistan’s low income the focus of the program is on creating a 
more productive social protection system, one that not only helps the poor cope with poverty, but 
also, by promoting exit and better risk management and helping cushion the social impact of 
reform, helps the poor participate in, and contribute to, economic growth (World Bank, 2005j).  
• This strategy could support the construction of a more effective social protection system around 
two pillars, with activities that would need to be phased in over time: (i) Developing ‘productive’ 
safety nets to help individuals cope with poverty and risk and promote exit from poverty through (a) 
strengthening basic income support and services, with a focus strengthening cash transfer programs 
potentially linked to human development outcomes, and (ii) Providing effective social security to 
reduce individuals’ risk of falling into poverty by (a) improving the functioning of the formal social 
security system (pensions, disability survivor) and, given that extending social security coverage is 
a long term proposition, and (b) piloting innovative approaches to mitigate risk in the informal 
sector (e.g., community health insurance).76  
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 A workfare program is also a type of informal unemployment insurance program. 
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• These efforts should be complemented by measures aimed at reducing or eliminating other smaller 
(and often ineffective) initiatives and consolidating fragmented new initiatives to curtail the overall 
fragmentation of the social protection system.  
• Expanding coverage of safety net programs through better targeting and moving away from 
untargeted subsidies, and over the long term releasing resources from non-poor social security 
spending, by increasing its links to individual contributions. 
 
II. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 
4.4 As evident in its Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Government of Pakistan is aware of the 
need to protect the poor and vulnerable through developing a more comprehensive approach to 
social protection. This approach is an opportunity to establish priorities and goals for the social 
protection system as a whole and for specific programs to better articulate them around common guiding 
principles. Considering social protection as a system rather than a collection of different programs would 
allow the government to curtail fragmentation, improve the quality of social protection spending, and 
have higher impact. A strategy would be an opportunity to clarify the role and responsibilities of various 
social protection institutions.  
4.5 In moving forward, a social protection system can be organized around two pillars:  
 Productive safety nets to help individuals cope and escape poverty, with the flexibility to respond to 
natural disasters. This involves (a) reforming and strengthening basic income/cash support, and 
linking it, based on pilot results, to improving human capital outcomes of the poor; and (b) gearing 
the system to respond more effectively to natural disasters and other aggregate shocks (e.g., 
droughts, earthquakes). Piloting and evaluating innovative and affordable models to complement 
this basic safety net (e.g., workfare, and social welfare and care services) could be considered to 
strengthen basic income support, with scaling up pending fiscal resources and administrative 
capacity. 
 Effective social security to reduce individual’s risk of falling into poverty: This much longer term 
effort could focus on (a) strengthening the formal social security system (public and private) 
through contributory schemes that offer consumption smoothing against individual risks (health, 
sickness, disability); and (b) given potentially high exposure to individual risks, piloting and 
evaluating innovative approaches to extend insurance coverage to the informal sector (e.g., social 
pensions or community based insurance), with scaling up based on administrative resources and 
fiscal capacity 
4.6 Gradual, as opposed to simultaneous implementation of various reforms is desirable, given 
fiscal and administrative constraints. As expansion of social security to address individual risks will 
take time to unfold, a well-targeted and administered safety net is likely to be the main social protection 
instrument for Pakistan in the near term.  
 
4.7 Given fiscal constraints, the expansion of coverage could be financed through better 
targeting of existing programs, phasing out untargeted programs and program consolidation. Initial 
estimates show that a package of reforms, such as the one noted below, could significantly increase total 
annual expenditures on safety nets,77 which may not be fiscally or administrative feasible in the near 
future. Thus, as a first measure, increasing coverage will mean better targeting current programs, and 
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 Appendix 4 provides potential fiscal costs of safety net programs under particular assumptions of coverage and 
benefit levels. 
82 
reducing fragmentation and duplication of efforts across agencies (e.g., various stipend, training programs 
embodied in the cash transfer system) and reducing untargeted programs (e.g. wheat subsidies). Increase 
in coverage over and beyond these resources will need to be phased in as resources and administrative 
capacity allow. However, the declining share of GDP spent on safety net programs is worrisome and it is 
therefore welcome that the government is considering how best to ensure adequate yet fiscally affordable 
spending on safety nets in its draft social protection strategy. Over time, the share of resources to social 
security programs, largely availed by the non-poor, will also need to be addressed and better linked to 
individual contributions and any expansion of coverage (including social pensions) in social security will 
need to be carefully considered against available resources. To pool resources across rich and poor 
provinces, safety net programs need to be federally financed. Social security pool risk through individual 
contributions that are calculated on actuarial fairness, safety nets are general revenue financed in order to 
pool risks across rich and poor regions. 
 
4.8 Improvements in administrative arrangements are needed for better delivery of social 
protection benefits and services. Without adequate administration, public information, and incentives to 
promote better governance, even the best designed programs can fail. Better governance of safety nets 
includes streamlining of benefits, clarifying roles of public actors, facilitating private sector partnerships, 
strengthening data collection and reporting systems, refining targeting systems, increasing system 
outreach, strengthening staff and management capacity, and setting up monitoring and evaluation. Better 
governance of social security would involve strengthening the capacity to forecast and simulate the 
impact of reforms, modernizing record keeping, and improving management and oversight of funds. 
Public information will be important for higher program outreach and public relations campaigns could be 
used to communicate and seek support for reforms.  
 
4.9 Social protection reforms will need leadership and inter-institutional coordination. While 
several separate agencies run different programs, policy needs to be coordinated to ensure national policy 
goals are met, synergies reached, and fragmentation avoided. Other countries with a similar challenge 
have retained their Ministry of Social Welfare or its equivalent in a coordinating role for social assistance 
and the Ministry of Labor or its equivalent in a similar role for social security. In Pakistan’s case, the 
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education would seem a natural choice for overseeing and 
coordinating safety net reforms, since the minister chairs the Cabinet’s social sector committee, but it 
would need strengthened capacity to design and evaluate policy. Coordination is important. For example, 
developing and implementing conditional cash transfers calls for coordination between Ministry of Social 
Welfare, Bait-ul-Mal, Health, and Education. Similarly social security and employment-based programs 
could be overseen by the Ministry of Labor after consolidating some of the current implementation 
arrangements that split responsibilities between federal and provincial agencies.  
 
4.10 We now turn to key areas of action for each of the two parts of the system. 
83 
 
Table 4.1: Overview of main programs, target groups, and expected outcomes 
Program Target group Expected program 
objective after reform 
Priority being addressed 
1. Safety Net 
 a. Basic Income Support and Services 
 Unconditional Chronic poor  • Income support • Protecting against poverty 
including from aggregate 
shocks  
 Social care services 
(pilot) 
Vulnerable groups 
(disabled, children, 
others) 
• Enhanced welfare of 
target groups 
• Protecting against poverty 
including from aggregate 
shocks 
 
b. Promoting Exit  
 Transforming 
unconditional to 
conditional Transfers 
Chronic poor (with 
children) 
• Increase Human capital 
of poor 
children/mothers 
• Promoting exit from 
poverty 
 Links to micro finance, 
skill development 
 
Chronic poor (adults) • Increased access to 
economic opportunities 
• Promoting exit from 
poverty 
c. Addressing Aggregate Shocks 
 Workfare 
(pilot) 
 
Poor or vulnerable 
households with 
members of working 
age 
• Income support 
• Lower income volatility 
• Promoting risk 
management  
2. Social Security 
a. Formal Social 
security 
Formal sector workers 
(platform for informal 
workers) 
  
• Protection against old-
age poverty, disability 
and survivorship 
• Promoting risk 
management  
b. Informal Security 
(pilot of community 
based insurance; 
social pensions) 
Informal Sector  • Protection against health 
shocks 
• Promoting risk 
management 
III. SPECIFIC OPTIONS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN, FINANCING, AND IMPLEMENTATION 
4.11 Following the general discussion above, in this section we provide more detail on options for 
reform within the two broad areas identified above: strengthening safety net programs and improving 
social security.  
A. Developing Productive Safety Nets: Coping with Risks and Promoting Exit from Poverty 
4.12 This section discusses options that would help improve the efficiency of the safety net: 
strengthening the basic income support programs, including provisions for exit; promoting social welfare 
and care services; and introducing flexibility in the safety net to protect individuals against income shocks 
through workfare. Needed investments in streamlining programs, administration, and financing are also 
discussed below. 
1. Strengthening Basic Cash transfer/Income Support Programs  
4.13 Strengthening the cash transfer system will require attention to expansion in coverage, attention 
to benefit levels; and improvements in targeting efficiency of programs, within available fiscal resources. 
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Expansion of coverage  
4.14 The coverage provided by Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal cash transfer programs needs to be expanded if 
programs are to act as significant poverty alleviation mechanisms. As noted above, the coverage of both 
programs is quite low to act as a viable safety net. Coverage expansion at current levels of expenditure 
could be undertaken partially through improvements in administrative efficiency and focus on core 
mandates in the two cash transfer programs (e.g., better targeting of cash programs, reduced program 
fragmentation and overlap). Under assumptions of perfect targeting, current expenditures of Zakat, Bait-
ul-Mal, and the wheat subsidy combined could be used to provide coverage to 3.1 million poor 
households (or 42 percent of the poor and 17.9 percent of the poverty gap—Table 4.2). However, 
targeting is not perfect even in the best of circumstances. Under assumptions of 20 percent of benefits 
going to the non-poor, current expenditures of Zakat, Bait-ul-Mal, and the wheat subsidy could provide 
coverage to 2.5 million poor households and cover one-third of the poor and 14 percent of the poverty 
gap.  
Level of Benefit: Balancing Adequacy, Coverage, and Incentives 
Increasing benefit will have to have to be weighed against work disincentives, fiscal costs and coverage 
expansion. Program benefit is very low for both programs and some increase in benefit to provide poverty 
impact is justified. However, increasing benefits for all recipients would need to be weighed against 
expanding program coverage, which is a more immediate need of both programs. While work 
disincentives are not likely to be significant given the current low level of benefit, an increase in benefit 
should take these into account, particularly for poor households, for whom benefits are a larger share of 
consumption (and wage). There is one caveat. Increases in benefit cannot be envisioned for Zakat, given 
declining program revenues. Benefit levels should also be coordinated across cash transfer programs and 
with other safety net programs to ensure equity and incorporate incentives.78 
 
Table 4.2: Fiscal resources and the poverty gap 
Zakat PBM
Wheat 
subsidy All three
Revenues/expenditures (million Rs., current) 6291 4100 8000 18391
Scenario 1: Assuming perfect targeting
Number of poor that could be covered with cash transfers at current benefit levels (million) 1.0 0.7 1.3 3.1
Share of poor that this would cover (assuming perfect targeting) 14.3% 9.3% 18.2% 41.9%
Share of poverty gap this could cover 6.1% 4.0% 7.8% 17.9%
Scenario 2: Assuming 20% of resources leak to the non-poor
Number of poor that could be covered with cash transfers at current benefit levels (million) 0.8 0.5 1.1 2.5
Share of poor that this would cover (assuming perfect targeting) 11.5% 7.5% 14.6% 33.5%
Share of poverty gap this could cover 4.9% 3.2% 6.2% 14.3%
Memo item: resources required to fill 50% of poverty gap (mill Rs) 51442
 
 
4.15 Cash transfers with low, recurrent, and reliable transfers are preferable over large one-off 
benefits. Cash transfers that are smaller in terms of amount of transfer (e.g., Food Support Program of 
Bait-ul-Mal or guzara of Zakat) appear to be better targeted and governed than larger one-off grants such 
as Rehabilitation grants (Zakat) and Individual Financial Assistance (Bait-ul-Mal). Larger amounts of 
transfer have a larger poverty impact but can induce more attempts at benefit capture by the non-poor. 
Moreover, microfinance with its repayment discipline and repeat loans is arguably better suited for small 
enterprise development support than one-off grants. Thus, phasing out one-off high benefit programs and 
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 Best practice in higher income countries with formal economies is to set benefits as a percent of average wage, with maximum 
safety net benefits lower than minimum wage, which is itself lower than unemployment benefits and minimum pensions. 
85 
keeping benefits low, with options discussed above, should help improve governance and targeting of 
programs. 
4.16  Benefit payment should be made regularly (every few months) and in a timely fashion, to allow 
households to smooth consumption over the eligibility period. Benefit adequacy includes the level and the 
timeliness of benefit payment. As noted in the earlier chapter, aside from low benefits, the delay in 
granting of benefit and irregularity of payment is noted by recipients as severely limiting the usefulness of 
the program. Ensuring adequate financing of programs, better payment systems, and improvements in 
program administration should, inter alia, help improve the timeliness and regularity of benefit. 
4.17 The duration of benefit also needs attention. Zakat and PBM’s effectiveness in terms of both 
long-term poverty alleviation and adaptability to changing household circumstances within a given budget 
envelope could be enhanced by defining a program graduation policy. For example, re-checking 
eligibility periodically (taking households off the books) would help ensure that, within limited fiscal 
resources, new beneficiaries can be incorporated to program rolls as and when they become eligible. 
Temporary employment in workfare/public work programs, where they exist, could be closely 
coordinated with social assistance programs, can also be used as an incentive test and allow screening of 
household members who are able to work. 
 
 
Box 4.1: Setting Benefits Levels – Balancing Adequacy and Incentives 
 
One of the key challenges in the design of cash transfer systems is to balance the individual's need for 
assistance against the adverse effects on the labor supply that may arise from providing transfer payments. 
How generous should a cash transfer program be?79 Social (cash-based) assistance programs in developing 
countries typically provide benefits that are considerably less than “minimum incomes” and certainly far 
less then the “minimum standards” requirements established under the ILO Minimum Standards convention 
(ILO 1952). For example, in China, regular social assistance in rural areas was equal to a quarter to one-
third of the poverty line income. In India, a monthly social assistance pension pays 10 percent of the poverty 
line household income in most states (Jain 1999). 
Are these benefits too low? If benefits are very small, then the program may not provide much of a 
safety net, and it may become quite expensive to administer. In extreme cases, the costs of ensuring 
compliance may be even greater than the benefits provided to the poor. There are several reasons for lower 
benefit levels in low income countries: 
o Access to informal income. Unlike many upper-income countries where an interruption of the 
employment of a household member implies that the household's earnings will fall significantly, a 
change in employment status in developing countries may simply mean that the breadwinner has 
shifted from the formal to the informal sector or from relying mainly on his or her own earnings to 
relying more on an informal transfer from a family member. 
o Affordability. Developing countries have much lower tax revenues, limiting their ability to provide 
generous benefits. 
o Adverse incentive effects. The more generous the cash transfer program, the more such programs are 
likely to discourage (or crowd out) private transfers, to encourage individuals to behave in ways that 
will gain and retain their program eligibility, to discourage thrift and precautionary savings, and to 
encourage those not covered by the program to try to claim benefits as well. This is especially the case 
in countries where there is a large near-poor population. 
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 Benefit generosity is commonly defined in terms of replacement income. This compares cash benefits (either gross or net of 
tax) to past earnings, the earnings of an average production worker, the minimum wage, or average incomes. Benefit generosity 
is also expressed in terms of ease of access to benefits, the duration of benefits, the level of in-kind assistance provided in 
conjunction to cash benefits, the stringency of benefit-retention requirements, and the size of co-funding requirements for public 
insurance and assistance.  
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4.18 Making benefit receipt conditional on beneficiary participation in income enhancing programs 
can also reduce benefit dependency and promote exit from poverty. Given the high vulnerability of 
children and the need to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, programs can promote access of 
poor children to health and education programs through conditioning cash transfer receipt on participation 
in health and education programs, assuming positive evaluation of pilots underway (see below). Over 
time, the program can also increase access of poor beneficiaries to training/skills programs and 
microfinance programs to promote exit from poverty.  
Increasing Targeting Efficiency: Adoption of an Objective Targeting Instrument  
4.19 While some elements of both cash transfer programs show pro-poor targeting performance—
particularly the Bait-ul-Mal Food Support Program (see Chapter 3)—the targeting of both programs could 
be significantly improved. Both programs exhibit significant resource leakage to the non-poor compared 
to similar programs in other countries. Given that program coverage is already limited due to scarce 
resources, inefficient targeting can significantly undermine program impact on poverty and inequality. 
 
4.20 A number of targeting instruments can be considered for Pakistan (see Box 4.2). One option is to 
develop a proxy means test (PMT). This method uses a weighted average of characteristics (or categories) 
to determine household eligibility for benefit. Given its reliance on easily verifiable characteristics of 
poor rather than their formal income, it is suited to countries with informal economies. If expenditures 
remain limited for covering the poor across all geographic areas, some form of geographic targeting might 
be considered in addition to PMT. 
 
4.21 Initial simulations suggest that proxy means testing could significantly improve programs’ 
targeting outcomes. Simulations used the PIHS and the Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 
2004/05 (PSLM) nationally representative household surveys to estimate a formula based on a set of 
verifiable household observables such as housing, demographics, education, occupation, and land 
holdings. The simulated targeting results were compared to the actual consumption and poverty status of 
the households. The estimated formula achieves 46 percent leakage and under-coverage for the country as 
a whole with a cut-off of 20 percent. For a 10 percent cutoff, leakage and under-coverage would be 60 
percent. The model does better in urban than in rural areas. More work will need to be done to fully 
evaluate the adaptability of this approach to the current cash transfer system, including potentially 
augmentation with other targeting measures. 
 
4.22 Combining household assessment with geographic targeting can improve accuracy. Some 
countries combine household assessment mechanisms with a certain degree of geographic targeting. The 
international review by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) shows that combining multiple types of 
targeting mechanisms (e.g., PMT with geographic targeting) can yield higher accuracy. Areas with high 
concentrations or density of poverty can be prioritized for registration (e.g., with the survey-outreach 
approach) and program expansion.80 Community based verification may be also be useful to improve the 
accuracy of targeting outcomes. 
 
4.23 Using a transparent targeting procedure would allow the formulation and communication of 
clear eligibility criteria, the absence of which constitutes a major weakness in both cash transfer 
programs. It would also allow transparency in selection of beneficiaries and reducing the discretion of 
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 Nonetheless, to ensure that the poor in other (non-prioritized) areas also have access to the program – and to 
promote perceptions of fairness and transparency–anyone should be able to apply to register in the unified 
household information system at any time via on-demand applications (provided that they are clearly informed that 
registration does not guarantee benefits). 
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local officials. All applicants, both those selected and rejected, would be included in the targeting 
information base allowing for program monitoring and ex-post auditing. This could substantially increase 
transparency in the selection of beneficiaries and ensuring compliance with program selection criteria.81 
 
4.24 Aside from the development of transparent targeting mechanism, there are many details that go 
into designing and implementing household targeting systems that take time to pilot, design and 
implement, particularly on a large scale. Numerous factors need to be considered, including: (a) an 
appropriate data collection strategy; (b) adequate systems management; (c) the feasibility and potential 
accuracy of household assessment mechanisms; (d) institutional arrangements; and (e) monitoring and 
oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency, credibility and control of fraud (See Box 4.6). 
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 While community-based targeting, as used in Zakat, has not led to particularly favorable targeting outcomes, other 
countries have had success using this method. 
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Box 4.2: Proxy Means Testing – A promising approach to targeting cash transfers 
 
Targeting cash transfers is complex. The ‘gold standard’ of targeting—using a verified means test (VMT) that 
determines eligibility based on monetary income—is not feasible in most developing countries. It is costly and 
requires formal income records. Poorer countries with large informal economies, where income is difficult to 
observe or verify are not ideally suited to use this targeting method. Instead, developing countries rely on 
alternatives such as: 
• Proxy means test (using a composite formula based on observable household characteristics) 
• Categorical targeting (for example, pension to the old, disabled, etc.) 
• Geographical targeting (focusing on areas known to be poor) 
• Self-targeting through consumption (i.e., tying subsidies to inferior goods) or work requirements (as in 
public works/workfare, see below) 
• Community-based targeting (community members decide on eligibility) 
• Or a combination of these methods. 
Proxy means testing (PMT) has emerged as a promising approach in countries with large informal labor 
markets. Proxy means relies on a composite formula based on observable household characteristics (assets, 
demographics, education, occupation, and housing) to estimate household income, drawing on the statistical 
relationship between these characteristics and the actual, observed poverty status of households. Households 
whose estimated income falls below a predetermined threshold are eligible for transfers. To preempt 
households from misreporting their characteristics, proxy means tests need to be based on characteristics that 
can be verified fairly easily 
Many countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia are using PMT to 
improve targeting performance of social transfers (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 2004; Grosh and Baker, 
1995). In a recent study on Latin America and Caribbean countries, Castaneda and Lindert (2005) found that 
PMT performed well in terms of targeting outcomes, cost efficiency and transparency. PMT systems in LAC 
have generated targeting incidence outcomes that approximate the impressive record of VMT for a mere 
fraction of the cost of interviewing and screening for eligibility. Between 80-90 percent of the benefits of 
proxy-means tested programs in Chile and Mexico are received by the poorest 40 percent of households in 
those countries. Moreover, the costs of these systems are relatively low (ranging from US$2.3-8.4 per 
interview in LAC, or 9-34 percent of comparable interview costs for VMT in the U.S.), and administrative 
requirements are more manageable for developing countries (particularly middle-income countries). Finally, 
the PMT systems in several LAC countries also rank fairly high for transparency. 
Targeting is not without costs. In Latin America, the cost of proxy means testing varies from US$2.3 in 
Colombia to US$8.4 in Chile (equivalent to Pakistan Rs. 138-504) per visit (costs would likely be lower in 
Pakistan given lower labor costs). This is because administering a proxy means test requires household 
information, outreach, verification and monitoring of claims. It also requires political commitment to promote 
transparency. International experience suggests that institutional and administrative feasibility are amongst the 
main potential barriers to implementing this targeting method. 
 
 
2. Incorporating Incentives for Exit: Conditional Cash Transfers  
 
4.25 As noted above, introducing incentives in the main cash transfer programs to promote 
participation of poor children in health and education programs could help reduce inter-generational 
transmission of poverty. Monetary incentives in the form of conditional cash transfers have helped 
promote school enrollment among working children in several countries, leading to a reduction in child 
labor. The application of this approach to Pakistan will depend on the evaluation results of the many 
pilots underway in this area. (see Box 4.4). International evidence suggests that implementation of this 
programs requires attention to the following issues: 
 
4.26 While child labor can be reduced through cash incentive to promote schooling, it may also need 
to be complemented by other services. India has reduced child labor and increased school enrollment 
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through greater community involvement by increasing awareness-raising and peer pressure on parents 
that do not send children to school, and the provision of special ‘bridge schools’ that facilitate the 
transition of working children to the regular school system. While special schools for child workers may 
be important for ensuring that working children are able to catch up with their cohorts, efforts to 
mainstream child laborers from special to regular provincial schools at a faster pace would allow a greater 
number of children to be covered. 
 
4.27 Supply side constraints? Will programs work in countries where supply of services is constrained, 
as in the case of Pakistan? The CCT program may need to be circumscribed to those areas where service 
provision, e.g., health clinics and schools, exist and where there is limited absenteeism in the system. That 
said, the program itself may stimulate supply. For example, the Bangladesh stipend program—a 
conditional cash transfer for education—has increased enrollment (and reduced child labor) in a country 
where the coverage of schools is not extensive. The program need not be limited to public schools and the 
modalities of extending school choice will need to be carefully considered. 
 
4.28 Conditional cash transfers will require inter-ministerial coordination. To be effective, a CCT 
program requires coordination between social welfare, health and education ministries. The role of social 
welfare departments is to identify/target the poor and deliver the transfer, while the Ministries of 
Education and Health provide services and certify enrollment in programs.  
 
4.29 Future options. While current conditional cash transfer pilots are focused on increasing education 
outcomes of the poor, in the future, as in other countries, these programs could also be evaluated for their 
potential for providing incentives for children (and pregnant mothers) to participate in health and nutrition 
programs. What would a CCT component linked to health and nutrition look like? It could be designed to 
promote a range of desirable health practices by mothers and families, for example, at least 3 prenatal 
visits during the last two trimesters of pregnancy; ensuring attendance at delivery by a skilled birth 
attendant; initiation of breastfeeding at birth; appropriate vaccinations and vitamin A provided at required 
intervals; and dissemination of good health knowledge and practices.  
 
4.30 Tawana—a part of an overall safety net program? The program’s core objectives of providing 
meals as a means of alleviating hunger and increase attendance and learning makes it a type of 
conditional in kind transfer program. However, any scaling up of this program will require resolving 
current problems noted earlier. The fiscal costs of expansion of the school meal program will therefore 
need to be weighed against phasing in of alternative options, e.g., the potential scaling up of conditional 
cash transfer programs that have similar but complementary objectives.  
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Box 4.3: Promoting Access to Microfinance 
 
Promoting access to the poor to earning opportunities will require scaling up of microfinance and piloting of 
approaches to link safety net recipients to microfinance, through investment in training beneficiaries, 
promoting savings, and initiating small loans. 
Strengthening the coverage and efficiency of the microfinance sector can expand income earning 
opportunities for the poor. Resources channeled into this sector are used for growth in outreach and coverage 
rather than for subsidizing interest rates. Microfinance programs—if directed to the entrepreneurial poor—can 
help reduce the overall need for safety nets by enabling the poor to increase their incomes and escape poverty. 
Thus, more could be done to expand microfinance products to the poor and to women, and very small loans 
and financial products apart from loans could be used to this end. At the same time, even if expanded, many 
poor are not able to avail micro-finance programs (because of low literacy, information, etc.). Therefore a 
complementary approach could be used to link safety net beneficiaries to micro-finance programs. The 
government could consider this approach, based on a pilot of the Bangladesh VGD model already under way 
(see Box 3.8). 
Increasing the employment prospects of the poor is also important for promoting exit from safety nets. As 
noted in chapter 3, this approach has been gaining currency worldwide to reduce benefit dependency. An 
option for doing so might be to promote access of poor cash transfer recipients to training/skills development, 
and set aside employment for local unemployed poor (identified through social welfare agencies) in local 
public works programs. In areas where workfare programs exist, these programs could provide employment 
opportunities for the poor (providing cash for work) while incorporating work incentives for the poor. 
 
 
4.31 Finally, it will be important to ensure that conditional cash and in-kind transfer programs 
currently being piloted do not promote further fragmentation of the cash transfer system. Effective cash 
transfer systems require considerable investment in government capacity to target and deliver benefits. In 
most countries, safety net reforms are consolidating diverse cash transfer systems (Latin America, Eastern 
Europe) to promote greater fiscal, targeting, and administrative efficiency in delivering benefits. Thus, it 
will be important that on-going pilots are eventually consolidated and administered (and targeted) through 
the main cash transfer system, rather than through newly created systems. 
 
3. Complementing income support with community-based social care services  
4.32 Social welfare services are an important complement to cash-based programs, but are still in their 
nascent stage in Pakistan. They should be scaled up only gradually, with careful evaluation of innovative 
models of care, with attention to fiscal costs, and underpinned by the development of a stronger 
institutional framework and stronger public private partnerships. Several options could be contemplated 
in this regard: 
• Focusing on a community-based approach for identifying and delivering services. Social welfare 
services are often identified and delivered at the community level to ensure that services are tailored 
to the needs of communities. The provision of services to individuals in their local environments (vs. 
institutions) is also considered the best option for care. Capacity building and information campaigns 
at the community level will be required to strengthen awareness about vulnerable groups, reduce 
stigma, and increase knowledge about adequate care options. 
• Strengthening the public sector role in the framework for planning and policy, contracting, and 
quality assurance/oversight. The public sector could focus on policy development, regulation, e.g., 
establishing the types of services to be provided, the groups eligible for services, the development of 
service standards, licensing arrangements for providers, setting targets for service delivery and 
monitoring and evaluation. The role of the federal and provincial government in the financing and 
administration of services also needs to be clarified.  
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• Greater emphasis could be to focus on partnering with the private sector, including community- 
based organizations such as RSPs, to deliver services. Capacity building to handle the increasing 
diversity of providers will be required both at the central and local government levels, and also for 
private providers. The government will still need to provide oversight of services provided. 
4. Increasing Responsiveness to Aggregate Risks  
4.33 There is a significant amount of income volatility that remains uninsured in Pakistan. 
Shocks, e.g., droughts and seasonal unemployment are the main causes of income volatility and, as a 
result, transitory poverty. Exposure to risk, e.g., (temporary) unemployment is common, with the average 
surveyed worker experiencing 40-60 days a year without employment.  
 
4.34 Pakistan has a major gap in programs that can be scaled up to address 
income/unemployment shocks that stem from unexpected natural disasters (e.g., droughts, floods 
earthquakes) and the more expected seasonality in agricultural production. The wheat subsidy is costly, 
does not protect the poor from price shocks and could be phased out over time, underpinned by a well 
targeted cash transfer system (see Box 3.5). An effective cash transfer and social welfare and care system, 
suitably provisioned to expand in times of disasters, can provide the basis for responding to crisis and 
replacing ad hoc efforts to provide this type of assistance from scratch. However, these programs are by 
their nature targeted, so that their elasticity of response, particularly for more frequent shocks, is often 
low. Workfare, given its ability to expand and contract in times of disasters, could potentially complement 
these programs, but attention to design and implementation would be crucial to ensure its effective 
implementation. This section focuses on the potential parameters of a workfare program that could be 
piloted and evaluated for potential use in Pakistan. 
 
Piloting Workfare 
 
4.35 Geographically and self-targeted workfare program could help address income loss as a 
result of droughts and seasonal unemployment Workfare programs typically aim to increase access to 
income generating opportunities among the poor by providing short-term unskilled manual labor 
employment on infrastructure and other types of projects. These programs are usually self-targeted (see 
discussion below), which allows them to expand coverage during seasons of low labor demand or in the 
event of a shock, and to contract otherwise. Pakistan has experimented with similar types of programs in 
the past, and could also benefit from piloting and evaluating a workfare program that could be used to 
help workers cope with aggregate shocks. 
 
4.36 International experience suggests that a great deal of attention needs to be paid to program 
design and implementation in order to ensure maximum effectiveness and minimize leakages, and 
administration requirements can be substantial. Key lessons for program design are provided below 
and in Box 4.4: 
• Selection of wage rate and targeting. Program wage rates should be set low enough to encourage self-
targeting (i.e., only the poor are willing to perform manual work at that wage) and avoid complex 
administrative structures. The recommended wage rate for a public workfare program is one slightly 
lower than the local wage rate for unskilled labor (about Rs. 100 per day for landless male labor in 
Pakistan, with about half for females,82) even if this wage rate is below the minimum wage for the 
                                                 
82
 The average agricultural wages in Punjab (Punjab Economic Survey) have increased over time and are about 160 
Rs. per day (in 2000 prices). The Pakistan Safety Net survey gives a mean/median wage rate for landless labor as 
Rs. 90 per day (males); and about Rs. 55 per day (females). Wage variations across provinces would need to be 
reflected in program design.  
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formal sector. For example, while wages would have to be set to encourage self-targeting, Pakistan 
could consider a unified and gender-neutral wage rate of about Rs. 75 per day (US$1.25).83  
• Limits to program’s participation and disincentives. Providing 50 days of employment per worker 
may offer sufficient scope for consumption smoothing for most poor workers without undermining 
incentives to look for alternative sources of income. Data from the PSNS shows that workers in rural 
areas experience between 40-60 days of unemployment a year. Conditional on wage rates being low 
enough, demand for the program should then expand during periods when the opportunity cost of 
labor for poor households is low, normally the agricultural slack seasons, and contract when it is high. 
This would require the program to have enough resources on hand to expand its coverage whenever 
participation rates go up. Irrespective of seasonal variation, however, the program ought to be 
available throughout the year to serve an insurance function, giving workers the choice to join when 
needed. 
• Selection of projects to be supported by workfare program. To ensure maximum impact on 
employment and income generation, the program should support projects with a high labor share. 
Community involvement in program participation would need to be encouraged (as in the case of 
RSP programs). In general, projects chosen should be labor intensive. Experience from a wide range 
of countries suggests labor shares could range from 50-75 percent of total costs. Program selection 
could also play an important role in helping communities build up risk mitigation mechanisms, 
particularly in what regards natural disasters in mountainous, drought-prone, and flood-prone areas. 
This could be done by selecting small projects that support reforestation, soil erosion reduction, water 
conservation, etc.  
• Timing and Seasonality. As already noted, the program yields maximum benefits if it operates 
intensively during periods when the opportunity cost of labor for poor households is low, coinciding 
with agricultural slack seasons. However, the program should be in place throughout the year if it is 
to serve an insurance function, and should be ready to expand in times of natural disasters, as in the 
case of India’s Maharashtra Guarantee Scheme. 
• Promotion of women’s participation. The program could be designed to enable women’s 
participation. In Afghanistan, women were eager to participate provided conditions were conducive: 
activities for women and men were identified, and work gangs and locations were separated so 
women could work without being seen by men. Supervisors were female. India’s Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee scheme promoted women’s participation through provision of employment 
within 5 kilometers of their residence and provision of childcare on site. Close to 40 percent of 
participants are women. In Zambia, women’s participation increased when the mode of payment was 
changed from daily wage to piece rate to enable flexibility in timing. These considerations (timing, 
mode of payment, location, on-site childcare, etc.) suggest that public workfare activity can promote 
women’s participation. 
                                                 
83
 However, if targeting via self-selection is found to be infeasible at this level of the wage rate, then other 
approaches need to be explored. One such approach that has proven useful in some countries is community 
targeting. Once a ceiling is set for participation, e.g., one third of households sending one worker to the program, 
communities could be asked to select one-third of the households. Some broad criteria for communities to select 
participating workers could be established, such as number of children, based on a proxy means test.  
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Box 4.4: How to design workfare? 
 
International experience suggests that the most important design features of successful public works programs 
are: 
 The wage rate ought to be set at a level no higher than the prevailing market wage for unskilled manual 
labor. This will enable poor individuals to self-select into the program thereby avoiding the cost of 
administrative selection of participants. 
 It is best to avoid restrictions on eligibility; the fact that a person wants work at the offered wage rate 
would ideally be the only requirement for eligibility. 
 If rationing is required (because demand for work exceeds the budget available at the wage set) then the 
program can be targeted to areas with high poverty. However, it is desirable to allow some flexibility in 
future budget allocations across areas, to reflect differences in demand for the scheme. 
 The labor intensity (share of wage bill in total cost) ought to be as high as possible, while still maintaining 
the capital costs necessary for preserving the quality of the assets created. 
 Workfare projects can be synchronized to the timing of agricultural slack seasons to ensure significant 
consumption smoothing of poor households. 
 In order to encourage female participation piece rates or task-based wages may be considered, along with 
childcare arrangements. 
 Transaction costs to the poor can be kept low by locating project sites close to villages. 
 A good monitoring and evaluation system is required. By far the single most important drawback in many 
countries is the lack of base line and follow up information on participants. Without this information, the 
program, its targeting, and cost effectiveness cannot be assessed. 
 
Source: Subbarao (2003) and World Bank (2001). 
 
 
• The cost of launching and fully implementing a workfare program under the above assumptions could 
be costly, about be Rs. 21-37 billion, or 0.4-0.7 percent of GDP, while a smaller, geographically 
targeted program could cost much less—0.1 percent of GDP (see assumptions below). Similarly, 
workfare could be targeted to particularly poor districts. In this case districts affected by the recent 
earthquake would be natural candidates. As noted above, the implementation of this program would 
require attention to administrative capacity and the availability of fiscal resources. 
5. Strengthening Safety Net Administration  
4.37 Implementation issues in safety net programs noted in Chapter 3 can severely constrain benefit 
delivery, reducing the positive impact of any program. These include dispersed policy making capacity, a 
fragmented system, inadequate human resources, inadequate outreach, and the lack of information. The 
fragmentation of programs and lack of clear targeting and eligibility conditions also strain program 
administration. These problems are not uncommon to cash programs around the world and international 
experience suggests several steps that could be taken to improve administrative efficiency of programs.  
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Box 4.5: Phasing out the wheat subsidy 
 
The wheat subsidy program does not meet its objectives of protecting the poorest against aggregate price shocks 
and introduces serious distortions in the wheat market (i.e., transport restrictions). There are a number of 
reforms that could be considered for reducing these distortions and reaching the poor. Resources allocated for 
the wheat subsidy could be used much more effectively for programs targeting the poor, such as cash transfers 
or food stamps. To date, reforms include increases in procurement prices, the promotion of private sector 
imports and government imports. Each of these initiatives has been attempted. To deepen reforms, two possible 
reform options could be considered: 
• Increasing the release price of wheat sold to millers would help reduce the cost of the subsidy. 
• A medium term solution, consistent with international practice, would be to reduce distortions in the wheat 
pricing, while still protecting the poor against adverse price shocks would be to allow gradual increases in 
wheat prices to reflect market levels, while supporting the poor through more targeted support to the poor, 
e.g., via food stamps or a strengthened targeted cash transfer program. 
Transforming the wheat subsidy would be a major policy shift for Pakistan. Resources released from the wheat 
subsidy—which are considerable relative to the two main cash transfer programs—could be used much more 
effectively as additional resources for programs to target the poor. 
Moving in this direction would require a thorough analysis and dialogue with government of who benefits 
from these policies, what are the real costs, and what policy and program alternatives exist to more effectively 
use scarce public resources to meet food security needs of poor households in Pakistan84 (see also Box 3.5). 
 
 
 
Better coordination of policy making and implementation 
4.38 Clearly defined roles of federal, provincial and local governments in delivering safety nets, 
and strengthening private partnerships. The relative roles of central and local governments in ensuring 
program design, financing, quality standards, monitoring and evaluation will need to be clearly defined. 
These roles will need to be coordinated to ensure consistent safety net policy design, to ensure shared 
interpretation of the standards, adequate training and education of staff, including periodic assessments 
and potential for promotions (within the civil service system), codes of ethics, and the development and 
use of quality management tools. While there is no blue-print for delineation of institutional roles, and 
these roles may vary across countries, some general guiding principles might be used, as identified below. 
4.39 Central budget financing for safety nets? Continuing federal financing for the main cash 
transfer programs allows pooling of resources that can be used to target the poorest regions and 
households. Thus, federal financing of Bait-ul-Mal should continue. While social welfare programs are 
often financed and provided by the provincial level, the government might consider co-financing these 
programs to ensure adequate provision for poorer provinces. There are two risks associated with 
provincial or local financing of cash transfers. First, there is a risk that the poorest local governments with 
the greatest need will be able to raise and spend few resources. Second, without earmarked financing 
sources there is a high risk that funds designated for social assistance programs will be diverted 
elsewhere. In several countries (Bulgaria, Romania, for example), decentralized financing mechanisms 
have resulted in substantial inter-regional disparities in coverage, with the poorer localities providing the 
least amount of services. This leads to a situation in which funds are not available to those who need them 
the most.  
 
 
                                                 
84
 For a brief summary of wheat policies in Pakistan see Dorosh (2004). 
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Program management: staff, outreach, M&E 
4.40 Improving program monitoring through administrative, survey data and impact 
evaluations to provide feedback to policy. A variety of tools should be used to minimize leakages and 
poor governance in the system, though no system can eliminate them. To improve administration, it will 
be important to put in place a database management system that keeps information on applicants and 
beneficiaries; and tracks expenditures and payments. To promote quality at all levels, federal cost-sharing 
and financial incentives for municipalities need to be in place if they are to be charged with implementing 
data collection. The database could also include information on financing of the program, budgeted and 
actual expenditures and payment and payroll information. In addition to administrative data, safety net 
modules can be designed as add-ons to the main household survey (potentially over-sampling the poor) to 
also allow more information on their adequacy, coverage and targeting efficiency. Finally, impact 
evaluation of new approaches should be considered as a means of fostering innovation and assessing their 
applicability to country circumstances. 
4.41 Strengthening program outreach. Safety net systems need sufficient outreach to local 
communities to implement the program. Program officials need opportunities and incentives to visit poor 
households and communities to identify and respond to their needs. Personal visits are needed to verify 
claims, monitoring beneficiaries, through random audits, automated checks, comparing registries with 
other data, and conduct random-sample quality control reviews. These procedures are important for 
improving the targeting of the program, as lack of information about the program is a barrier to applying 
for some poor households.  
4.42 Widely publicizing the program and promoting feedback, particularly program conditions, 
e.g., eligibility requirements, modifications through information campaigns and outreach, are other 
ways to enhance transparency and improve program targeting. In addition, promoting feedback on 
program performance through beneficiary assessments and citizen oversight (“social controls”) can also 
strengthen program monitoring, e.g., posting lists of beneficiaries in public places in the communities, or 
conducting social audits.  
Using information technology for improving administration. Improving service delivery will require 
investment in information technology appropriate for Pakistan’s level of income. Making prompt 
decisions and regular timely payments is critical for better service delivery in both cash transfer systems 
and can be facilitated by computerization of record keeping and payment information, which has been 
shown elsewhere to reduce processing times for benefit claims and helped to cut down on claim fraud. 
Pakistan’s use of a unique identification number would be very useful in developing this system. 
Similarly using efficient payment systems—partnering where possible with private providers, e.g., using 
banks, post offices, or other mechanisms to deliver payments directly to the beneficiaries and bypassing 
middle authorities helps to improve payment efficiency and reduce leakage (Box 4.6).85  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85
 New technologies including mobile computing, biometrics, satellite communications, simple and smart cards, 
global positioning systems, radio frequency identification tags, automated teller machines and solar power all hold 
great promise for improving. 
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Box 4.6: Targeting systems 
 
 
Household targeting systems are commonly used to determine eligibility for cash transfer programs. With household 
assessment, an official (usually a government employee) directly assesses, household by household, whether the 
applicant is eligible for a specific program(s). While the actual design and implementation of household targeting 
systems varies significantly by country, most systems involve the following basic steps that seek to establish 
transparent, open and on-going processes for entry into the unified information registry, such that anyone may apply 
for program benefits at anytime (although qualification for program benefits depends on meeting program eligibility 
criteria—see Figure 1): 
• Collecting data on characteristics of (potentially eligible) households via household-level interviews (either in 
offices, via home visits, or both); 
• Entering these data into a unified information registry (with varying degrees of verification and consistency 
checks); 
• Comparing data on household characteristics with pre-established eligibility criteria (program specific);and 
• Establishing program-specific beneficiary lists (sub-registries) for the purposes of program implementation and 
payroll. Within this system, there is an important distinction between the unified household information 
registry (or “cadaster”), which includes all interviewed households (which may or may not be eligible for 
program benefits for an array of programs) and the program-specific beneficiary lists (sub-registries), which 
include only households that have been screened and deemed eligible for specific programs.86 
 
 
 
                                                 
86
 Castaneda and Lindert (2005). 
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4.43 Qualified management and staff. Last, but certainly not least, program administration is 
dependent on adequate network of offices with high quality staff and management. Staff will need to be 
trained in implementing safety net programs. For example, it will be important to train staff in targeting 
and eligibility conditions, as well as in the implementation of social care services. This will require 
attention to human resources, to strengthen the professional skills of staff, and potentially to increasing 
their presence at local levels. While Zakat has extensive outreach, Bait-ul-Mal and the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Special Education have only district level offices to administer programs. 
B. Improving social security: Reducing the risk of falling into poverty 
4.44 A social security system allows individuals to avoid poverty by smoothing their consumption 
over their lifetime against idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., health, disability, loss of employment, and 
longevity). While Pakistan mandates social security to the formal sector—both public and private 
sector—extending social security to the broader population is a long-term challenge. It will require 
improved fiscal sustainability and administrative capacity of formal social security schemes, and greater 
formalization of the economy. In the interim, extending coverage to the informal sector might be 
considered through innovative approaches, e.g., piloting community-based health insurance. 
Articulating a long-term vision 
4.45 Despite the longer term implementation, Pakistan could still consider a vision for a long- 
term social security system. This longer term view would better enable the country to guide reform 
efforts in formal social security systems to underpin this system in the future. The first steps would be to 
strengthen mandatory public and private pension schemes, improving their fiscal sustainability, 
administration and record keeping—as already being considered by the government in the case of civil 
service pensions—and potentially consider piloting and evaluating innovative approaches to expand 
coverage to the uncovered sector.  
4.46 Establishing clear benefit targets for old age, disability and survivors’ insurance, as well as 
defining health coverage are critical first steps toward formulating a coherent social protection 
strategy. In order to finance these benefits, financing sources consistent with estimated costs based on 
actuarial calculations would be needed.  
4.47 Several factors make a more fundamental reform package attractive at the present time. 
Rapid economic growth is raising incomes and making it possible for more households to save and insure. 
The international experience suggests that there will be more demand for consumption smoothing through 
public and private institutions. Population aging, albeit gradual at the national level, is more pronounced 
in the urban areas and salaried class. This could translate into greater demand for pensions.  
4.48 Related sectoral developments are also conducive to deeper reforms. Important reforms in the 
financial sector have taken place, especially in the banking sector, providing a solid foundation for a new 
contractual savings sector. The first sign of this is the introduction in 2005 of the new Voluntary Pension 
Scheme (VPS) regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission Pakistan (SECP). Along with 
parallel capital market reforms, the conditions for managing term-savings instruments are improving. 
4.49 Finally, a fundamental or ‘systemic’ reform may soon be under way for pension schemes 
covering public sector workers. Recommendations for a systemic reform – one which would change the 
paradigm for future public sector pensions – have led to a more general reconsideration of issues such as 
funding, public management and parallel systems across pension provision in Pakistan. A Pension 
Reform Working Group was announced in March 2006, and a number of parametric reform measures for 
civil service pensions have been proposed recently in the context of a Pay and Pension Committee, but 
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have not been implemented. There is also a proposal to introduce a defined contribution scheme that 
would eventually lead to a fully funded pension scheme. These developments may open the door to 
fundamental rethinking of pensions and other elements of social security for the first time in several 
decades. 
4.50 Fundamental reform requires identification of risks to be covered, definition of target 
replacement rates, and determination of financing parameters and administrative and 
implementation arrangements. The first step is to define the most important risks faced by households 
against which the system should offer protection–presumably disability, death, old age, loss of earnings 
for various reasons and health. The next step would be to define a target benefit level in each of the core 
areas (for example, a target replacement rate for pensioners). These targets would, in turn, imply certain 
costs based on actuarial projections. An explicit decision would then be needed as to what portion of these 
costs would be pre-funded or passed onto future taxpayers. Finally, the institutional and administrative 
arrangements that work most efficiently in terms of cost and risk pooling would be determined.  
4.51 Transition from the current situation to the new long-term vision may take a generation to 
unfold. The preconditions for introducing a comprehensive social security system will require a 
considerable time to put in place in Pakistan. However, developing this vision will allow a more 
concerted and coordinated review of pension and social security schemes. Taking no action however, 
would simply maintain a system that is either inadequate or unsustainable, or both. In the meantime, 
effective change will require strengthening formal social security schemes (including improvements in the 
fiscal sustainability of private and public schemes, strengthening administration, and reducing 
duplication) and innovating on approaches to expand coverage to the informal sector. We focus here on 
the private and informal sectors, given that civil service reform issues have been extensively covered in a 
recent report (World Bank, 2006). 
Strengthening formal social security systems 
4.52 Expansion of coverage of formal social security systems requires improving their fiscal viability 
of schemes and strengthening program administration.  
4.53 Increasing fiscal sustainability and financial management. To improve the fiscal sustainability 
of civil service schemes will require parametric changes in the system, e.g., changes in the assessment 
base, accrual rates and gradual increases in the retirement age will reduce short term and the present value 
of future spending fiscal costs. Systemic changes in the system—that is, a shift to a defined contribution 
system—will require up-front fiscal outlays, but will eventually lead to a more sustainable civil service 
pension system, reducing the present value of fiscal expenditures on pensions from 71 to 47 percent of 
GDP. Options for improving the fiscal sustainability of EOBI will also need to be considered. As the 
latest independent actuarial report finds that cash flows become negative in less than two decades, it will 
be important to consider options for improving the fiscal solvency of the program, with attention to 
improving its consumption-smoothing aspect. Improvements in the financial management of reserves will 
be required to ensure reasonable returns that can improve the financial sustainability of EOBI. 
Information on the management of other funds also needs to be improved, including strengthening 
independent oversight. Investment policy statements and process will need to be defined and disclosure 
improved.  
4.54 Improving administrative capacity (recordkeeping and oversight). Monitoring systems will 
need to be strengthened to avoid evasion, thus strengthening the financial position of funded schemes. 
Improvements in tracking of individual earning histories in electronic form for the pension department to 
make accurate payments will be needed for parametric reforms in the civil service scheme. For systemic 
reforms such as the introduction of a Defined Contribution (DC) scheme, recordkeeping is much more 
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stringent. In this case, monthly tracking of individual employee accounts to adjust for changes in status 
and remuneration, and monthly reports to workers to facilitate any discrepancy in information and 
reconciliation of accounts. Improving enforcement mechanisms for late payments and reporting will need 
to be instituted. In all schemes, monitoring is weak and will need to be considerably strengthened. 
4.55 Reducing program fragmentation. Administrative costs may be reduced through consolidation 
of certain activities (especially cash transfers) in one institution.87 The idea of consolidating provincial 
schemes with the EOBI is not a new one and has been suggested by Pakistani and international experts. 
An initial step could be the harmonization of practices in a number of areas including reporting 
procedures, accounting standards, independent audits and actuarial evaluations. Also, given the overlap in 
membership and employer registers, some efforts to upgrade and centralize a common database might be 
considered. This may be possible through NADRA, for example. Simplifying the process for registration 
and collection for employers would also encourage participation by reducing their costs. In this regard, 
the current effort to consolidate legislation is a welcome first steep, though processes for external 
oversight will be particularly important. According to officials, an effort is currently being made to 
consolidate legislation in this area. However, while an important first step, the ultimate problem may lie 
in the lack of oversight in the system and mechanisms for enforcing the legislation. Boards are tripartite 
and government controlled boards of monopoly social insurance institutions have shown that there is 
some need for external oversight. In a few countries, the financial sector regulator provides guidelines on 
basic governance issues such as reporting practices. 
Extending coverage to the informal sector 
4.56 There are two general approaches to extend pension and other social security coverage to 
informal sector workers. The first is to specify a table (ranging from simple to complex) of flat 
payments over time to be made by the worker and a flat payment to be made after fulfilling the eligibility 
requirements of age and vesting period. This approach seeks to retain a defined benefit but takes into 
account the fact that there is no regular wage to which a formula (such as the one EOBI) could be applied. 
The second approach is a defined contribution arrangement where accumulated contributions of varying 
amounts and periodicity are accumulated in an individual account toward an eventual withdrawal upon 
reaching old age. This approach allows greater flexibility and can be directly subsidized with a matching 
contribution from the government to increase take up. However, to date, there is only limited international 
experience with these two approaches (Table 4.4). 
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  ADB (2004), in close consultation with the Ministry of Labor, stated that “there should be some 
rationalization of the activities undertaken by social protection institutions …. to reduce duplication, concentrate on 
highest priority areas and to make accountability for outcomes clearer”. 
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Table 4.3: International experience with extending pension coverage to informal sector 
Country Scheme type Other insurance Status
Dominican Republic Subsidized DC life and disability Law passed but not implemented
India (West Bengal) Subsidized DC none Implemented; 650,000 members in 2005
India (Kerala) Mixed DB and DC various Implemented
Indonesia Mixed DB and DC work injury, health, life Law passed but not implemented
Mexico Subsidized DC unclear Law passed but not implemented
Sri Lanka Pseudo DB life and disability Implemented; 650,000 members in 2005
Thailand Undecided unclear Law under consideration
Tunisia Pseudo DB life and disability, others Implemented
Turkey Pseudo DB life and disability Implemented
Vietnam Subsidized DC none Draft law under consideration
 
Source: Palacios (forthcoming). 
Note: “DB” means Defined Benefit; “DC” is Defined Contribution. Source: Palacios (forthcoming). 
4.57 One advantage of the defined contribution approach to old age pensions/social security is 
that the financing and administration of additional insurance products can be facilitated. In 
particular, group contracts for disability and death insurance can be purchased from private firms based 
on individual account information available through the individual accounts pension scheme. Moreover, 
the actuarially fair premia can take into account the underlying balances and can therefore be lower than 
otherwise. Policymakers must however recognize that any subsidy required to achieve significant take up 
among informal sector workers will have to be provided up front. The advantage is that this may add 
fiscal discipline compared to schemes that incur unfunded liabilities that are not initially reflected in the 
fiscal accounts. 
4.58 Health insurance should be considered as a separate, and in many ways, more complex 
issue, and one which currently does not have enabling conditions for introduction in Pakistan. Thus 
far, the discussion has centered on cash benefits such as old age, disability and survivor pensions and 
could be extended to unemployment, sickness, employment injury and other risks. Health insurance, 
above and beyond cash transfers to cover earnings loss in the face of health shocks, involve much more 
complicated implementation issues. Recommendations to extend the existing ESSI programs to self 
employed workers and to pilot HMOs have not been implemented in the last few years due to the 
complexity of the task involved and the constraints in terms of available medical facilities. In fact, the 
debate as to when and under what conditions it is appropriate to introduce mandatory social health 
insurance continues. Many of the conditions that favor this approach are not evident today in Pakistan.88 
4.59 Microfinance institutions and other groups are also beginning to play a role in extending 
insurance to segments of the labor force that fall outside of formal mandates. Neighboring countries 
like India and Bangladesh have seen a significant growth in micro insurance products on offer in the last 
few years, which could be repeated in Pakistan. However, the low penetration of MFIs (outside of 
Bangladesh) and particularly in Pakistan suggests that this strategy would have a long gestation period. 
However, there might be scope for using community-based groups for providing insurance products in 
Pakistan, and this possibility might be explored. As noted in Chapter 3, the new hospitalization insurance 
program offered by Adamjee Insurance through the rural support programs does just this. 
4.60 MFIs and other groups (like the rural support programs) could ‘plug into’ a formal sector 
arrangement such as the defined contribution pension cum insurance model described above. 
                                                 
88
 For example, see the cautions regarding premature introduction of compulsory health insurance and the relevant 
experience in Asia in Gertler (1998). 
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Combined with reforms to the formal sector schemes (described above), this could create a seamless 
system of pension coverage and eventually, other group insurance. It would allow easier movement 
between informal and formal, public and private sector work and reduce administrative costs that would 
tend to be duplicated under parallel schemes. In this regard, the implementation of the recent 
hospitalization insurance program of the rural support program will have to be carefully followed and 
evaluated. 
4.61 Social pensions? As noted in Chapter 3, social pensions are another means of providing 
protection in old age to informal sector workers. The results of the NWFP pilot social pension scheme 
will need to be carefully evaluated prior to expansion. As also noted above, these schemes can have 
extensive fiscal costs (depending on their design) and opportunity costs (in terms of directing cash 
transfers from other poor groups).  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.62 In this chapter we have laid out possible reform options for social protection that address the 
challenges identified in Chapters 2 and 3. This agenda combines recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of existing programs with suggestions about the creation of new programs in 
those areas where the current program mix fails to provide adequate support. The discussion has touched 
upon both general and specific aspects of the proposed reform with the objective of stimulating further 
debate at various levels—from broad reform principles, to costing, to institutional and implementation 
arrangements, to changes in specific programs. It has emphasized that piloting and evaluating programs 
and attention to adequate administrative capacity and fiscal resources are essential for developing viable 
social protection systems. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, we hope that the material presented in the 
chapter and, more generally, in this report serves as an input for the government in preparation of 
strategies and policies. In this sense the report, and particularly this last chapter, is meant to be seen as 
food for thought rather than as a blueprint. Ultimately it is clear that decisions about the direction and 
magnitude of reforms efforts rest with the government and its stakeholders.  
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